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Abstract 
Key Performance Indicator Disclosures by Large UK Private and Public Listed 
Companies 
  
This study aims to investigate the degree of compliance by large UK private and 
public listed companies with the Companies Act 2006 section 417 (6) requirement to 
disclose KPIs in their annual reports. Specifically, the study investigates the extent of 
KPI disclosures by 410 UK companies comprising the largest 205 private limited and 
largest 205 public listed companies. The study also examines whether corporate 
governance mechanisms and company specific characteristics influence the extent of 
KPI disclosures in the annual reports of these companies. The extent of KPI 
disclosures in this study is measured using three indices to quantify KPI disclosures.  
Some hypotheses for the independent variables were developed and tested using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression method to determine whether corporate 
governance and company specific characteristics are associated with the extent of 
KPIs disclosure by private, public listed and the pooled companies. In terms of the 
extent of disclosure, the results suggest that approximately 51% of private companies 
and 90% of public listed companies disclose at least one KPI in their annual reports.  
The OLS regression results indicate that corporate governance mechanisms 
(proportion of non-executive directors, board size and director share ownership) and 
company specific characteristics (company size and profitability) are significantly 
associated with the extent of KPI disclosures by private, public listed and the pooled 
companies.  The frequency of board meetings and multinationality do not 
significantly explain disclosure extent and comprehensiveness. The overall 
conclusion of this research is that private companies do not seem to comply with the 
requirements to disclose KPIs and that corporate governance mechanisms are 
important in ensuring compliance with the requirement to disclose KPIs.  The results 
have important implications for policy makers and accounting regulators such as the 
Accounting Standards Board in general, and in particular the Financial Reporting 
Review Panel (FRRP) which is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that large 
private and public listed companies comply with extant regulatory framework. 
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1 Introduction and Research Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
The importance of key performance indicators (KPIs) dates back to 1903 when 
Henry Ford used them in order to streamline the production process.  This research is 
about the nature and disclosure of key performance indicators (KPIs) in company 
annual reports of United Kingdom (UK) firms.  KPIs are ‘factors by reference to 
which the development, performance or position of the business/entity can be 
effectively measured as determined by the directors. They are quantified 
measurements that reflect the critical success factors of the entity and disclose 
progress towards achieving a particular objective or objectives’ (ASB, 2006a).  The 
Companies Act, 2006 as amended by Statutory Instruments 2005 No. 1011 (SI 
2005/1011) requires the use of financial and non-financial KPIs in the Business 
Review (BR) section of the company’s annual report as explained below. The 
relevant section of SI 2005/1011 was effective for years beginning on or after 1 April 
2005. 
 The Business Review (BR) was introduced in order to provide greater 
disclosure to shareholders.  It is a product of the European Union Accounts 
Modernisation Directive (EU AMD) 2003, which requires companies to produce an 
enhanced directors’ report.  According to the Trucost guide (2005), the operating and 
financial review (OFR) was abolished since the EU AMD now takes precedence and 
is applicable to medium and  large companies registered in Great Britain.  The EU 
AMD allows for a new enhanced BR section in the annual report.  It is under the EU 
AMD that KPIs are required for the analysis of financial and non-financial 
performance, including environmental and employee matters where relevant.   
21 
 
 The Chancellor (then Gordon Brown) announced the abolition of the 
requirements of the OFR on the 28
th
 of November 2005 with the aim of reducing the 
regulatory burden on UK companies.  In the UK, the requirements of the directive 
were first implemented in the form of the Operating and Financial Review (ASB., 
2005) which extended the requirements of the EU AMD (2003).  Directors were thus 
from April 2006 exempt from disclosing information in the annual report according 
to the requirements of the OFR.  In spite of this, the reporting requirements for the 
BR are now contained in the Companies Act 2006 (as amended 234ZZB).  The EU 
AMD regulation requires the BR to include certain items of information that provide 
an understanding of the position, performance and development of the company’s 
business to which the annual report belongs.  Bearing in mind that KPIs are factors 
by reference to which the development, performance or position of the business of 
the company can be measured effectively.  The AMD regulations were set to include 
analysis of KPIs and where appropriate, analysis using other KPIs including 
information relating to employee and environmental matters.  Section 234ZZB of the 
CA 2006 however leaves it to the discretion of the management within the reporting 
firm as to what KPIs are to be reported in the BR section of the annual report.  
Regulation therefore does not stipulate particular KPIs to be reported nor does it 
specify how many KPIs are to be reported. 
The study aims to investigate the nature of KPI disclosures by analysing some 
factors which are thought to have an influence on disclosure patterns within listed 
and private companies.  The research will initially assess the extent of KPI 
disclosures within two categories (large listed and large private UK companies).  The 
study will further investigate the association of disclosure levels with corporate 
governance mechanisms (proportion of non-executive directors, frequency of board 
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meetings, proportion of finance experts on board, percentage of shares 
owned/controlled by directors at annual report date, board size and audit committee 
size) and company specific characteristics (company size, gearing, profitability, 
multinationality, profitability, liquidity, multiple listing and listing status).  Large 
companies were chosen because these are believed to exhibit the best reporting 
practices compared to smaller business entities and hence would be a first-rate 
starting point in research of this nature. 
Another reason for investigating private and public companies is due to their 
perceived differences.  Private companies cannot offer shares and/or debentures to 
the public whereas public companies can offer their shares to the public.  Only public 
companies can apply for listing on a recognised stock exchange.  The differences 
suggest that public listed companies tend to have a larger shareholder base compared 
to private limited entities. As a consequence, disclosure patterns differ due to the 
differences in shareholder base.  While there is prolific research on disclosure 
literature for listed companies (Cooke, 1989a, Ho and Wong, 2001c, Izan, 2006, 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007a, Wall and Martin, 2003, Bingfa et al., 2011, Qi et 
al., 2012), there are hardly any studies on disclosure in respect to private limited 
companies. 
It has been argued in the past that the financial reporting system is incapable 
of explaining the extra value generated by businesses through new relationships, 
internally generated assets and knowledge (Wallman, 1996, Wallman, 1997, Starovic 
and Marr, 2003).  The shift in reliance from traditional financial reporting to 
intellectual capital (IC) reporting within larger companies for valuation purposes 
paralleled with analyst following is another reason why the researcher has selected to 
study KPIs reporting of larger companies.  A previous study supports this argument 
23 
 
through stating that larger companies face greater demand for information from the 
financial press and financial analysts than smaller companies (Schipper, 1991, 
Brennan and Hourigan, 2000, Hassan and Ibrahim, 2012).   
In addition, financial markets in the past have used financial measures such as 
earnings per share (EPS), revenue and profit to measure company success (Beatham 
et al., 2004).  It has however been suggested by Decker et al. (2002) that the 
historical statement of financial position only captures, on average, approximately 
20% of the market value of companies today.  They put forward that 80% of their 
value is made up of intangible assets, non-financial value drivers and the difference 
between the historical cost and market value of the assets recorded.  The disclosure 
of KPIs allows markets to measure company success according to what managers 
perceive as the main drivers of the entity’s achievements.  These include both 
financial and non-financial measures.  Consequently, non-financial measures of 
performance have attracted considerable interest from regulators, practitioners and 
academics (Cerf, 1961, Verecchia, 1983, Watson et al., 2002a, Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2007a, Tauringana and Mangena, 2009). 
Private limited companies, public listed and the pooled (private and public 
listed) set of companies will all be tested using the regression models to be 
formulated.  The models will assess the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
and company specific characteristics on the disclosure of KPIs in annual reports.  It 
may be suggested that the main difference between listed and private companies is 
their ownership structure.  As a result, disclosure patterns would differ due to 
dissimilar stakeholder information needs.  As earlier mentioned there is prolific 
research on disclosure literature for listed companies (Cooke, 1989a, Ho and Wong, 
2001c, Izan, 2006, Mangena and Tauringana, 2007a, Wall and Martin, 2003) and 
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there are hardly any studies on disclosure with respect to private companies such as 
the work of Tauringana (1997).  On the corollary, this research will add to existing 
literature and present evidence.  A sample of cross industry companies would give a 
reflection of general KPI reporting. 
 The investigation of the association of company characteristics with disclosure is 
very important as argued by Buzby (1975) that such an exercise may be used to 
recommend policy.  It is also asserted by Tauringana (1997) that it is important to 
investigate the impact of certain characteristics on disclosures by unlisted companies 
to assist in the regulation of accounting and corporate reporting practices.  Existing 
research has largely focused on public listed companies because they have a larger 
shareholder base as their shares are publicly traded on the stock exchange.  Public 
listed company shareholders are generally regarded as the most important user group 
of the annual report (ASB, 1999).  With 146,762 private limited companies 
(Companies House, 2009) registered in the UK and a mere 3,051 listed (London 
Stock Exchange, 2009) on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), listed companies 
represent a meagre 2.0365% of the total number of companies operating in the UK.  
It is apparent that private companies contribute significantly to the economy. 
The disclosure of KPIs now allows markets to measure company success 
according to what managers perceive as the main drivers of the entity’s achievements 
which include both financial and non-financial measures.  This measure enhances 
what financial markets have used in the past such as EPS, revenue and profit to 
measure company success (Beatham et al., 2004).  Consequently, non-financial 
measures of performance have attracted considerable interest from regulators, 
practitioners and academics (Cerf, 1961, Verecchia, 1983, Watson et al., 2002a, 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007a). 
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The cost of acquiring private company data has limited disclosure research 
within the field.  The study of private company disclosure is however essential 
because of the economic contribution of such companies hence more specific 
legislation may be encouraged to enhance the quality and quantity of disclosure.  
Research reveals that private companies’ annual employment growth over a five year 
period to 2006/7 was 8% compared to 0.4% for FTSE 100 companies, comparative 
annual growth in sales revenue for the same period was 8% and 6% respectively thus 
demonstrating the importance of private company economic contribution (I.E. 
Consulting, 2008). 
The comprehensive and quantitative characteristics of KPIs within private 
companies will provide virtually new knowledge and evidence on the nature of and 
disclosure patterns among UK private companies.  This research also aims to 
highlight characteristic differences between disclosure patterns of listed firms with 
those of large private entities.  Previous research (Nobes, 1984) in other countries 
suggests that large private firms behave differently from the bulk of listed 
companies.  This research will therefore establish whether this trend is prevalent in 
the UK and if so, provide evidence.  The findings of the research will contribute by 
adding to the limited literature (mainly by the accounting profession) on the 
reporting practices regarding KPIs by UK (non-financial) listed and private 
companies. 
Prior to this study, only Singhvi & Desai (1971), Firth (1979) and Tauringana 
(1997) have investigated which characteristics influence disclosures by unlisted 
companies.  This study therefore provides further evidence on private limited 
companies through an investigation of KPI disclosures in their annual reports.  In 
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addition this study will also assess the impact of corporate governance characteristics 
on KPIs disclosure by unlisted companies.  It may arguably be a pioneering study.   
Bearing in mind the important economic contributions by private companies in 
the UK as previously mentioned, numerous studies have been undertaken on the 
association of company specific characteristics and disclosure within UK listed 
companies  (Roberts and Gray, 1988, Gray and Roberts, 1989, Lutfi, 1989, Gray et 
al., 1995, Watson et al., 2002a) and they have facilitated policy formulation.  The 
researcher however argues that such studies have been instrumental in disclosure 
policy formulation but focus on listed company research alone.  It is unjust because 
private companies have not been considered and yet have been proved to be vital to 
the UK economy.  There is also limited published research within the UK 
investigating the association of corporate governance mechanisms with disclosure, 
several global studies have however been considered (Chen and Jaggi, 2000, Ho and 
Wong, 2001c, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Eng and Mak, 2003, Aboagye-Otchere et 
al., 2012, Cormier et al., 2010). 
It can be suggested that recommendations should not be made on the basis of 
partial data (listed company research only) and this research presents additional 
information (unlisted company KPI disclosure findings) to add on to known 
information and ultimately presents a more comprehensive account of the nature of 
KPI disclosure practices across both listed and unlisted industrial firms.  A final and 
major motivation for this study is the fact that existing research investigates the 
extent of disclosure from the ‘demand’ side in the sense that the indices used to 
measure disclosure consist of items information users demand from management and 
find useful in their decision making. However, these items of information may not 
necessarily be the most important in terms of evaluating company performance.  As a 
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consequence, the new requirements of the Companies Act (CA) 2006 (section 417) 
place the onus on the ‘supply side’ by requiring management to disclose information 
they consider to be key performance indicators.  Research on the extent of KPIs is 
therefore required since it is currently unknown whether the factors that have been 
found to affect the extent of disclosure of information demanded by users are the 
same factors that influence the supply of information considered KPIs by 
management. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
In light of the requirements for companies operating in the UK to report on KPIs, 
the main objective of this research is to investigate the extent of KPI disclosures.  
There will also be three other subsidiary objectives which will be investigated.   
These will be achieved by determining the association between disclosures within 
UK listed and private companies with chosen variables.  Such will include company 
specific characteristics (company size, gearing, profitability, liquidity, 
multinationality, listing status and multiple listing) and corporate governance 
mechanisms (proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee size, frequency 
of board meetings, proportion of finance experts, board size and director share 
ownership).  Objectives can be broken down as below: 
 
1. To investigate the extent of KPI disclosures by large private limited and public 
listed companies operating in the UK. 
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2. To investigate the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and company 
specific characteristics
1
 on annual report KPI disclosures by private limited 
companies. 
 
3. To investigate the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and company 
characteristics on the disclosure of KPIs in the annual reports of public listed 
companies. 
 
4. To examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and company 
specific characteristics on the disclosure of KPIs in the annual reports of the 
pooled
2
 set of companies. 
 
1.3 Summary of Research Methodology 
The research objectives are investigated through a positivist approach.  Ryan et 
al. (2002) suggest that the positivist approach relies on even regularities in closed or 
close-able systems through isolation and control of variables.  Quantitative analysis 
is therefore applied in this study to assess the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables.  According to Gibson (2004), numerous studies in business 
and industry embrace a positivistic paradigm which makes an attempt to reduce the 
study of a phenomenon to something that can be measured by focusing on large scale 
empirical hypothesis testing and deductive reasoning.  The following sections 1.3.1 
and 1.3.2 summarise the data and methods used for the study respectively. 
                                                          
1
 Excluding listing status and multiple listing because these companies do not trade their stocks on 
recognised stock exchanges. 
2
 This is the combined list of data from both private and public listed companies. 
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1.3.1 Data 
The cross section for the empirical analysis is a sample of the 205 largest 
non-financial UK listed companies’ annual reports for the year 2008.  In addition to 
this is a sample of annual reports from the 205 largest private (UK) companies, these 
were acquired from the Companies House.  Non-financial companies were chosen 
because financial entities have a different set of governing principles so far as 
disclosures are concerned.  The other requirement for the public companies in the 
sample was that they had to be stock exchange listed.  All companies had to have 
been consistently constituent in the FTSE 350 and the Sunday Times Top Track 100 
& 250. 
 
1.3.2 Method 
The first stage of the research was to measure the extent of disclosures as in 
previous studies (Deloitte, 2006b, Black Sun Plc, 2006, Deloitte, 2006a, Accounting 
Standards Board, 2007, Beattie and Thomson, 2007, Tauringana and Mangena, 
2006a, Kanto and Schadewitz, 2000) by scoring KPI disclosure levels against an 
index.  The selected index for each company was the difference between the 
summation of all the reported KPIs and the summation of irrelevant KPIs 
(Tauringana and Mangena, 2009).  A similar scoring process was repeated for private 
companies.  This method ensures that the level of disclosure is only calculated based 
on the attributes that are relevant to the entity in question.  The disclosure level is 
therefore measured as the amount of disclosures made as a percentage of the 
maximum possible relevant disclosures. 
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The study measures the disclosure of KPIs using three methods.  These KPI 
measures constitute the dependent variable of the study.  The disclosure index will be 
constructed on the assumption that annual reports are useful to many users.  As a 
result, the items included in the disclosure index will be wide ranging and not 
confined to a specific user group as tried and tested in previous research (Tauringana, 
1997, Cooke, 1989a, Wallace, 1987, Cooke, 1991, Kyeyune, 2010, Dardor, 2009).  
Upon reviewing previous studies (for example Cooke, 1989a, Cooke, 1991, Wallace, 
1987, Tauringana, 1997, Wallace et al., 1994a, Kaya, 2012, Joseph and Taplin, 
2011), it was decided not to attach weights to the items of disclosure, but to take into 
account their usefulness to different user groups because there usually is no 
difference between weighted and unweighted disclosure indexes (Spero, 1979, 
Mangena and Pike, 2004). The first (KPISCORE) was a measure of total number of 
KPIs disclosed as a proportion of the relevant index.  The second measure was the 
word count (WCOUNT) methodology such as that use by Li et al. (2008b).  This 
method measured the number of words used to measure KPIs as a percentage of the 
total number of words in the annual report.  The third measure assessed the 
comprehensiveness of the disclosures made (COMP).  This method was an aggregate 
of four sub measures which were presence of a KPI, relevant amount, reason for 
change and provision of forward looking information (see for example Kyeyune, 
2010). 
Financial statement variables that have been found in previous studies to be 
influential to the extent of financial reporting disclosures were considered.  They 
include proportion of non-executive directors (PNED) (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 
2005), audit committee size (AUDSIZE) (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005, Li et al., 
2008b), frequency of board meetings (BOARDM) (e.g. Laksmana, 2008a), 
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proportion of financial experts (FINEXP) (e.g. Akhigbe and Martin, 2006), board 
size (BDSIZE) (e.g. Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012), director share ownership 
(DSHARE) (e.g. Tauringana and Mangena, 2006a), company size (SIZE) (e.g. 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008), gearing (GEAR) (e.g. Zarzeski, 1996), profitability 
(PROF) (Wallace and Naser, 1995), liquidity (LQDT) (Watson et al., 2002a), 
multinationality (MULTIN) (Robb et al., 2001), listing status (LSTAT) (Aboagye-
Otchere et al., 2012) and multiple listing (MLIST) (Mangena and Pike, 2005, Elzahar 
and Hussainey, 2012). 
The study made use of multiple regressions to examine the relationship 
between the corporate governance mechanisms and company specific characteristics 
listed above.  The following models were tested: 
 
1. OLS regression was used to assess the influence of the independent variables on 
the extent of KPI disclosures by private companies using three models. 
 
KPISCORE/WCOUNT/COMP = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BDMEET + 
4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 
LQDT + 11 MULTIN + j 
 
2. OLS regression to assess the influence of the independent variables on the 
extent of KPI disclosures by public listed companies using three models. 
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KPISCORE/WCOUNT/COMP = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM 
+ 4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 
10 LQDT + 11 MULTIN + 12 MLIST + j 
 
3. OLS regression to assess the influence of the independent variables on the 
extent of KPI disclosures by the pooled set of companies using three models.  
Only the private limited disclosing companies were considered in the pooled 
companies’ model and a matching random sample of public companies was 
used. 
 
KPISCORE/WCOUNT/COMP = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM 
+ 4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 
10 LQDT + 11 MULTIN + 12 MLIST + 13 LSTAT + j 
 
1.4 Findings of the Research 
The results of this study in respect of the first objective reveal that there are 
significant differences in the level of KPI disclosures between private and public 
listed companies.  It was found that approximately half of the large private 
companies disclose KPIs in their annual reports while approximately nine in ten 
public listed companies disclose KPIs in their annual reports.  Approximately seven 
in every ten of the total large companies that were investigated disclosed at least a 
KPI in their annual reports.  Previous studies over the years have indicated that the 
level of KPI disclosures has gradually increased with time as companies attempt to 
adapt to the KPIs reporting regulations under CA 2006.  Tauringana and Mangena 
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(2009) for example, found that the level of disclosure in the media industry was 
approximately 56% prior to 2006 and approximately 75% post 2006. 
This research found that three variables, the proportion of non-executive 
directors (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), company size (Barako et al., 2006b, Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2008, Alsaeed, 2006, Brüggen et al., 2009) and profitability 
(Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2012b, Ahmad et al., 2003), significantly explain the 
disclosure of KPI disclosures across all the three models tested which were the extent 
of KPI disclosures measured by an index, the amount of words used to describe KPIs 
and the comprehensiveness of the KPIs disclosed by large private limited companies.  
It was found that the size of the audit committee did not explain the extent of KPI 
disclosures by private limited companies as measured by KPI score, word count and 
comprehensiveness.  Other studies find contrary results for example Bukh et al. 
(2005) did not find company size to explain the extent of disclosures, they suggest 
that the finding might have been influenced by the limited number of observations. 
34 
 
Table 1: Summary of Results
3
 
Variable KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
Private Limited Companies 
PNED Yes** Yes*** Yes* 
AUDSIZE No No No 
BOARDM Yes*** Yes* No 
FINEXP Yes** No No 
BDSIZE Yes** Yes*** No 
DSHARE No Yes*** Yes** 
COSIZE Yes*** Yes** Yes* 
GEAR Yes** Yes** No 
PROF Yes** Yes*** Yes** 
LQDT No No Yes** 
MULTIN No No Yes* 
Public Listed Companies 
PNED Yes** No Yes** 
AUDSIZE No No No 
BOARDM Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
FINEXP No No No 
BDSIZE No No No 
DSHARE Yes*** Yes* Yes** 
COSIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes* 
GEAR Yes*** Yes** Yes*** 
PROF Yes*** Yes* Yes*** 
LQDT Yes*** Yes** Yes*** 
MULTIN No No No 
MLIST No No Yes* 
Pooled Companies 
PNED Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
AUDSIZE Yes*** Yes** No 
BOARDM No No No 
FINEXP Yes** No Yes** 
BDSIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
DSHARE Yes** Yes*** Yes*** 
COSIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
GEAR No Yes** Yes** 
PROF Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
LQDT Yes* No Yes*** 
MULTIN No No No 
LSTAT No Yes* No 
MLIST No Yes** Yes*** 
***. Significant at the 0.01 level, **.  Significant at the 0.05 level 
                                                          
3
 The results summarised in the Table 1 above, refer to the reduced samples.  OLS for the reduced 
samples was conducted on only those companies that disclosed KPIs in their annual reports.  A set of 
regression results for non KPI disclosing companies are attached in Appendix 3.  Table 6 and 7 in the 
Data and Research Methodology chapter provide definitions for the variables in the summary of the 
results table above. 
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*.  Significant at the 0.1 level 
In respect of the third objective (public listed companies), it was found that 
KPIs disclosure extent measured by an index, amount of words used in describing 
KPIs and the comprehensiveness of KPIs can be explained by six variables as 
opposed to just three for private companies.  The findings in this study are in line 
with other studies that also found board meetings held in the year (e.g. Vafeas, 
1999), proportion of shares owned by the directors (e.g. Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006, Ruland et al., 1990), company size (e.g. Barako et al., 2006b, 
Branco and Rodrigues, 2008, Alsaeed, 2006, Brüggen et al., 2009), the level of 
gearing (e.g. Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2012b, Cormier and Magnan, 1999, Aerts 
and Cormier, 2009, Ahmad et al., 2003), profitability (e.g. Andrikopoulos and 
Kriklani, 2012b) and liquidity (e.g. Barako et al., 2006b, Cooke, 1989a, Belkaoui-
Riahi and Kahl, 1978) to significantly influence the extent of disclosures.  Other 
studies such as Laksmana (2008b) found contrary results, for example no association 
between frequency of board meetings and disclosure yet Conger et al. (1998a) point 
out that increased meeting frequency could lead to increased effectiveness.  Barako 
(2006b) found no relationship between disclosures and liquidity and Wallace (1994a) 
found a negative relationship.  The results reveal that audit committee size, 
proportion of financial experts, board size and multinationality do not explain the 
extent of KPI disclosures in all three models. 
The fourth objective relates to the pooled set of companies.  The results 
indicate that the proportion of non-executive directors (Chen and Jaggi, 2000), the 
size of the board (Yermack, 1996), director share ownership (Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006, Ruland et al., 1990), company size (Barako et al., 2006b, Branco 
and Rodrigues, 2008, Alsaeed, 2006, Brüggen et al., 2009) and profitability 
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(Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2012b, Ahmad et al., 2003) are significantly related to 
the extent of KPI disclosures through all three models tested.  The frequency of 
board meetings and multinationality did not explain the extent of KPI disclosures.  In 
the case of the proportion of non-executive directors, Chen and Jaggi (2000) found a 
positive relationship which is in line with the findings in this study for word count, 
however a negative relationship was found with the comprehensiveness of 
disclosures made.  Cheng and Courtenay (2006), contrary to the findings in this 
study, find that board size is not significantly related to disclosure extent. 
 
1.5 Importance and Potential Contribution of the Research 
The study is important because it provides further insight into the nature of 
KPIs that are reported by large listed and private limited firms.  The findings of this 
research will provide investors among other stakeholders with an additional platform 
from which to make investment decisions particularly those to do with buying, 
holding or selling stocks.  The study also highlights the importance of KPI 
information to various stakeholders by bringing to light the fact that KPI information 
shows what makes the business tick from the perspective of management.   
The research goes on to present updated disclosure levels and patterns.  From 
this information, it is therefore easy to assess whether the regulations for companies 
to report on KPIs are meeting their objectives.  An assessment on the impact of 
regulation leads to policy recommendation.  In the case of this study, it appears that 
public listed companies are highly adhering to the regulation to report KPIs but 
private limited companies perhaps need to be closely monitored to ensure effective 
KPIs reporting by these business entities especially given that the majority of the 
companies operating in the UK are private limited entities.  The results of this 
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research show variations from previous research due to the dynamic nature of the 
business environment. 
These findings may be useful to policy makers such as the FRRP by 
providing them with current information on the nature and state of KPI reporting 
within the UK.  Policy makers may set out optimal disclosure frameworks and 
identify inconsistencies between the nature of KPI reporting by listed and private 
companies through investigations of this nature.  Evidence of these findings will be 
instrumental in setting optimum disclosure frameworks.  Consequently additional 
knowledge presented by such a study may aid in avoiding overregulation in the 
future due to a more comprehensible understanding of KPIs. 
The results of this research may also assist policy makers in deciding whether 
there is need for additional rules to ensure compliance of reported KPIs.  It has also 
been suggested in recent research on the influence of the business review (BR) on 
KPIs in the UK media sector that KPI disclosure studies benefit policy makers by 
revealing the characteristics of those firms likely/less likely to report KPIs 
(Tauringana and Mangena, 2009).  By analysing factors that influence the level of 
disclosures, policy makers can therefore target companies that exhibit certain 
characteristics in terms of monitoring and perhaps tightening of regulatory 
requirements as opposed to formulating umbrella policies. 
To the academic audience, this research makes some methodological 
contributions.  The study makes use of three different measures for determining KPI 
disclosures extent.  The study makes use of a standard disclosure index (Bukh et al., 
2005, Clarkson et al., 2008, Ntim et al., 2011, Nurunnabi et al., 2011, Nurunnabi and 
Hossain, 2012) and word count (Li et al., 2008b) method as in previous studies.  The 
study contributes in disclosure research by devising a measure for 
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comprehensiveness.  This can be applied to different studies within this branch of 
research.  Comprehensiveness is a proxy for measuring the quality of disclosures.  It 
can therefore be seen that this study is useful to a wide audience including 
academics, practitioners and shareholders among various stakeholders.  The section 
below provides an outline of the remainder of the thesis. 
 
1.6 Outline of the Research 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews financial 
reporting practices with particular emphasis on annual report disclosures.  The 
empirical literature review conducted discusses studies that have investigated 
corporate governance mechanisms and company specific characteristics mainly 
focusing on those variable that were later tested as part of this study.  The chapter 
also discusses some of the possible reasons to conflicting results in previous studies 
and limitations to disclosure studies which were taken into consideration for the 
purpose of this study. 
In Chapter 3, the focus turns to annual report users and their information 
needs.  This chapter examines several issues which include the aims of financial 
reporting and what the information needs of different users are.  The chapter also 
investigates KPI information which is a requirement under the prevailing statute.  
The qualitative characteristics of useful financial information are also discussed.  
Chapter 4 synthesises evolutionary accounting theories.  The chapter is split into two 
main sections which are capital market based theories.  Under this section topics 
such as the signalling theory and the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) are covered.  
Stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and the agency theory are some of the theories 
that are discussed under the non-capital market based theories. 
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Chapter 5 discusses the hypotheses development in order to ensure a focus 
for the investigation.  The hypotheses formulated were tested against the extent of 
KPI disclosures in the annual reports of large UK companies.  The thirteen 
hypotheses are developed from the attributes discussed in the literature review 
chapter.  The rationales for the hypotheses formulated were derived from the 
previous literature discussed in Chapter 2 and theories that were discussed in Chapter 
4.  Chapter 6 of the study turns to the sample and methods used in the research.  The 
chapter initially discusses the sample selection and how the annual reports were 
scored.  The choice of statistical tests and explanations of how the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and company specific characteristics is 
tested are illustrated through selected models.  The chapter explains the validity and 
reliability considerations applied and closes with a summary and conclusion. 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 present the results for the tests to the hypotheses that 
were formulated in Chapter 5.  These chapters cover the results for private limited 
companies, public listed companies and the pooled set of companies respectively.  
The tests carried out are in line with the multiple regression models for the extent of 
KPI disclosures.  The chapters cover results on the extent of KPI disclosures in 
annual reports, correlations, regressions and diagnostic checks among other things.  
Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the thesis.  The aspects considered in this last 
chapter include a summary of the research; its contributions, implications, limitations 
and opportunities for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
41 
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 Disclosure studies have dated back since the 1960s (Cerf, 1961).  Since then, 
there have been numerous researchers who have assessed the influence of company 
specific characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms and market related variables 
on financial reporting disclosures in the UK and across the world.  Although this 
research focuses on the disclosure of KPIs, it is important to analyse previous research 
in disclosure studies for the purpose of clarifying the state of disclosure literature to 
date.  This part of the research will analyse the findings, particularly the variables 
identified in prior research to be the influencing tools of the extent disclosures. 
This chapter summarises previous research, particularly the variable factors 
thought to influence information disclosure in various financial reporting media with 
emphasis being placed on annual reports.  The analysis is meticulous and looks at 
previous works from past but by no means all of it.  The next section 2.2, of this 
chapter discusses Previous Research and breaks down company specific 
characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms and market related variables.  This 
is followed by section 2.3 which summarises previous research.  The Limitations in 
Disclosure studies are outlined in section 2.4 followed by section 2.5 on the 
Conflicting Results and Possible Explanations.  The chapter closes with a Summary 
and Conclusion in section 2.6.   
 
2.2 Previous Research 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
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 It is believed that poor corporate governance has become the “Achilles’ heel” of 
many corporations (Okike, 2007).  The increase in importance of corporate 
governance in the 1990’s and early 2000’s led other researchers to investigate 
whether ownership and corporate governance characteristics influence the extent of 
disclosure.  Several studies have investigated the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the extent of information disclosure (for example Eng and Mak, 
2003, Ho and Wong, 2001c, Samaha et al., 2012a, Cheng and Courtenay, 2004, Ezat 
and El-Masry, 2008).  Through an analysis of literature, it may be found which and 
how different governance arrangements influence the level of disclosures. Under 
corporate governance mechanisms the variables which will be investigated include 
the proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee size, frequency of board 
meetings, proportion of financial experts, board size and director share ownership.  
One of the advantages of investigating these variables is due to their impact in 
assisting in the control of agency problems.   
 
2.2.1.1 Proportion of Non-executive Directors 
The proportion of non-executive directors is measured as a percentage of the 
total number of members on the board of directors.  In a study (Chen and Jaggi, 
2000) of 158 Singapore listed firms, it was found that there was a positive 
relationship between the extent of mandatory disclosures and the proportion of 
independent directors.  Chen and Jaggi (2000) however suggested that non-executive 
directors are less inclined to significantly influencing firms to disclose more 
information particularly to outside investors as they are less aligned with the 
management operations in the case of family owned firms.  Another study (Eng and 
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Mak, 2003) based on the studies of Chen and Jaggi (2000) hypothesised a positive 
relationship. 
As opposed to the above, Barako et al. (2006a) conducted a study in Kenya in 
which they investigated 54 companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE).  
The results indicated a significant negative association between non-executive 
directors and the extent of voluntary disclosure.  An identified limitation of the study 
is however encapsulated in the operational definition of an independent non-
executive director; non-executive directors generally may not be independent. 
 The major role of boards is in their control functions (Pound, 1995).  They are 
perceived as a monitoring tool to management behaviour and this is perceived as 
causation for increased disclosures of corporate information (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 
1990).  A larger proportion of independent directors on the board leads to more 
effective monitoring of managerial opportunism hence firms may be expected to 
make a higher proportion of information disclosures (Leftwich et al., 1981, Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  In this context the increased disclosures are not necessarily a result of 
reporting on the management and their activities (which may not be desirable) but 
those of increased exposure of the business and its activities in general to the 
shareholders.   The additional information may range among several disclosure 
categories such as social and environmental, segmental and voluntary disclosures 
among many.  The quality of disclosures is thought to be enhanced by a higher 
proportion of independent directors and also reduces the benefits of withholding 
information (Forker, 1992).  It may also be argued that where there are a higher 
number of non-executive directors, they are likely to bring to the company’s 
reporting structure, good practices that they have gained from working in other 
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organisations and this is normally aligned with transparency and the reduction of 
information asymmetry. 
Even though there are several studies reporting a positive association between 
the level of information disclosures and the proportion of non-executive directors 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Cheng and Courtenay, 2006).  Some report that 
companies with a large proportion of non-executive directors possibly brings conflict 
and in turn reducing the level of disclosure (Chaganti, 1985), others simply did not 
find a relationship between disclosure extent and the quantity of non-executive 
directors (Ho and Wong, 2001c).  It is likely that firms with a fair proportion of non-
executive directors may be viewed in positive light by shareholders in terms of 
independence and accountability. 
 Tauringana and Mangena (2009) in their research on the extent of KPIs reporting 
by 32 companies in the UK Media sector found the proportion of non-executive 
directors to be significantly negatively associated with the level of disclosure (at a 
5% level or better).  The regression results were contrary to the predicted direction of 
association and hence difficult to explain as it was thought that non-executive 
directors would/are expected to protect the shareholders’ interests.  There is however 
a possibility that the “results derive from the measure used which does not 
differentiate between independent and non-executive directors.  If the company has a 
higher proportion of non-independent non-executive directors, the non-executive 
directors may be influenced by managers and therefore may not compel or encourage 
KPI reporting in the annual reports” (Tauringana and Mangena, 2009). 
Previous studies confirming the influence of non-executive directors on the 
disclosure of information verify their importance as a governance mechanism that 
assists in alleviating the agency problem.  The importance of non-executive directors 
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has also been demonstrated in other settings such as positive share price reactions to 
specific critical events when the firm’s board is dominated by non-executive 
directors. Examples of these events include management buyout announcements 
(Lee et al., 1992) and tender offer bids (Byrd and Hickman, 1992, Cotter et al., 
1997). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) for example found that corporate governance 
variables (chairpersons who are non-executive directors and domination of family 
members on boards) were significantly associated with voluntary disclosure at a 5% 
level of significance in their study on Malaysian companies.  As with board members 
who are non-executive directors, their study may have contributed in explaining that 
non-executive directors may be viewed as advocates of transparency.  A higher 
number of non-executive directors may lead to greater influence and greater 
disclosures.  Due to the results that diverge in this area, more research about the 
variable may be necessary to be undertaken. 
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2.2.1.2 Frequency of Board meetings 
 There is very little research on the relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and the level of disclosure.  Some of the identified studies relating to board 
meeting frequency related only to its association with company performance (Evans 
and Weir, 1995, Frey, 1993), discretionary current accruals (Xie et al., 2001), yield 
spreads (Anderson et al., 2004), board member compensation (Indrarini, 2007), 
quantity of disclosure (Kent and Stewart, 2008, Tauringana et al., 2008) and 
timeliness of annual reports (Tauringana et al., 2008).  An investigation into previous 
studies provides an insight into the nature of meeting frequency as an independent 
variable. 
Policy is implemented by senior management, if there are regular meetings 
between them  and directors of the company, this should reduce the scope for 
discretionary behaviour  and therefore lead to superior performance in comparison to 
those firms who exercise fewer meetings between the board and senior management 
(Evans and Weir, 1995).  Information asymmetry is one of the major causes of the 
agency problem simply because agents are likely to have accurate, detailed and 
specific information which the principal is less likely to have.  Monitoring can be 
perceived as a disciplinary device for managers and may bear negative connotations 
which will lead to reduced effort from managers.  Monitoring may therefore be 
viewed as an indication of distrust (Frey, 1993).  Even though studies present 
evidence of a relationship between the frequency of board meetings and the extent of 
information disclosure, it may be necessary to strike a balance between too little and 
too many board meetings in order to reduce agency costs.  The researcher does 
however appreciate that regular meetings allow for potential and existing problems to 
be identified, rectified or avoided and in turn leading to superior performance. 
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In a study of the timeliness of annual reports of Kenyan corporations; it was 
suggested that the frequency of board meetings would negatively be associated with 
timeliness (Tauringana et al., 2008), where timeliness here refers to the publication 
of the annual report in good time, with the legal restricts.  As afore-mentioned, the 
rationale to their finding was that meeting frequency allows for the identification and 
addressing of problems as they arise and thus a quicker release of the annual report.  
It may however be argued that other conditions may have led to this finding because 
where a board meets more frequently, it entails that more issues will be identified 
and therefore may result in more time being taken to straighten out the identified 
issues.  Further research on this variable is certainly needed to clarify the status quo.  
The frequency of board meetings was also found to be positively associated with 
firm performance.  In another study, firms which were subject to prior poor 
performance were found to have improved following years of abnormal activity in 
terms of the frequency of board meetings held in the relevant periods (Vafeas, 2000). 
 Kent and Stewart (2004) found that the quantity of disclosure was positively 
associated with the frequency of board meetings.  The suggestion from several 
previous studies points out that boards with regular meetings are more likely perform 
their duties in a more diligent fashion than those that do not meet as regularly (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992, Conger et al., 1998a, Vafeas, 1999, Kent and Stewart, 2008).  
Further research needs to be conducted in this area judging by previous results and 
limited research particularly in the UK. 
 
2.2.1.3 Proportion of Finance Experts on Board 
 There is relatively little research that has been devoted to analysing the 
relationship between the proportion of finance experts on the board of directors and 
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the extent of information disclosure in annual reports.  Prior studies for example 
found that capital markets react positively to the appointment of non-executive 
directors with financial expertise particularly to the audit committees (DeFond et al., 
2005). This suggests that finance expertise on the audit committee is perceived by 
the market as enhancing the quality of financial reporting.   
 Some research revealed that the audit committee finance expertise can positively 
explain the extent of information disclosure (Mangena and Pike, 2005).  The finding 
may suggest that financial experts are effective in alleviating the problem of 
information asymmetry where finance experts provide more detail in the financial 
reporting of business entities to stakeholders.  Abbott et al. (2000) however found a 
negative relationship between finance experts and the level of disclosures.  Gray 
directors with accounting expertise may be thought of as ones to produce less 
transparent disclosures in company annual reports on comparison. 
This requirement by the NYSE and LSE for example implies that financial 
experts are likely to address the relevant and appropriate questions to the 
management and identify mishaps concerning the firm’s financial reporting.  Several 
researchers (Abbott et al., 2004, Bédard et al., 2004, Davidson et al., 2004, DeFond 
et al., 2005, Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007, Chan and Li, 2008) have backed this 
notion.  It may further be suggested that the board of directors are also very 
instrumental in the construction of the financial report hence it is important to have 
finance experts on that board.  Finance experts on the board of directors may be 
perceived as backers of disclosure transparency.  
It has been suggested by other academics that insiders who possess financial 
expertise are related to lower disclosure transparency. Felo (2009) for example 
suggests that directors with accounting expertise are related to lower annual report 
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transparency. These results generally indicate that regulators and other stakeholders 
may want to focus on board composition (independence and expertise) in addition to 
audit committee composition when considering ways to enhance disclosure 
transparency.  Due to the scarcity of research in this area, further research is 
important in order to establish the impact of financial experts on the level of annual 
report disclosures. 
 
2.2.1.4 Director Share Ownership 
The diffusion of equity and the type of its owners have in the past been used 
to explain the extent of financial reporting disclosures.  A diffuse ownership is 
thought to help owners to monitor the behaviour of management as predicted by the 
agency theory (Leftwich et al., 1981, Craswell and Taylor, 1992, McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe, 1993, Hossain et al., 1994b, Raffournier, 1995) hence there will be 
greater disclosure within such companies.  According to the agency theory it was 
suggested that there is a separation of ownership and control and conflicts likely to 
arise as a result of the conflicting interests of these two parties (see for example 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Watts, 1977).  Where share ownership is widely held, 
then the potential for conflicts between the principal and agent is bound to be greater 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983).  The disclosure of information is likely to be greater in 
widely held firms because in such situations, the principals will monitor their 
interests in order to ensure that they are optimised and the agents signal this 
information. 
Hossain et al., (1994b) in their study found that ownership structure is 
significantly associated with the disclosure of information.  Chau and Gray (2002b) 
investigated disclosures by companies in Hong Kong and Singapore.  The Hong 
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Kong Stock Exchange for example requires disclosure of information relating to the 
number of shares owned by the directors.  In the study the ownership variable was 
calculated by summation of the shares owned by directors and dominant share 
holders.  The coefficients for ownership structure in both Hong Kong and Singapore 
were found to be positive and significantly influential to information disclosures in 
both countries for all the information disclosure groups investigated. 
In their study, Ruland et al., (1990) measured ownership structure by the 
proportion of voting stock owned by officers and directors.  They then went on to use 
probit analysis and investigated the probability of whether management making an 
earnings forecast is explained by analysts’ forecast error, absolute analysts’ error, 
firm making a debt or equity offering and ownership structure.  Their results showed 
that firms are less likely to provide management forecasts of earnings as inside 
ownership increased.  This supports the agency theory suggested by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) of a corresponding decrease in disclosures when inside ownership 
increases.  Information demand is likely to decline if less people are in control of the 
company particularly if those individuals are from the supply side of that 
information.    Shareholdings by non-executive directors  were posited to be 
associated with higher monitoring incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Jensen, 
1993). 
Management shareholding has in the past been proven to be positively 
associated with the amount of information disclosed particularly that to do with 
earnings (Warfield et al., 1995) where managerial ownership refers to the percentage 
of ordinary shares held by senior managers including directors.  It is suggested that 
the extent of managers' shareholdings can reduce agency costs as it serves to align 
the interests of management with those of other shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976).  The agency theory hence predicts that there is a positive association between 
management interests and the level of voluntary disclosure.  There is considerably 
little research that has investigated the impact of director share ownership on 
disclosures in annual reports and there is need for clarification in this area. 
 
2.2.1.5 Board size 
Board size refers to the amount of individuals that are on the board of 
directors regardless of their roles.  There are studies that have analysed the effect on 
financial reporting relative to the size of the board.  A negative relationship between 
board size and disclosure was observed in a Canadian study by Cornier et al., (2009).  
In their findings they stated the reason for the relationship was primarily due to the 
state of the Canadian legal system.  The legal protection of investors is higher than 
most parts of the world by comparison.  Cornier (2009)  suggests that whenever there 
are disclosures by any company within the annual report, the information is always 
perceived as credible.  For this reason stakeholders expect to observe a reduction in 
the agency costs of a declining information asymmetry.  They also stated that a 
reduction on stock market asymmetry is also expected to be a result of increased 
corporate governance disclosures. 
It was suggested that board monitoring increase inversely with the size of the 
board (John and Senbet, 1998).  They however pointed out that this benefit is likely 
to be countered by the incremental cost of poorer communication and decision 
making efficiencies associated with large groups (see Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, 
Jensen, 1993).  Cheng and Courtenay (2006) investigated companies that are listed 
on the Singapore Exchange Limited (SGX) from the year 2000.  They found that 
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there was no relationship between the size of boards and the disclosure scores they 
measured. 
It is difficult to ascertain the general direction of the relationship between 
board size and the extent of disclosures in financial reporting.  There are several 
studies which have investigated the area and the results have been mixed for example 
some found a positive relationship between board size and firm performance (Chiang 
and Lin, 2007, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), and some a  positive relationship between 
board size and board monitoring (Anderson et al., 2004, Williams et al., 2005).  
Other studies established that the size of the board will have an influence on the their 
ability to monitor and control managers (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Jensen, 1993).    
Although this being the case other studies have observed contrary findings to this 
notion  and suggest that smaller boards are more efficient at performing their duties 
for example it is easier for a smaller group to reach an agreement on a matter of 
concern (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Jensen, 1993, Beasley, 1996). 
 
2.2.1.6 Audit Committee Size 
 Audit committees may be viewed as proponents of transparency in disclosures 
by companies.  It may be suggested that audit committees do not only assess the 
accuracy of disclosures but may also have an influence on clarity in the information 
that is disseminated by the board of directors.  Li et al., (2008a), investigated a 
sample of one hundred public listed companies and in their analysis found that audit 
committee size was significantly associated with intellectual capital disclosures. 
 The Cadbury Report (1992) upholds that audit committees oversee the work 
of the board of directors as well as the management particularly on matters regarding 
corporate governance.  Their other main role is also that of ensuring financial 
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reporting is true and fair.  Some authors have gone on to explain their roles as 
monitors of both internal and external auditors of the organisation in the bid to 
protect the stakeholders of the firm (DeZoort, 1997, Ho and Wong, 2001c).  The 
rationale is that due to all these monitoring processes, the stakeholders of the entity 
benefit from a reduction in information asymmetry through increased monitoring and 
disclosures when there is a larger audit committee.  This line of thought is supported 
by previous work which posits that an audit committee’s presence does not only 
result in increased disclosures to the stakeholders but also improves the quality of the 
disclosures made (Forker, 1992).  Forker’s (1992)  and Ho & Wong’s (2001b) results 
in a Hong Kong study however demonstrated a weak association with the quality of 
disclosures made. 
 
2.2.2 Company Specific Characteristics 
 There are a number of studies that have examined the extent and determinants of 
disclosures over the years (e.g. Copeland and Fredericks, 1968, Belkaoui and Kahl, 
1978, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Bradbury, 1991, Chen and Jaggi, 2000, Barako 
et al., 2006a, Tauringana et al., 2008).  Earlier studies mainly investigated the extent 
of disclosures and whether those disclosures were influenced by company 
characteristics such as company size, profitability, gearing and industry type among 
other possibilities.   
Previous disclosure studies which investigated the influence of company 
characteristics, tended to vary in the nature of disclosures being investigated.  Some 
studies have investigated the impact of selected company characteristics on 
mandatory disclosure (Wallace, 1987, Wallace et al., 1994a, Wallace and Naser, 
1995), some on mandatory & voluntary disclosure (Wallace, 1987, Cooke, 1989a), 
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and some studies were limited to voluntary disclosure alone (Firth, 1979, Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987, Hossain et al., 1995, Tauringana, 1997); others on the extent of 
segment reporting to firm-specific characteristics, according to a positive accounting 
approach (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  In 
general, there is prolific research on disclosures but there is little UK based research 
particularly that to do with private limited companies.  Disclosure studies in large 
tend to entrust their theoretical frameworks in the agency theory and signalling 
theories.  The company specific characteristics that have been selected for 
investigation as part of this thesis include company size, gearing, profitability, 
liquidity, multinationality, listing status and multiple listing. 
 
2.2.2.1  Company Size 
Company size was the first (e.g. Cerf, 1961, Singhvi and Desai, 1971b, 
Buzby, 1975) variable found to be significantly associated with disclosure and since 
then, several other mandatory and voluntary disclosure studies (Buzby, 1975, 
Cooke, 1989a, Wallace et al., 1994a, Tauringana, 1997, Depoers, 2000, Wong-
Boren and Chow, 1987, Meek et al., 1995a, Alvarez, 2011, Domínguez, 2012, 
Suttipun and Stanton, 2012) have also examined company size.  The majority have 
found the variable to be significantly and positively associated with disclosure levels 
but some did not find this relationship (Ng, 1985, Davey, 1982, Roberts, 1992). 
It will become clear through this literature review that the most popular research 
on disclosure investigated the influence of company size largely owing to the fact that it 
was a pioneering area within disclosure studies as mentioned above.  Size has been 
measured using different proxies such as total assets (Cerf, 1961, Singhvi, 1967, Firth, 
1979, McNally et al., 1982, McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993, Wallace et al., 1994a, 
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Wallace and Naser, 1995, Hossain et al., 1995, Singhvi and Desai, 1971b, Raffournier, 
1995); turnover (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978, Firth, 1979, Roberts and Gray, 1988, Gray 
and Roberts, 1989, Wallace et al., 1994a, Raffournier, 1995) and market capitalisation 
(Nurunnabi and Hossain, 2012, An et al., 2011, Hossain et al., 1994b) among many. 
Cerf (1961) pioneered the use of financial reports to investigate disclosures.  
This method is still in use and is the same adopted by many researchers in the field 
including this study.  In his research, Cerf (1961) investigated 527 firms (258 New 
York Stock Exchange listed, 156 Over The Counter traded stocks’ firms and 113 
listed on other stock exchanges).  The study made use of regression analysis on 31 
weighted items and covered financial reports from the period of July 1956 to June 
1957.  Cerf (1961) among other variables found that asset size was positively 
associated with the level of disclosure.  Singhvi and Desai (1971b) a decade later 
found similar results in a study that followed the research design pioneered by Cerf 
(1961)  It may be suggested that legitimacy costs among other reasons here are a 
valid reason for firms with larger asset values to disclose more information in their 
annual reports than those with smaller assets values.  Larger firms (on the basis of 
asset size) are likely to have a big following of both individual and institutional 
investors. 
Another argument in support of this finding is that firms with larger asset size 
are more likely to be of interest to regulatory bodies compared to those with smaller 
asset size.  Regulatory bodies may wish to ensure that the relevant firms’ operations 
are exemplary within the industry within which they operate such that if they are to 
operate in a non-ethical or non-exemplary fashion the impact will not be disastrous to 
the particular industry in question.  A relevant example is the BP Oil spill of April 
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2010 in which the American government eventually filed a lawsuit (Swint and Blum, 
2010).   
Other previous research (Lunt, 1982) divided the sample of companies into 
two groups according to size, and argued that the differences in disclosure between 
the two groups suggested that large companies disclose more information than small 
companies. However, Lunt (1982) did not attempt to assess the significance of these 
differences. The reason given was that any attempt to assess the significance 
involved a subjective perception of what was rendered important and secondly that 
smaller companies may have less information to disclose than larger companies 
anyway.  In support of the argument that smaller companies would disclose less 
information anyway, it may be suggested that the cost implications to smaller 
companies for information gathering, printing and publications may otherwise have a 
severe impact on their expenses and in turn their profit in comparison to larger firms. 
Disclosing less information would thus entail significant savings.  Although 
the point raised by Lunt (1982) could be true, the problem could be addressed in part 
by a scoring procedure that accounts for the applicability of items to particular 
companies which is demonstrated in later research (Wallace et al., 1994a, 
Schadewlitz and Blevins, 1998, Ho and Wong, 2001c). 
Another UK study (Hussey and Woolfe, 1998) employed the Mann-Whitney 
test, to determine whether the inclusion of segmental information in corporate reports 
was associated with company size (measured in terms of total sales) and found a 
strong association.  Larger companies may be linked with increased segmental 
reporting disclosures for a variety of reasons, one possibility that leads to increased 
disclosure being where companies operate in various segments/countries/regions.  As 
such these companies will not only be bound by the regulations within which the 
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company is registered but also with the regulations in which the company operates 
hence leading to possible increased disclosures and the level of mandatory 
information required under various laws differing.  Large companies in general run 
complex operations such as producing multiple product combinations and operate 
over wide geographical expanses including being listed on several stock exchanges 
and operating as multinationals.  This entails that there is also a vast scope of rules 
and regulations those entities have to adhere to as imposed by legislation within the 
countries of incorporation.  Such entities are therefore obliged to disclose certain 
information as part of the business review (BR) section in the corporate reports. 
Schadewlitz and Blevins (1998) examined the relationship between company 
size and the extent of disclosure in interim reports of companies listed on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange. Using a self-developed disclosure index of 26 information 
items, they analysed 256 interim reports published by 70 listed companies over the 
period 1985 to 1993.  They employed two regression models to determine whether 
company size, measured in terms of annual net sales and the number of workers in 
the firm, is related to interim disclosure levels.  Their results indicated that company 
size (measured in terms of number of workers) was directly related to the extent of 
disclosure.  However, there was no association between company size (measured in 
terms of annual net sales) and voluntary disclosure. 
Bradbury (1991, 1992) did not find an association between company size and 
the extent of voluntary disclosures.  Taking a look at the latter study (Bradbury, 
1992),  the suggestion was that company size is not a significant determinant of  
disclosures.  Bradbury (1992) investigated disclosures among New Zealand company 
reports.  The sample consisted 172 listed companies that reported semi-annual 
earnings during the period 1973-76 when the content of interim reports in New 
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Zealand was unregulated, the researcher (Bradbury, 1992) divided the interim report 
disclosures into two categories, “quantified” and “non-quantified” disclosures.  The 
author hypothesized that accounting reports are more valuable to investors in smaller 
firms and therefore smaller firms were more likely to supply accounting reports prior 
to disclosure laws than larger firms.  Bradbury (1991) did not detect any significant 
differences between small and large companies thus suggesting that company size 
was not a determinant of interim disclosure extent as opposed to the studies 
discussed above.   
Size measured by market capitalisation is a fairly commonly used proxy (as 
examplified among others by Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Lang and Lundholm, 
1993, Hossain et al., 1994b).  Most of the above studies purport that this variable is 
significantly associated with the extent of disclosure as opposed to a few as earlier 
mentioned.  A less popular proxy that has been used before is size measured by number 
of shareholders (Cerf, 1961, Singhvi, 1968, Singhvi and Desai, 1971b).  All three 
studies found a positive significant association between company size (measured by 
number of shareholders) and disclosures reported in the annual reports.  One may 
suggest from the finding that companies with larger market capitalisation and a higher 
number of shareholders are bound to have a larger information following.  In other 
words the demand for information would likely be higher than smaller size companies 
based on this measure.  It would therefore make sense based on this suggestion to 
propose that such firms are likely to disclose more information in their interim and or 
annual reports to reduce information asymmetry. 
As many have analysed and accepted the association of company size with the 
extent of disclosures.  It is without doubt that some scholars (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978, Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979, Ball and Foster, 1982, Watts and Zimmerman, 
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1986) argued against the use of company size despite the manner of measurement.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that firm size has been used as an operationalising 
variable for several varying hypotheses.  Such would include a variation of facets which 
would potentially affect disclosure levels anyway; examples include (1) management 
ability & advice, (2) political costs, (3) competitive advantage and (4) information 
production costs.  Ball and Foster (1982) add to this argument suggesting that the wide 
variation of proxies makes it difficult to determine which of the variables company size 
is actually estimating as it may not be proved as to whether it is specifically referring to 
any of 1-4 above or a combination.  Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) argued that the 
use of company size as a proxy may not adequately capture the impact of political costs.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) somewhat agree with Haggerman and Zmijewski (1979) 
on the problems associated with using company size as a proxy  but on the contrary 
justify the use of size by suggesting that one may need to use crude measures in the 
early stages of developing a theory and it may thus be viewed as a composite proxy. 
A final point to raise in support of the argument that more research has 
pointed out that larger companies tend to disclose more information is the notion that 
the credibility of management disclosures is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, 
auditors and other capital market intermediaries (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  Theory 
also suggests that auditors enhance the credibility of financial reports but there is 
very little empirical evidence to substantiate this notion.   
Larger companies are subject to stricter disclosure requirements due to 
pressure from policy makers as the case in the introduction of KPIs disclosure in the 
BR section of the annual report (Tauringana and Mangena, 2009).  Regulators are 
also concerned about the welfare of the financially unsophisticated investors.  
Requirements therefore attempt to reduce the information gap between the informed 
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and the uninformed and the whole pressure being laid on the larger companies who 
can better afford the burden of increased disclosure costs.  Based on the review of 
literature regarding company size, it can be seen that not all measures of company 
size demonstrate a positive significant relationship regardless this being the most 
researched variable in disclosure studies.  Stanga (1976) and Wallace (1987) for 
example did not find size (measured by turnover) to significantly explain the extent of 
disclosures in financial reports. 
 
2.2.2.2 Gearing 
Gearing measures the long term risk implied by a firm’s financial structure.  
It therefore reveals the balance between the funds invested by the shareholders and 
those invested by lenders.  A certain level of gearing may have the effect of raising 
the shareholders real return on investment and is subsequently attractive to the 
shareholders. Debt obviously poses a certain level of financial risk hence a high 
gearing ratio may indicate and unsustainable level of debt (Watson et al., 2002a). 
Many studies have analysed the influence of gearing on the levels of 
disclosure.  The results of these studies have been mixed as some found a significant 
positive relationship with disclosure (Malone et al., 1993, Hossain et al., 1994b, 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999); some did not find an association (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987, Wallace et al., 1994a, Hossain et al., 1995, Raffournier, 1995) while 
others found a significant negative relationship (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978).  Many 
researchers in the past such as Fama & Miller (1972) Jensen & Meckling (1976) and 
Smith & Warner (1979) have postulated that agency costs would normally be higher 
for those firms possessing a proportionally higher level of debt in their capital 
structures.  They hence suggest that there is a positive association between the firms’ 
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gearing and their extent of financial disclosure.  It can be suggested that when there 
is a higher level of risk associated with a firm then it follows that the stakeholders 
such as shareholders, lenders and suppliers among others are concerned about the 
going concern of the entity and as such the firm will offer reassurances to these 
parties in the form of increased disclosures. 
After the study by Jensen and Meckling (1976) on the agency theory, Watts 
(1977) went on to suggest that the potential wealth transfers from fixed claimants to 
residual claimants increase as the level of gearing also increases.   Debt holders will 
try to price-protect themselves and in turn shareholders and managers will be 
incentivised to offer an increased level of monitoring such as through voluntarily 
disclosing information in interim and annual reports.  The agency theory therefore 
posits that the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure will be an increasing function 
of leverage. 
Most of the identifiable disclosure studies postulate that there is a relationship 
between gearing and the extent of disclosures (for example Bradbury, 1992, Hossain 
et al., 1994b, Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978, Ahmed and Courtis, 1999, Ben-Amar and 
Zeghal, 2011, Dal-Ri Murcia and dos Santos, 2012).  It was hypothesized that 
companies with higher levels of debt financing disclosed more interim report 
information than companies with lower levels of debt financing (Bradbury, 1991).  
The results however did not support the hypothesis in the predicted direction.  A 
negative association between interim disclosure and financial leverage was detected, 
suggesting that companies with higher levels of debt financing disclosed less 
information than companies with lower levels of debt financing.  As opposed to the 
suggestion above on higher leveraged firms providing reassurances for the future 
continuance of the company, where the opposite is true may be a result of directors 
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having little or no confidence in the going concern of the business entity hence 
deliberately shunning the disclosure of additional information on the position of the 
firm.  In some cases it may be found that the management will not wish to disclose a 
debt rescue package.  
These results find support from later interim disclosure studies that 
investigated financial leverage (Tan and Tower, 1997, Schadewlitz and Blevins, 
1998).  In one study for example, Tan and Tower (1997) investigated the 
determinants of disclosure compliance with interim reporting requirements among 
Australian and Singaporean companies.  They reported that companies with lower 
levels of debt leverage showed higher levels of disclosure compliance than 
companies with higher levels of debt in their capital structure.  In a Finnish study 
(Schadewlitz and Blevins, 1998), it was also found that financial leverage was 
associated with the extent of disclosure in interim reports. Their results clearly 
indicated that the level of interim disclosure in Finnish interim reports was 
negatively associated with financial leverage, suggesting that companies with high 
financial leverage disclosed less information. 
 On the contrary Craswell and Taylor (1992) purported in their study that 
gearing significantly explains shifts in the levels of disclosure of reserves by 
Australian oil and gas companies.  Bradbury (1992) also found a significantly 
positive association between leverage and the extent of voluntary segment disclosure 
in New Zealand diversified companies.  Although studies on balance generally tend 
to suggest that voluntary disclosures can be expected to increase or decrease with 
leverage, Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) however found no association of this 
variable with voluntary disclosures for their sample of Mexican companies and 
suggest that Mexican companies may use other mechanisms besides voluntary 
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annual report disclosures for containing shareholder-debt holder-manager interest 
conflicts (p.540). 
The signalling theory suggests a possible link between disclosure and gearing 
although the direction of the relationship is unclear as witnessed through evidence of 
mixed results above.  Ross (1977) explains increased leverage as a positive signal 
and an expression of confidence for the future by managers.  This notion is an 
arguable one as the cause for increased leverage is subject to scrutiny, a two way 
path in which leverage increments may be for example a consequence of insufficient 
working capital which is not favourable.  Myers & Majluf (1984) suggest that an 
unanticipated increase in leverage may entail that the firm has/had a smaller than 
expected cash flow hence sends negative signals.  On the other hand leverage 
increments can be the result of equity for further investment which can be a positive 
factor.  It can be seen then, that the theory is inconclusive as to the expected direction 
of the relationship between gearing and the level of disclosure paralleled with the 
evidence of inconclusive empirical results.  
Further evidence of mixed results includes the work of Belkaoui & Kahl 
(1978) who showed a negative relationship between financial leverage and 
disclosure, whereas Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) found that leverage offered no 
explanation of voluntary disclosure.  Gray & Roberts (1989) however, found that 
company capital structure had a positive and significant impact on voluntary 
disclosure (at a 5% level) when they used the Mann Whitney test, but not when the 
Chi squared test was used.   Some studies as the above have used more than one 
method, another example is Hossain et al. (1994b) and Raffournier (1995) who use 
both a univariate and multivariate frame of analysis.  Raffournier (Raffournier, 1995) 
did not find a significant relationship between company leverage and disclosure in 
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either analysis.  Although Hossain et al. (1994) found a significant association was 
present using univariate analysis, when multivariate analysis was employed no 
significant relationship was observed.  The next subsection will continue to analyse 
company specific variables and will particularly investigate previous research on the 
impact of profitability on the level of disclosures within financial reporting. 
 
2.2.2.3 Profitability 
The profitability of a firm may in large demonstrate that firms ability to absorb 
its running costs hence its success.  Singhvi and Desai (1971b) suggested that there are 
several ways in which profitability may be measured.  It goes without mention that the 
manner in which this measurement is made may have an influence on the results of the 
influence of the variable on the extent of disclosure.  This variable may be measured 
in a variety of ways such as rate of return on investment or earnings margin (Singhvi 
and Desai, 1971b).  Profit as with gearing has had a lot of researchers investigate its 
association with the level of disclosure.  There have been mixed results in the 
findings for instance some found a positive association between profit and the extent 
of disclosure (Singhvi and Desai, 1971b, Wallace et al., 1994a, Yang and Crowther, 
2012, Cormier and Gordon, 2001); others found no association (Raffournier, 1995, 
Inchausti, 1997, Ahmed and Courtis, 1999, Guidry and Patten, 2012) and some 
postulated that there was a negative relationship between profitability and the extent 
of disclosure (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978, Ho and Taylor, 2007, Smith et al., 2007). 
The signalling theory suggests that if a company is making a healthy profit 
and performing well, it would wish to signal their superior performance to financial 
reporting information users particularly investors.  Akerlof (1970) suggested that 
when companies are performing well they tend to wish to disclose their excellent 
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performance to their stakeholders.  If a company’s profit is higher than the industry 
average, then the management are likely to disclose more information in order to 
assure its shareholders of their strong financial position (Singhvi and Desai, 1971b, 
Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2012b).  The agency theory also suggests a likely 
association between profitability and disclosure.  Inchausti (1997) for example 
argues that managers of very profitable firms will disclose detailed information in 
order to support the continuance of their positions and compensation arrangements.  
Further, it is argued (Ng and Koh, 1994) that more profitable companies will be 
subject to greater public scrutiny and will therefore apply self-regulation mechanisms 
such as increased disclosures to try and avoid external regulation. 
Schadewlitz and Blevins (1998) postulate that there is  a positive relationship 
between financial report disclosures and profitability; they measured profitability in 
terms of profit to net sales ratio.  However, contrary to their hypothesised direction, 
they found that company profitability seemed to reduce rather than increase the level 
of disclosure in reports.  They provide two possible reasons for this finding.  The first 
being that managers may believe that the existence of a company’s good 
performance provides an adequate signal of profitability and therefore find it 
unnecessary to disclose more information.  The other reason provided was that 
growth oriented, firm specific information could be so valuable that the companies 
are not prepared to disclose it in its reports for fear of attracting new entrants in the 
industry.  This is therefore a measure that may be put in place to protect competitive 
position.  
Beattie & Jones (1992) in their study investigating the use of graphs in 
financial statements, tested the hypothesis that graphs of key financial variables are 
more likely to be included in annual reports of companies with `good' rather than 
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`bad' performance in terms of the variable graphed.  They found a significant (at a 
1% level) positive relationship between performance as measured by profit before 
tax, earnings per share, dividend per share and the inclusion of graphs in terms of 
these variables.  Cormier and Gordon (2001) in their study of disclosure practices by 
multinationals also found that disclosure was significantly associated with profit; this 
finding is in line with that of Nurunnabi and Hossain (2012).  Similarly, Williamson 
(1984) found that on average the return on sales ratio was significantly higher for 
disclosing than for non-disclosing companies.  Inchausti (1997) however, found no 
evidence of a relationship between disclosure and profitability in her study of 
Spanish firms similarly with Guidry and Patten (2012). 
Chen et al., (2002) investigated the effect of profitability on managers’ 
motivation to include balance sheet information with quarterly earnings 
announcements.  They found that companies reporting losses were more likely to 
include balance sheet information which is consistent with some previous studies 
(e.g. Schadewlitz and Blevins, 1998).  Chen et al., (2002) argued that in the presence 
of a loss, earnings fail in their traditional role as an indicator of future earnings; thus 
suggesting that  loss-making companies would have incentives to provide more 
information to supplement reported earnings.  It is easy to criticise this line of 
thought simply because the reporting of profits cannot simply be replaced by the 
reporting of losses in the absence of profits.  The implications are very important 
here and it is difficult to see how they can replace each other.  It is within reason to 
suggest that losses reporting may be positively related to the extent of disclosure on 
the basis that management of a firm may wish to highlight possible factors such as 
investments for the future; another possibility could be due to the management 
disclosing that the losses reported are not as catastrophic as they may appear. 
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According to Akerlof (1970), there is a cost attached to being perceived as a 
"lemon".  As a result, those well run, profitable firms are incentivised to distinguish 
themselves from less profitable firms.  This process aids in raising capital on the best 
available terms (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Anderson and Carverhill, 2012).  
More profitable firms can be expected to disclose more voluntary accounting 
information (Foster, 1986, Domínguez, 2012).  Unfortunately some studies such as 
McNally et al. (1982) do not find their profitability measure to significantly explain 
voluntary disclosures by New Zealand companies and do not offer any possible 
explanations in their study.  Guidry and Patten (Guidry and Patten, 2012) also did not 
find an association between disclosure and profitability.   
Akerlof (1970) stated that well-run firms with higher profitability and higher 
growth rates would want to distinguish itself from the contrary as afore mentioned.   
Where companies are performing well, then their superiority can be signalled and 
information asymmetry between investors and managers reduced and agency costs 
trimmed down through increased disclosure.  Akerlof’s (1970) argument is easily 
supported,  for example by the study of non-financial companies listed on the Bolsa 
de Volares de Sao Paulo (BOVESPA), it was found that profitability was positively 
significantly associated at the 10% level with social and environmental disclosure.  
However mixed results are prevalent in this area and even within the same country 
such as the fact that several UK studies (e.g. Spero, 1979, Roberts and Gray, 1988, 
Gray and Roberts, 1989, Lutfi, 1989, Watson et al., 2002a, Bozzolan et al., 2006, Li 
et al., 2008b, Li et al., 2012) report mixed results on the association between 
profitability and disclosure.  This is clearly an area of further research until there is 
some level of correlation among results. 
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2.2.2.4 Multinationality 
Multinationality is a variable that has been investigated in many previous 
studies (for example Chau and Gray, 2002b, Xiao et al., 2004, Barako et al., 2006b, 
Gelb et al., 2008, Gray, 1978).  Multinationality in this study stems from an aspect of 
segmental reporting. It refers to companies that have substantial operations outside of 
Great Britain (GB).  There are not many studies that have focused on the extent of 
disclosures based on the level of substantial operations abroad.  In a study by Gray 
(1978), he found of the largest EEC Multinationals that he investigated, where a 
company had at least two or three countries in which it operates, 95% of such entities  
made increased disclosures in the annual report.  Majority of such companies, 
according to Gray (1978); in fact provided an additional segmental reporting section 
in their annual reports.  This finding by Gray (1978) may be supported in part by the 
legitimacy theory.  The theory posits that firms perform certain socially desired 
actions in return of approval by its stakeholders, this in turn strenghtens the relevant 
businesses’ going concern.  The actions taken by the business may be viewed 
somewhat as a social contract with its stakeholders.  Another reason for increased 
disclosures is due to regulations within the regions of operation.  An example is in 
the United States where Gray (1978) suggests that the problem of limited disclosures 
was identified and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a 
standard that provides for a detailed disclosure framework. 
In a more recent study by Nalikka (2008) on companies listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange.  The paper placed focus on the impact of corporate culture on 
disclosures.  The study investigates 135 companies using regression analysis to 
establish whether there are any relationships between the variables concerned.  
Nalikka (2008) found that multinationality is positively and significantly associated 
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with the level of disclosures in annual reports.  This result is not unusual because 
multinational companies are expected to supply increased information as a result of 
internationalisation of both business and capital markets.  Firms operating in several 
countries are also challenged to meet the information needs of a diverse group of 
stakeholders including cultural backgrounds.  The local community in a company 
venturing in a new country for example, may wish to make investments.  Monitoring 
costs may increase and subsequently have a direct impact on the agency costs for which 
the problem may be alleviated by the reduction of information asymmetry through 
increased disclosures. 
On the contrary it may be suggested that operating in other segments will not 
necessarily entail increased disclosures due to the costs, monetary, physical and 
intellectual.  The costs of segment reporting include some vital logistics such as 
transfer pricing and segment definition among many.  Finally it is important to note 
that in some cases some companies operate in other countries or segments where 
regulations and recommendations may be lax such as the UK’s Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance which operates a comply or explain policy rather than punish 
the offender.  In such situations it would be reasonable to expect companies operating in 
such regions not to provide additional disclosures.  There have been mixed results in 
the past as some found a positive relationship between multinationality and 
disclosure (e.g. Depoers, 2000, Raffournier, 1995, Cooke, 1992, Nalikka, 2008); 
some finding no association (e.g. Garcia-Benau and Monterrey-Mayoral, 1992); and 
Gelb et al. (2008) found a negative relationship. 
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2.2.2.5 Liquidity 
 Liquidity measures the ability of a company to pay its debts when they fall due.  
There are however various methods in which it may be measured which include the 
current ratio, quick ratio and the operating cash flow ratio.  The manner in which this 
measurement is made as with the profitability measurements may have an influence in 
the direction of the results.  It has been suggested in the past that firms with a high 
liquidity ratio may wish to make increased disclosure to highlight their soundness 
(Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978).  Akerlof (1970) suggests that well performing firms will 
wish to signal their performance, in this case performance being a firmly positive cash 
flow position. 
 One may suggest that a company with high liquidity will wish to reassure its 
debtors that they are in a financial healthy position to pay off what they owe when it 
falls due.  Companies with better liquidity positions are more likely to disclose this 
information.  The stakeholder theory which was pioneered by Edward Freeman (1984) 
also supports this argument through its emphasis on giving regard to the interests of 
stakeholders, in this case creditors.  The stakeholder theory thus posits that information 
asymmetry may be reduced by increased disclosures and consequently reducing agency 
costs.  It has in the past been suggested that companies in a stronger financial position 
will tend to disclose more information than weaker companies (Wallace, 1987).  Barako 
et al. (Barako et al., 2006b) extended disclosure research to a developing country.  The 
study examined annual report disclosures by listed companies on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange over the period from 1992 to 2001.  The results of the 54 companies 
investigated using multivariate analysis revealed that liquidity did not have a significant 
influence on the level of disclosures by Kenyan listed companies. 
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 Looking at previous studies, it also seems that previous results on this variable 
have yielded mixed results in the past.  A positive significant association was found to 
exist between liquidity and the extent of disclosures by Belkaoui and Kahl (1978).  
Tauringana (1997) points out that where companies are in a low liquidity situation, they 
my attempt to disclose less information about their situation in a bid to avoid creditors 
demanding their money for the fear of not getting it at all.  Liquidity was however found 
to have a negative significant relationship with disclosures in other studies (Wallace, 
1987, Wallace et al., 1994a).  Other identified studies in the area demonstrated that there 
was no significant relationship with the extent of disclosure (Wallace and Naser, 1995) 
including Lutfi (1989) in the UK.    From the extant, it may be seen that the variable 
requires further research. 
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2.2.2.6 Listing Status 
 Every stock exchange has a list of rules that should be observed by companies 
requiring to be listed.  Such rules as a matter of fact will bind companies to report on 
certain aspects in their corporate reports which is essentially a form of increased 
disclosure (Cooke, 1991).  Many studies have investigated listing status in the past 
(Kun et al., 2008, Collett and Hrasky, 2005, García-Meca and Martínez, 2005, Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007, Wang and Claiborne, 2008).  Previous literature has suggested 
that listed companies tend to disclose more information than those that are not listed 
at all (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Depoers, 2000).  Firth (1979) suggests that 
information disclosure by companies listed on a stock exchange stimulates activity 
for the company’s stocks.  It may therefore be worthwhile to disclose enough 
information to alleviate asymmetry and provide reassurances to stockholders about 
the stability and the going concern of the company. 
 Collett and Hrasky (2005) for example investigated disclosures by listed firms 
in Australia.  The study took its sample from the Connect 4 database which list 
companies on the stock exchange in Australia (ASX).  Their sample size was 299 from 
the year 1994.  They used a dichotomous disclosure index to measure disclosures and 
employed multinomial logistic regression to assess the relationship between listing 
status and information disclosures.  Listing status was found to significantly explain the 
level of information disclosure, this finding is in line with other prior studies (Eng and 
Mak, 2003, Meek et al., 1995a, Carson, 1996, Williams, 1999). 
 Cooke (1989a) argues that monitoring may vary due to listing status, he posits that 
agents in general have more information than the principals who require the 
information.  Larger shareholder bases of listed companies are likely to be exposed to 
higher monitoring costs.  This situation as afore mentioned can be improved by 
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increased disclosures.  Listing status was found to be significantly associated with the 
extent of disclosures by several studies (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971b, Cooke, 1989a, 
Wallace et al., 1994a) including Firth (Firth, 1979) in the UK.  Other studies however 
did not find any significant relationship (e.g. Gray et al., 1995, García-Meca and 
Martínez, 2005). 
 
2.2.2.7 Multiple Listing Status 
Previous studies dating as far back as the 1970s (Singhvi and Desai, 1971b) 
have found  market related variables such as listing status and earnings margin to be 
associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in company reports.  There are 
various reasons incentivising managers to voluntarily disclose information, one being 
to reduce monitoring by outside shareholders particularly where a firm is listed on 
more than one stock exchange.  In the same way it has been suggested that as the 
managers’ share ownership falls, outside shareholders will increase monitoring of 
managers behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Some managers voluntarily 
disclose information in order to exaggerate their firms’ favourable attributes and 
results.  Adversely, voluntary disclosures may be manipulated by some cushioning of 
the bad attributes of their firms.  This is therefore a bid by companies to influence the 
perceptions of stakeholders of the entities (Bansal and Clelland, 2004) and for these 
reasons disclose more voluntary information. 
The corporate financial reporting literature suggests that several corporate 
attributes influence the extent to which listed companies comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements of the stock exchange on which they are listed (Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994, Wallace and Naser, 1995).  Several studies have suggested that 
listing on multiple stock exchanges will influence increase corporate disclosures 
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(Cooke, 1989a, Gray et al., 1995a).  An argument that may be forwarded for the 
increase in informational demand is due to broadening of the stakeholder base.  
Where companies venture into foreign stock exchanges, the reasons are mainly 
explained through the capital needs theory.  A more diverse stockholder base will 
probably demand more information due to the diversification of investor agendas and 
limited knowledge about a foreign corporation.  Schipper (1981) and Cooke (1989a) 
suggest that monitoring costs would be higher for firms with multiple listing status 
and this state might be alleviated by increased information disclosure. 
According to Cooke (1989a), companies that are listed in foreign stock 
exchanges and disclose information generously are likely to attract increased demand 
for that company’s shares.  Several other researchers seem to agree that there is a 
positive association between multiple listing status and the extent of corporate 
disclosures as any such company with such a status would consequentially be bound 
by the rules of the different exchanges it is listed on (Choi, 1973, Meek and Gray, 
1989, Cooke, 1989a, Cooke, 1991, Cooke, 1992) except for where foreign exchanges 
have lesser listing rules. The multiple listing variable is once again one that has 
seemed to yield different results based on the statistical methods implemented for 
example Cooke, (1989a, 1991), Hossain et al., (1994b), Meek et al., (1995a), Hossain 
et al., (1995), Depoers, (2000) found a significant association using multivariate 
analysis but not while using univariate analysis, as in Tauringana’s (1997) UK study.  
Further research will be conducted using regression analysis to investigate whether 
there are any deviations from previous findings. 
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2.3 Summary of previous research 
Table 2 is a summarised version of the previous studies analysed in the 
literature review section of this study.  Clearly this table does not encompass all the 
studies that have been undertaken but serves for illustrative rather than exhaustive 
purposes.  The list is therefore indicative of prior work in disclosure studies. 
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed  
Researcher/s (Year) Country No. of firms Disclosure items Variables confirmed Variables not 
confirmed 
      
Cerf (1961) USA 527 31 Size (Assets, Number of 
Shareholders) 
Profitability 
Listing Status 
      
Singvhi (1967 and 
1968) 
USA 150 32 Size (total assets), 
number of shareholders, 
listing status, auditor 
firm, rate of return and 
earnings margin 
Financial position of 
the firm 
      
Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) 
USA 155 34 Asset size, number of 
stockholders, rate of 
return, earnings margin, 
listing status, audit firm 
size 
 
      
Choi (1973)  64 36 Size, industry  
      
Buzby (1975) USA 88 39 Size (Assets) Listing Status 
      
Stanga (1976) USA 80 79 industry Size (turnover) 
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed Continued… 
Researcher/s (Year) Country No. of firms Disclosure items Variables confirmed Variables not 
confirmed 
      
Belkaoui and Kahl 
(1978) 
Canada 200 30 Size (turnover and assets), 
Gearing, Profitability, Industry 
Net profit/total assets 
and capitalisation 
ratios 
      
Gray and Roberts 
(1989) 
UK 212 34 Size (turnover and net tangible 
assets), and debt to equity 
ratio 
Profit margin, 
percentage of foreign 
sales and 
geographical 
diversification index 
      
Cooke (1989a) Sweden 90 224 Size (total assets, turnover, 
number of shareholders), 
Quotation status, Industry, 
Multiple listing 
Parent company 
relationship (Sweden) 
 
      
Lutfi (1989) UK   Size (turnover and number of 
employees, directors’ share of 
equity, share option scheme, 
gearing and profitability 
(negative) 
 
      
Roberts and Gray 
(1988) 
UK   Size (turnover)  
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed Continued… 
Researcher/s (Year) Country No. of firms Disclosure 
items 
Variables confirmed Variables not 
confirmed 
      
Ruland, Tung and 
George (1990) 
USA 146  Proportion of voting stock 
owned by officers and 
directors 
 
      
Cooke (1991) Japan 48 106 Size  
      
Bradbury (1991) New Zealand 158  Interim dividend, financial 
leverage, unexpected 
earnings, size, non-manager 
shareholding 
industry 
      
Diamond and 
Verrechia (1991) 
USA 2 Large institutional 
traders 
 Substantial shareholdings 
by institutional investors 
 
      
Bradbury (1992) New Zealand 172  Industry type and 
unexpected earnings 
Size (market value) 
and earnings volatility 
      
Cooke (1992) Japan 35 165 Size, listing status, industry 
type 
 
      
Craswell and Taylor 
(1992) 
Australia 98  Gearing, Auditor identity 
(high/low quality), Cash 
flow risk, Size (total assets) 
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed Continued… 
Researcher/s 
(Year) 
Country No. of firms Disclosure items Variables confirmed Variables not confirmed 
      
Husssey and Wolfe 
(1994) 
UK 223  Company size Not applicable 
      
Wallace and Naser 
(1995) 
Hong Kong 80 142 Size (total assets and sales), 
conglomerate, profit margin 
(negative) 
Rate of return, liquidity 
ratio, financial leverage, 
size (market capitalisation) 
and auditor firm 
      
Meek et al. (1995) US, UK, 
France, 
Germany and 
Holland 
226  Size, country of origin, 
industry, leverage, 
multinationality (extent of 
multinational operations), 
profitability, international 
listing status 
 
      
Hossain, Perera and 
Rahman (1995) 
New Zealand   Size (assets), foreign listing 
status, leverage 
Assets in place and auditor 
firm 
      
Raffournier (1995) Switzerland   Size, (total assets and sales), 
and internationality 
Leverage, profitability, 
ownership structure, 
auditor size, percentage 
fixed assets and industry 
type 
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed Continued… 
Researcher/s (Year) Country No. of firms Disclosure 
items 
Variables confirmed Variables not 
confirmed 
      
Zarzeski (1996) France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Japan, 
Norway, UK, US 
256 58 Foreign sales, size, gearing, 
uncertainty avoidance, 
individualism-collectivism, 
masculinity-femininity, power 
distance 
 
      
Inchausti (1997) Spain 138 50  Profitability 
      
Botosan (1997) US 122  Cost of equity, market beta, 
market value, analyst following 
 
      
Hussey and Woolfe 
(1998) 
UK 138  Company size (total sales) Industry type 
      
Chen, DeFond, Park 
(2002) 
USA 2551 23086 Volatile stock returns, 
Profitability 
 
      
Chau and Gray 
(2002) 
Hong Kong and 
Singapore 
60 (Hong Kong), 62 
(Singapore) 
116 Industry, company age, 
profitability, M&A acquisition 
transactions, unexpected earnings, 
volatile stock returns, large 
forecast errors 
none 
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed Continued… 
Researcher/s (Year) Country No. of firms Disclosure items Variables confirmed Variables not 
confirmed 
      
Eng and Mak (2003) Singapore 158 55 Proportion of non-executive directors, 
Managerial ownership, Significant 
government ownership 
Blockholder 
ownership  
      
Mangena and Pike 
(2004) 
UK 256 113 Audit committee finance expertise  
      
Mangena and Pike 
(2005) 
UK 262  Shareholding of audit committee 
members, audit committee financial 
expertise, audit committee size, 
proportion of non-executive directors, 
institutional shareholdings, auditor 
involvement, company size, multiple 
listing, gearing ratio, interim report 
profit, liquidity ratio, executive 
director shareholding 
 
      
Sletten (2006) USA  919 
announcements of 
financial 
restatements 
Stock price declines  
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed Continued… 
Researcher/s (Year) Country No. of firms Disclosure items Variables confirmed Variables not 
confirmed 
      
Barako et al., (2006) Kenya 54 106 Board Composition, Leverage, 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors, Presence of an audit 
committee, Shareholder 
concentration, Proportion of 
foreign ownership, Percentage of 
institutional ownership, Size (total 
assets), Leverage  
Board leadership, 
external audit, 
Profitability, 
Liquidity 
      
Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) 
Singapore 104 72 Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
Board size, CEO 
duality 
      
Tauringana and 
Mangena (2006) 
UK 170 46 Size, gearing, profitability, 
liquidity, exceptional items, 
directors share ownership, 
substantial institutional investors, 
auditor size, non-executive 
directors 
 
      
Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2008) 
Italy 255  Size, gearing, profitability, 
industry 
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Table 2: Summary of Disclosure Studies Analysed Continued… 
Researcher/s (Year) Country No. of firms Disclosure items Variables confirmed Variables not 
confirmed 
      
Li et al. (2008) UK 100  Independent non-executive 
directors, share concentration, size 
of audit committee, frequency of 
audit committee meetings, 
combined role of CEO and 
Chairman, length of LSE listing, 
profitability, firm size 
 
      
Tauringana and 
Mangena (2009) 
UK 32 79 Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
 
      
Schleicher and 
Walker (2010) 
UK 502  Profitability, risk  
      
Kyeyune (2010) UK 309  Dividend yield, earnings per share, 
size 
 
      
Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) 
UK 72  Activity type, firm size, cross 
listing, profitability, liquidity, 
gearing, institutional ownership, 
board size, role duality, board 
composition, audit committee size 
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2.4 Limitations in Disclosure studies 
There are limitations that may be identified in disclosure studies and as such 
have an impact on this research on KPIs disclosure.  The threat of litigation costs 
affects disclosure in two ways, the first being that managers may feel compelled to 
disclose particularly bad news against their will.  Second, litigation can potentially 
reduce manager incentives to provide forward looking information. Although 
managers may voluntarily disclose information, the existence of proprietary costs 
suggests that managers will not disclose all the information in a bid to protect their 
competitive position.  Lack of full disclosure may exist due to agency cost issues 
(Berger and Hann, 2003).  Career concerns and external reputation may lead to 
exaggerated disclosures.  Management may also limit the level of disclosure to avoid 
follow up questions by analysts. 
Political costs as suggested in a study of the economic implications of 
corporate financial reporting are a significant barrier to voluntary disclosure (Graham 
et al., 2005).  This is where managers limit voluntary disclosures to avoid attention 
from regulators who may in some cases use such information against them.  These 
reasons for and against voluntarily disclosing information therefore affect the studies 
of disclosure determinants but on the other hand may be viewed as possible 
explanations for the error term when regression analysis is manipulated. 
It may be suggested that mandatory disclosures help in reducing information 
gaps between the financially unsophisticated and those who are financially astute as 
afore mentioned.  Voluntary disclosures are still thought to be necessary in order to 
correct the gaps in the usefulness of disclosures particularly to investors.  Due to the 
suggestion that mandatory disclosures are thought not to be as forthcoming as 
voluntary disclosures; managers may only disclose information in this category to 
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satisfice regulation.  Another general restriction on research of this nature is that 
disclosure cannot be reliably measured because companies may use different 
phraseology yet referring to a similar point. 
 Since Cerf’s (1961) study,  researchers have investigated the extent and 
determinants of several types of disclosures e.g. voluntary    (Firth, 1979, Wong-
Boren and Chow, 1987, Hossain et al., 1995), mandatory (Wallace, 1987, Wallace et 
al., 1994a, Wallace and Naser, 1995), intellectual capital (Brennan, 2001, Bukh et al., 
2001a, Bukh et al., 2001b, Bozzolan et al., 2003), social and environmental reporting 
(Freedman and Wasley, 1990, Guthrie and Parker, 1990, Gray et al., 1995a, Gray et 
al., 1995b) among many.  This study will be focusing on KPIs which is inherently 
another type of disclosure with interest brought about by the Companies Act (CA) 
2006 new regulation to report on them for large firms operating in the UK.  
Numerous previous types of disclosure studies were analysed in this chapter 
and an issue that was be highlighted is the consistency or divergence of findings.  
The mixed results may be viewed as a call for further research.  Examples of such 
occurrences include Cerf (1961), Buzby (1975), Cooke (1991, 1992) and Ahmed & 
Courtis (1999) who all found that company size for example was significantly 
associated with the extent of disclosure while Bradbury (1991) found that company 
size was not significantly related to disclosures by New Zealand companies.  Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) in their study of culture and corporate governance in Malaysia 
found assets in place to be significantly and positively related to disclosure but the 
finding is contrary to what the study results by Hossain et al., (1994b)  exhibited, 
especially noting that the studies were based in the same country. 
The final example at this early stage being the studies by Soy (1996) and Hossain 
et al., (1994b) who all found that there was no relationship between foreign 
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ownership and voluntary disclosure;  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) observed contrary 
results which exhibited a positive relationship between foreign ownership and 
voluntary disclosure.  Without speculating, the researcher however looks into 
possible reasons that could have led to some of these inconsistencies that have been 
observed in the results over the years in disclosure studies.  The possible 
explanations though not exhaustive and definite, aid as pointers to considerations that 
may be factored in prior to making conclusions in this and further research.  There 
are several reasons that can be suggested to be responsible or contributor to 
inconsistent results.  It has however not been researched whether results would be 
similar if such things were eliminated for the purpose of asserting credibility of 
statistical methods employed in disclosure research.  Some of the reasons thought to 
bring about differences in outcomes include: 
The statistical methods adapted in certain research may produce inconsistent results 
if a different method is adapted.  Cooke (1989) for example used parametric methods in 
their study while others such as Buzby (1975) used non-parametric methods for similar 
studies.  
Time factor may be suggested to be a possible explanatory factor to differing 
results.  Certain environmental aspects may change over time, for example 
manufacturing firms may be pressured into disclosing information that reveal their 
efforts in reducing their carbon footprint, such may be a KPI.  Other factors that change 
over time include political pressure and cultural values as explained below. 
Political motivation was found to possibly explain deviations in the results sets 
from different studies for Malaysian corporations (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In their 
study they found companies in the construction industry to make the most disclosures. 
This finding was found to be inconsistent with one that was carried out analysing 
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disclosures over a period of three years in the same country (Soh, 1996).  Political 
motivation was thought to be the main reason behind the inconsistencies because 
during the period of the study by Haniffa and Cooke (2002), the nation’s mantra was 
to ‘think big’, which culminated in the growth of prestigious large projects and 
particular priority being awarded to the local construction firms. 
Cultural differences as suggested by Jaggi (1975) and Gray (1988).  They suggest 
that differing cultures among countries possibly bring about a different manner of 
responsiveness to disclosure recommendations and policy.  There is evidence of 
differing responses by reporting companies domiciled in different countries. 
Measurement methods have often led to differences in results where the researchers 
measure the same variable using different methods.  Examples in disclosure studies 
include size measured differently such as by the number of shareholders, assets in place 
and turnover as exhibited in several studies (Cerf, 1961, Cooke, 1989a, Wallace et al., 
1994a, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).   Another instance is exemplified by how Singhvi 
and Desai (1971) measure the Rate of Return by dividing profit before tax by total 
assets while Wallace (1987) measured the rate of return by dividing profit after tax by 
capital employed.  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found assets-in-place to be significantly 
and positively explain disclosure at the 5% level, contrary to the findings of Hossain 
et al., (1994).  The former used market value of assets as their measure of assets-in-
place whereas Haniffa and Cook used the book value of assets and possibly resulting 
in diverging conclusions.   
The nature of the disclosures being investigated may influence the results, for 
example some researchers investigated the impact of certain corporate characteristics on 
mandatory disclosure, some on both mandatory and voluntary disclosure and others 
limited themselves to voluntary disclosures alone. 
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Scoring judgements; it is arguable that some differences may be a result of 
differences in judgement in the scoring of annual reports.  There can be problems in 
pointing out whether items are relevant to different companies or not.  There is also 
subjectivity as to the level of information that can be disclosed by a company before the 
researcher regards the item as sufficient to be counted as a disclosure.  
Variable secondary attributes may be suggested to contribute to conflicting 
conclusions, for example where a researcher investigates whether the proportion of 
shares owned by top ten shareholders influences the level of disclosure.  A secondary 
trait such as whether the top ten shareholders are local or foreign investors will have 
implications on the disclosure quality and quantity.  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found 
that the proportion of shares held by the top ten shareholders was positively related 
to disclosure. This finding again contradicts the findings of Hossain et al., (1994), 
who found a significant negative relationship for Malay listed companies.  It is 
possible that the mix of top ten shareholders would effectively have an impact on the 
level of disclosure of information. 
The Industry/Sector may play a part in the outcome of study results.  Certain 
industries bear policies that influence the reporting practices for example KPI 
disclosures in the UK construction industry and disclosures in the UK banking 
industry are governed by industry specific policies.  In conclusion the problem of 
inconsistent results is documented or rather acknowledged in most disclosure studies.  
There is a strong possibility the above mentioned factors jointly or severally assist in 
explaining the diverging outcomes of studies.  Wallace et al., (1994a) lend their support 
to the argument posited in this thesis that different features in research such as sample 
size, firm type, characteristics examined, measurement of disclosure indexes and 
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different statistical methods employed among other reason play a significant influence 
to arriving at different conclusions in different studies. 
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 The main thrust of the chapter was to review some of the existing research in 
disclosure studies in the UK and abroad.  Focus was placed on the impact of 
company characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms to gain deep 
understanding of the variables as per extant research.  The studies reviewed include 
research conducted in the UK and abroad. 
 Company size was found to bear the most consistent results as a variable under 
scrutiny.  The majority of the variables evaluated based on past research produced 
mixed results.  Company size is thought to have consistent findings due to its use as 
an operationalising variable for several hypotheses including information production 
costs, management ability, political costs, advice and competitive advantage.  It can 
however be argued that it is difficult to identify which of the above factor/s is 
responsible for the measure.  Having assessed the mixed results for the other 
variables reviewed, it may be suggested that this swaying of conclusions may have 
been influenced by one or joint/several factors such as cultural differences, time 
factor, the nature of the information being investigated, variable measurement 
methods, scoring methods and procedures and differences in the statistical methods 
employed among many possibilities.  Another observed general restriction on 
research of this nature was that disclosure could not be reliably measured because 
companies used different phraseology yet referring to a similar point. 
It may be argued that there are several reasons for studying the impact of 
company characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, market related variables 
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and ownership on disclosure of KPIs in the UK.  There is only one identified study 
(Tauringana and Mangena, 2009) that statistically investigates the variables influencing 
the reporting of KPIs.  This study is limited to the media industry hence it may not be 
reflective of the general KPI reporting trends of UK companies.  Secondly the 
sample of companies under investigation is limited to 32 firms which may not be 
sufficient to be used in interpolating general KPI reporting practices.  Although the 
analysis is over four years a larger sample could have yielded different results. 
As suggested by Tauringana and Mangena (2009), an area of further research 
would be to extend this research into other industries and make use of larger samples 
as will be done in this particular research.  PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006) suggest 
that KPIs are more likely to be company and sector specific, but it is important to 
have a general picture of the reporting trends across different industries for the 
purpose of policy implications.  It is also important to study further on the influence 
of certain variables on disclosure in the UK because the few existing local studies 
produced mixed results, for example the association of profitability and gearing with 
the extent of disclosure.  There is a knowledge gap for which further information will 
be potentially added through this research, for example on (1) the nature of KPI 
disclosures by UK public listed and private limited companies, (2) the influence of 
company specific characteristic variables on KPI disclosures, (3) the impact of 
certain corporate governance mechanisms on KPIs disclosures in annual reports 
among many. 
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3 Annual Report Users and their Information Needs 
3.1 Introduction 
 This study on key performance indicators (KPIs) analyses several variables and 
how those variables affect the disclosure of KPIs in the annual report.  The information 
that will be used in the analysis for this study will be derived from annual reports.  It is 
therefore important to analyse what the annual report is, who its users are and how 
useful it is to the identified stakeholder groups.  This chapter specifically discusses 
literature on the users of annual reports and their information needs.  This chapter will 
also assess whether there are any distinctive differences between the information needs 
of users of private and public company information.   
 It may be suggested that the information needs of annual report users are not 
independent; in the majority of cases, there are inter linkages between the needs of 
various user groups of the annual report and this issue is discussed in detail.  This 
chapter also contains a section that is dedicated to the reporting framework of KPIs and 
the IASB framework for the preparation of financial statements which are all 
disclosures that are found in annual reports but have important generic guidelines in 
order to make information useful to various users.  In this section, the researcher will 
look to assess how the reporting of KPIs links with the general reporting framework of 
financial information in the annual report.  
 The chapter is organised as follows:  This first section discusses the aims of 
financial reporting.  That section is followed by 3.2 on the stakeholders of the annual 
report.  Section 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the research techniques used for user need research 
and the information needs of those users respectively.  Section 3.6 looks at whether 
there are similarities and differences between the information needs of different users 
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specifically the users of private and public listed companies.  The study also assesses 
previous research on the usefulness of annual reports in section 3.7.  Section 3.8 
explores the reporting frameworks of KPIs and financial information in annual report 
followed by a summary and conclusion in section 3.9. 
 
3.2 The Aims of Financial Reporting and Trends Based on 
Jurisdiction 
 Work on financial reporting and its objectives dates back to the 1930s.  A vast 
majority of these early studies were based in America, for instance the American 
Accounting Association argued in 1936 that financial statements describe the utilisation 
of economic resources within an enterprise.  They also suggested that financial 
statements express the balance sheet’s position of the entity in relation to its creditors 
and investors.  The aims of financial reporting have always been a contentious area and 
are reviewed regularly in a bid to equate the balance between the demand and supply of 
financial reporting information. 
 An example of such a scenario was the joint meeting in 2005 between the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB); this was prior to the requirement to report KPIs in the annual 
report.  In the meeting (I.A.S.B and F.A.S.B, 2005), they tried to answer some key 
questions including which user groups should be targeted by financial reporting, 
whether financial reporting should look into the future or just present historical 
information about previous trading periods, should financial reporting include 
environmental & social information and what the role of the balance sheet among 
many.  The most recent of these major scenarios is the IASB’s approval of the 
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Conceptual Framework (the IFRS framework) for Financial Reporting (2010); this 
will be discussed in detail further in the chapter. 
 Going back in time, financial statements have also been referred to as useful 
in the provision of information that aids in approximating the potential for a business 
entity to earn money (A.I.C.P.A., 1970).  Later in 1973, the Trueblood Report which 
was a report compiled by a study group of public accountants from the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) concluded that the primary 
objectives of financial statements were to provide investors  and creditors with 
information that equips them for making economic decisions.  These decisions were 
thought to cover important matters such as comparisons, predictions and identifying 
potential cash flows.  This conclusion which is found in Chapter 11 of the report is 
reiterated in the Statement of Basic Accounting Theory (A.A.A., 1977).  The main 
objective of corporate reports is to disseminate information about the resources and the 
performance of the reporting firm (1975).  They also assert that financial reporting 
assigns economic measurements to these resources and performance.  The information 
should however be availed to individuals possessing reasonable rights to it.  An updated 
and more widely accepted definition of the objectives of financial reporting is as 
reported by the (A.S.B., 1991) that "the objective of financial statements is to provide 
information about the financial position, performance and financial adaptability of an 
enterprise that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions".   
 The objective of financial statements according to the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is to “provide information about the financial 
position, performance and changes in the financial position of an entity that is useful 
to a wide range of users in making economic decisions” (I.A.S.C., 1989, praragraph 
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12)
4
.  It must however be noted that although the IASB has this clear objective, some 
regulators do not necessarily follow suit because other factors come into play, hence 
standard setting is not always standard and neither is it always clear.  Examples of 
factors that come into play include the nature of the industry in which the reporting 
company operates.  In the UK for example, firms within the financial industry 
operate under specific sets of rules for disclosure purposes, these may not apply to a 
firm operating in the media industry for instance.  The main argument from the 
researcher’s point of view is that the IASB’s view on what the objectives of financial 
statements are determines the regulatory framework for financial reporting in the 
long term. 
 Regulators often try to set standards that enhance the economy and do not 
stifle business activity.  It is worth considering too that although the objectives 
according to the IASB for example seem simple, the standard setting process is a 
complex task that often has its pros and cons.  Standards are normally set within a 
framework that looks at both the quantitative and qualitative characteristics and this 
aspect is discussed in detailed in the section about KPIs and the qualitative 
characteristics of annual reports below. 
 Financial rules are constantly changing at different rates in different 
jurisdictions.  It is generally all for the betterment of the financial reporting system in 
meeting its reporting objectives and satisfying the information needs of financial 
reporting information users.  Some problems are however met when firstly some 
jurisdictions are resistant to the changes in rules/regulations/accounting standards.  
Some countries have had a very stable financial reporting framework and are 
                                                          
4
The statement however adopted by the IASB in 2001, was originally printed as part of the 
Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (1989). 
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reluctant to adopting the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for 
example, in European nations where some rules have not changed in over 20 years.  
Other countries such as the USA on the other hand, are very adaptable to change 
because the financial reporting environment is constantly facing changes and 
improvements in their financial reporting framework where some standards seem to 
change every year.  Secondly different countries and/or industries have objectives 
that may be conflicting to another hence offer resistance to adapt to international 
standards.  Financial reporting therefore aims to meet the information needs of 
different users using considered judgments based on the jurisdictions.  KPIs are a 
fairly new requirement and offer information to users from the management’s point 
of view.  Below are a series of examples in different regions highlighting how 
different cultures and jurisdictions may have implications to the objectives of 
financial reporting. 
 The majority of financial reporting rules in Switzerland for example are 
concerned with the objective of stable taxes and a stable economy.  The tax rules 
according to the Canton of Geneva allow for one third of the year end stock to be 
written off regardless of condition.  The effect is a reduction in the book value of 
assets and the profits.  The Swiss code
5
 and regulators take the view that companies 
should be undervalued during periods of economic boom through the creation of 
hidden reserves.  Such can then be utilised during economic downturn and cushion 
the disruption within the business environment.  Regulators in Switzerland argue that 
this approach is prudent and protects stockholders despite the fact that the methods 
clearly do not reflect the true economic state of the reporting entity.  Having 
                                                          
5
 The Swiss Commercial Code (code des obligations) 
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discussed the Swiss situation which has been in situ for a very long period of time, it 
is apparent that adopting IFRSs would be problematic.  Some companies however 
have moderately adopted the IFRSs as markets require accurate information that 
paints a true and fair picture of the economic state of the business entity.  An 
example of a Swiss firm that has adopted IFRSs is Nestle amongst several others. 
 The Swiss regulator places very little emphasis on information for capital 
markets in the construction of the financial reporting framework.  On the opposite 
end of the spectrum, the American system
6
 appears to pay particular attention to 
financial markets information.  Two main bodies in operation in the USA include the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for capital markets information and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) for standard setting.  Their joint 
information has the main objective similar to the ASB in the UK of providing 
information users with a platform from which to make investment decisions.  The 
focus according to the above is on public companies and it follows that the rules are 
not mandatory for private limited companies. 
In contrast to the Swiss and the American systems described above; the 
French systems places overall focus on combining the interests of different user 
groups in its standards setting process.  According to Horau (1995), under the Comité 
de réglementation comptable (Accounting Regulatory Committee); the standard 
setting process in France is founded on a multi-disciplinary cooperation that seeks to 
satisfy the needs of a mix of financial information users.  Horau (1995) also states 
that “French standard setting tries without always succeeding, to satisfy a number of 
unspecified or vaguely known needs of users who are never explicitly recognized”.  
                                                          
6
 US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) 
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Although international standard setting aims at standardising regulations, it is 
important to consider that cultural values and traditions within the business world 
affect financial reporting. 
Based on the general trends of defining the aims of financial reporting, one may 
however reach reasonable conclusions on the matter.  The generalised line of thought 
omnipresent is that financial reporting endeavours to satisfy users’ of financial reporting 
with material data that aids them in their decision making despite inclinations to other 
agendas such as taxing and economic stability in some jurisdictions.  An issue that may 
require further clarification is thus the identification of the users of financial reporting 
information.  The Corporate Report (1991) and the ASB (1991) identify seven user 
groups of financial reporting information while the AICPA (1970) and AAA (1977) 
only identify two groups.  This difference leads to a more widespread acceptance of the 
later models of defining user groups of financial reporting information. 
 
3.3 Users of the Annual Report 
 Some earlier studies as mentioned above have suggested that the only 
stakeholders of the annual report are creditors and investors.  It is however difficult to 
take that viewpoint nowadays due to the interests that certain members/groups of the 
public have on company information.  Part of this is due to the wider implications that 
company actions have on their day to day lives.  Such implications may include items 
such as pollution, employments prospects, local development and philanthropic 
activities.  This researcher does however agree that investors and creditors are the 
foremost users of annual report information.  Later studies however identify up to seven 
user groups of financial reporting information (e.g. Stone, 1967, Zoysa and Rudkin, 
2010, Beattie and Pratt, 2002).  The stakeholders of any given company are those 
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entities that affect or are affected by the activities of either party (I.F.R.S., 2010).  The 
researcher suggests that if a map of possible stakeholders of the annual report were to 
be drawn out according to the IFRS definition, it would look something like the 
illustration below (not all possibilities are accounted for). 
Figure 1: Generic Map of Stakeholders of the Annual Report 
 
 
 The groups or individuals above have different levels of interaction/affiliation 
with the business entity.  As a result of these differences it can be argued that their level 
of interest in information disclosed by the business entity varies.  Secondly, the nature 
of the information that they may seek to be disclosed by the reporting entity will also be 
different.  It is important to note that although companies do not have a legal 
requirement to report to each and every stakeholder possible; it has a moral obligation 
to the stakeholders of the business entity.  With that point in context, according to the 
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Corporate report (A.S.B., 1991); users of annual reports are those individuals or groups 
that have a reasonable right to information about a company. 
 The phrase above, “a reasonable right,” simply refers to individuals or groups 
that fall into the company stakeholder category.  The phrase also means that the 
disclosure of any such information that may be of use to stakeholders should be cost 
effective and not threaten the competitive position of the reporting entity.  The seven 
groups identified by The Corporate Report (A.S.B., 1991) as having a reasonable right 
to information include equity investors, loan creditors, employees, analyst-advisers, 
business contacts, government and the public.  Table 3 illustrates the user groups of 
company information as suggested by different authors. 
 
Table 3: Users of Annual Reports as Suggested by Four Reports 
The Corporate Report (1975) Making Corporate Reports Valuable 
(1988) 
The equity investor group The equity investor group 
The loan creditor group The loan creditor group 
The employee group The employee group 
The analyst-advisor group The business contact group 
The business contact group  
The government  
The public  
 
Accounting Standards Board (1991) 
 
IFRS Framework (2010) – only 
identifies primary users 
Present and potential investors Present and potential investors 
Employees Lenders 
Lenders Creditors 
Suppliers and creditors  
Customers  
Government and other agencies  
Public  
  
  
 Although company reports are normally directed to the shareholders of the 
reporting entity, it is clear that more than just the shareholders alone are affected by the 
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activities of a reporting entity.  Lee (1982) therefore suggests that more groups would 
be interested in annual report information.    
 Throughout the years, companies have provided information to those 
individuals or groups who provide financial investment.  The nature of the information 
provided to these investors has changed over the years depending on the nature of the 
financial investment provider for example banks, lenders, and shareholders.  Gray et al. 
(1989) suggest that reporting entities also have an obligation to reporting to the wider 
public who may have some form of affiliation with the business either directly or 
indirectly.  Such a wider audience is thought to include employees, trade unions, 
consumers, government agencies and the general public among others. 
 Gray et al. (1989) suggest about five reasons that warrant the need for 
information to be directed at a wider audience other than providers of financial 
investment alone.  Some of the reasons they suggested include pressures from trade 
unions particularly in developed countries having an impact on the information 
demanded from reporting entities.  Secondly Gray et al. (1989) recognise an increase in 
“challenges to authority.”  They argue that individuals or groups who are affected by 
certain institutional decisions have fought for a right to influence those decisions before 
they are made.  Third, there has been a post-war swing particularly in the UK and USA 
from governments to implement Keynesian-type economics that promote lesser 
regulation in the pursuit of private gains which would maximise the welfare of the 
society.  Dwelling on the same point, there has been a lot of concern over the gap 
between private gains and social gains especially in the case of negative externalities 
such as pollution.  Finally, some corporations exert influences on macro-economic 
variables, social and national economic policies due their sheer size and industry 
concentration.  This leads to greater concern in the demand for information. 
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 In a report entitled Making Corporate Reports Valuable (I.F.R.S., 2010), it was 
suggested that there are only four users of the annual report namely employees, 
business contacts, equity investors and loan creditors.  The ICAS Report, (2010) 
deliberately leaves out analyst- advisors, the government and the public at large.  They 
suggest that these groups are not primary stakeholders of information in the reporting 
entity which is in contrast to the Corporate Report (A.S.B., 1991) suggestions.  The 
ICAS Report (2010) places an argument that the analyst-advisor group use annual 
report information but they only do so in fulfilling their role as agents and not the end 
consumers of the information themselves.  The ICAS Report (2010) also goes on to 
argue that the specific information needs of the government and those of the public are 
not a priority unless it is in relation to their capacity as potential investors, loan creditors 
and/or business contacts. 
 Consistent with the ICAS Report (2010); IFRS (2010) also suggest that the 
primary users of general purpose financial reporting are present and potential 
investors, lenders and other creditors.  They suggest that these groups use such 
information for deciding on buying, selling or holding equity or debt instruments and 
providing or settling loans or other forms of credit.  IFRS (2010) go on to explain that 
primary users of annual reports use report information to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the current management (stewardship) at the reporting entity.  Section F 
0B6 of the IFRS (2010) report acknowledges that annual reports do not always 
contain all the information necessary for stakeholders to make economic decisions 
and suggest that they would need to consider pertinent information from alternative 
sources too.  Although the Framework notes mention that other parties such as 
prudential and market regulators may find annual reports useful.  They assert that 
both the objectives of general financial reporting and regulation may not be 
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consistent.  For that reason they suggest that annual reports are not directed to 
regulators or other parties (I.F.R.S., 2010, F OB10 and F BC1.20-BC 1.23). 
 Looking back at ICAS Report (2010) it can be seen that of the reasons provided 
for their arguments, it was stated that the government as a legislative authority can 
mandate the disclosure of specific information that they would solely be interested in.  
The information needs of the general public according to ICAS (2010) were found to be 
encapsulated in the information requirements by loan creditors, equity investors, 
employees and business contacts.  None of the information embedded in annual reports 
was found to specifically address the needs of the general public alone.  Further to 
public information, the ICAS Report (2010) suggests that the information needs of the 
public should be taken care of by the government as it stands to represent the people.  
Blake (1978) takes the view that is more aligned with the stakeholder definition; he 
argues that anyone with an affiliation with the reporting entity in terms of both interests 
and activities is a potential user of annual reports.  Blake (1978) therefore suggests that 
that further to the seven users identified by The Corporate Report (A.S.B., 1991); 
competitors, non-executive directors, regulatory bodies, researchers and journalists are 
also annual report stakeholders. 
 Gray and Roberts (1989) investigated the influence of fourteen user groups on 
the extent of voluntary disclosures by companies through the eyes of UK finance 
directors.  The study made use of a questionnaire sent out to the directors.   Gray and 
Roberts (1989) reported that the respondents ranked the groups to be of influential 
importance in the following ascending order; financial press, private investors, potential 
investors, institutional investors and financial analysts.  These were deemed to have an 
above average influence on the material voluntarily disclosed by reporting entities. 
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 Gray and Roberts (1989) reported that those with the least influence on the 
information voluntarily disclosed by companies scored less than 3 points on a 5 point 
likert scale according to UK finance directors.  Examples of such entities included 
employees, bankers, general public, creditors, consumer groups, domestic government 
agencies, foreign government agencies, domestic taxation authorities and foreign tax 
authorities.  The research by Gray and Roberts (1989) was based on listed companies 
alone so it is reasonable to see why they preferred to provide more voluntary reports to 
financial analysts and institutional investors.  Table 4 illustrates their findings. 
Table 4: The Influences of User Groups on Information Disclosure  
 
Rank Mean (n = 
116) 
Coefficient 
of 
Variation 
(%) 
Wilcoxon 
test prob. 
    
1    Financial Analysts 4.86 27 0.4662 
2    Institutional Investors 4.78  27 0.0000
**
 
3    Potential Investors 4.24 35 0.2675 
4    Private Investors 4.12 31 0.8697 
5    The Financial Press 4.05 34 0.4378 
6    Employees 2.93 35 0.1757 
7    Bankers 2.71 43 0.0000
**
 
8    General Public 1.84 48 0.0429
**
 
9    Creditors 1.58    47 0.8109   
9    Consumer Groups 1.58 56 0.5521 
11  Domestic Government Agencies 1.51    52 0.5014 
12  Foreign Government Agencies 1.46 59 0.4342 
13  Domestic Taxation Authorities 1.39 57 0.1614 
14  Foreign taxation Authorities 1.33 55  
    
 
*Range = 1-5;   1= no influence      5= large influence = significant at 5% level 
     (Adapted from Gray and Roberts, 1989, Table 7.3) 
 
Tauringana (1997) suggests that private investors may have been ranked behind 
financial analysts, institutional and potential investors by the respondents in the study 
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by Gray and Roberts (1989) because private investors may be too diffuse to have any 
influence (as a user group) on the information disclosed in annual reports.  The study 
however points out that there are several user groups of the annual report and it is 
difficult to pin it down to just a few distinct groups of users.  The next section will 
investigate the different information needs sought by different users of the annual 
report. 
 
3.4 Research Techniques for User Needs Research 
 There are several methods that are used to investigate a wide range of issues 
relating to what users of financial information statements look out for.  Beattie and Pratt 
(2002) suggest that the various issues investigated include matters such as what the 
preferred information items by users are, what information users utilise to make their 
decisions, how the information is related to decision performance and what information 
items appear to have value-relevance based on its impact on company value. 
 Based on previous studies one can conclude that different methods of 
investigation are used in these types of studies.  Information preference investigations 
are normally conducted through questionnaires.  Decision performance matters and 
known preferences are usually further investigated using three main methods (Beattie 
and Pratt, 2002).  Firstly, through analysis of content analysts’ reports (Previts et al., 
1994, Rogers and Grant, 1997, Breton and Taffler, 2001).  Secondly, through the 
documentation of actual decision processes via verbal protocol analysis (Biggs, 1984, 
Day, 1986b), participant observation (Gniewosz, 1990, Barker, 1998b) and retinal 
imaging (McEwen and Hunton, 1999).  Finally, experimental studies based on case 
studies (Mear and Firth, 1987). 
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3.5 Information Needs of the Annual Report Stakeholders 
 Different user groups of company information will have different needs based 
on their relationship with the company.  This will also determine the quantity and 
frequency of the information disclosure they require from the reporting entity.  The 
American Accounting Association (1973) argues that potential and current investors for 
example, use information disclosed by companies in deciding whether to go long or 
short on the reporting entities equity stocks.  In The Corporate Report (1991, p.22), it is 
also suggested that equity investors will wish to use disclosed information to look into 
the future and make decisions with regards the likely movements of share prices and 
future dividends, they will also use the information to make judgments on 
managements’ efficiency in running their company.  Based on the above it may be seen 
that the common information factors of concern to information users regard the 
reporting company’s current financial position, future prospects and management 
performance.   
 According to AAA (1973), when companies are preparing their annual report, 
they need to put credit lines into consideration.  The company needs to consider what 
kind of credit it may seek while on the other hand credit grantors need to make 
decisions on whether it is worthwhile and safe to offer credit to the reporting entity.  
Credit grantors will therefore assess what security measures are in place to ensure that 
they get a reasonable return for their lending risk.  In cases where credit has already 
been granted, creditors will need to assess whether to call up full payment on maturity 
of the credit deal or whether to increase or decrease the lending commitment. 
 Prospective creditors to the reporting entity will also need to make an 
assessment on whether the ambitions of the company they wish to lend are congruent 
with the creditors’.  Stability and growth prospects are also taken into account among 
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other considerations which may be creditor/firm specific depending on the nature of the 
industry that the reporting entity operates within.  The perceptions of the prospective 
creditors on the company’s image are also important.  Employees are another user 
group interested in the stability of their employer.  They will possibly look to find out 
whether there are any growth prospects for the company and whether there is a 
possibility of entitlement to bonuses and other pecuniary benefits that come with a 
stable and expanding firm. 
 The majority of the individuals and groups discussed so far in this section have 
a direct personal or financial association with reporting entity.  External stakeholders 
may also require information from the company but will not necessarily be directly 
related to the activities of the organisation in question.  Company information is 
required by the government and many policy formulating bodies.  This information may 
be required for statistical purposes and may be very useful in policy formulation which 
in turn affects not only the companies that report the information but other stakeholder 
groups such as employees and the general public.  Trade Unions represent employees 
and may find information reported in annual reports very useful in the formulation of 
policies that affect employees.   They may also require certain information for 
monitoring purposes and transmitting statistics to their members. 
 Customers and trade debtors are external stakeholders of the annual report and 
are concerned about certain aspects of company information reported in their annual 
reports.  Examples of such instances are where customers wish to have the reassurance 
that the reporting entity has the ability to produce a product of an assured quality at an 
economic price.  Customers also wish reassurance of the going concern of companies, 
for example in the tourist industry where holidays may be bought in advance, company 
stability issues are thus of grave concern.  On the other hand The Corporate Report 
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(1991, p. 25-26) states that "members of the community may wish to know about the 
role of economic entities as employers, contributions to political organisations, pressure 
groups and charities...expenditure affecting society and the environment". 
  From the outlook it seems that different users have different information needs 
from reporting entities.  At the same time it may be argued that there are bands of 
similar information that are disclosed by companies and all users groups are catered for 
within those bands, for instance in cases where the government is a representative of the 
general public therefore the band of information disclosed to the government would 
also cater for public needs.  There is however a case for both sides of the story as one 
may suggest that each individual information user group may require a specific aspect 
of information in a specific context to satisfy their information needs.  Since there are 
different user groups, different information needs and different relationships between 
information users and the reporting entities, it will be necessary to take a closer look at 
the similarities and differences in information needs.  The discussion of similarities and 
differences will assist in assessing what kind of information companies need to be 
disclosing in order to meet the needs of their various information users. 
 
3.6 Do Private Company Financial Statement Users Have Different 
Information Needs? 
In a recent report (FAFBT., 2012); the Financial Accounting Foundation 
Board of Trustees (FAFBT) voted to establish the Private Company Council (PCC).  
This is a move which is the first of many steps in developing a reporting framework 
that targets private companies.  The PCC under the proposals would work with the 
FASB in putting together a structure that facilitates GAAP modifications for 
privately owned companies.  This move is in response to the notion that there are 
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likely to be different information needs between the financial statement users of 
private and public listed companies.  A fundamental question that still requires being 
addressed through research is whether the information needs of these different users 
are actually different.  The Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) report (p. 8) on standard setting 
for private companies, once again suggests that users of private company information 
and those of public company information have different needs.  Clear distinctions of 
these needs are however not delineated and difficult to justify from an economic 
theory point of view (Rees, 2012, AICPA., 2005).  Some users of financial 
statements of private companies however concede that there might be to a certain 
extent, a redressing of the cost benefit equation. 
From the earlier discussions it can be summarised that one of the core 
objective of financial reporting is the provision of information relating to cash flows.  
This may include details such as the timing of these cash flows, their amounts and 
probability of future inflows.  Such information is important to capital providers in 
the case of public listed companies and important to lenders in the case of private 
limited companies.  The main contribution of the FASB in these changes thus relate 
to the creation of financial reporting standards that provide the different financial 
statement users with information relating to future cash flows depending on whether 
they are a capital provider or a lender.  It can be seen from the arguments that there is 
little to distinguish between the information needs of both sets of financial statement 
users (see for example Rees, 2012). 
Further to the argument that there are minimal differences in the information 
needs; the Financial Executives Research Foundation (FERF) issued a report entitled, 
“What do users of private company financial statements want?” (Sinnett and 
Graziano, 2006).  The report produced by Sinnet and Graziano (2006) highlighted 
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that users such as lenders, investment bankers and investors all required financial 
statements that are GAAP audited.  Private annual company financial report users 
however require more information than what is currently provided by private limited 
companies regarding the assessment of future cash flows.  Although private company 
information users require more information, they do not require different information 
to the users of financial statements from public listed companies. 
According to the FERF report of 2006, it may be concluded that private 
company financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP are of high value 
even when a comparison is made with the costs of preparing the financial statements.  
The results of the survey also indicated that private company reports were of medium 
to moderately high value but did not request respondents to provide any feedback 
regarding the value of public listed company statements thus a direct comparison 
difficult to make.  The main difference to be drawn is the fact that some of GAAP 
requirements are of little importance/relevance to private companies.  Based on the 
results of the survey, the possibility that the respondents have a low opinion of 
GAAP cannot be ruled out.  Secondly Rees (2012) suggests that the survey by 
(Sinnett and Graziano, 2006) might simply highlight the hardships
7
 faced by smaller 
companies in meeting GAAP requirements in comparison to public listed companies 
while failing to address the question of differences in the information needs by users 
of private and public company statements.  Based on the evidence there are no 
significant differences in the information required by the two groups of users; 
perhaps the main differences only lie in the value placed on the various information 
items by the respective groups of users. 
                                                          
7
 Due to limited resources 
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3.7 Empirical Evidence on the Usefulness of Annual Reports 
There are several studies that have investigated how useful the annual report is 
particularly as a  vehicle for discharging accountability (Boyne and Law, 1991, Chang et 
al., 1983).  Many authors have stated that the annual report is of most importance in 
terms of disseminating company information.  Marston and Shrives (1991a) for example 
concluded that the annual report is the most comprehensive document available to the 
public and is therefore the “main disclosure vehicle”.  Trayer and Warren (2005) posited 
that the annual report is the most important complete source of information available for 
details relating to companies.  Parker (1992) indicated that the annual report is of great 
importance and is a mass communication medium while Anderson and Epstein (1995) 
confirmed that the corporate annual report could make a major contribution to improved 
corporate communications, corporate accountability, and corporate governance. Despite 
this huge approval from some researchers, some have questioned the quality and 
usefulness of annual report disclosures and some of these studies are discussed below. 
 
3.7.1 Survey of Corporate Bodies and Financial Analysts 
 Previous surveys of financial analysts and corporate bodies have attempted to 
understand how scrupulously these information user groups read financial statements, 
what sources they use for investment decisions, how the investment decision process 
works and how well they understand accounting terminology.  Although stockbrokers 
and institutional investor make use of a wide variety of sources for obtaining financial 
information from reporting entities, the majority of their information is derived from 
interim and annual reports (Lee and Tweedie, 1981).  Lee and Tweedie, (1981) also 
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suggest in their study that issues concerning specific reporting practices such as 
valuations were more understood compared to matters of principle. 
 Mason (1971) conducted interviews on  24 investing institutions and 18 
stockbrokers in the UK.  The aim of the research was to find out their sources of 
information in order to make investment decisions.  The results of the research revealed 
that annual reports were rated very lowly by investment institutions as sources of 
information while stockbrokers and statistical cards were rated highly as sources of 
information.  On the other hand, the stockbrokers themselves rated personal contacts as 
the most important source of information then followed by company reports. Annual 
and interim reports were also found to be the most widely used sources of information 
by stockbrokers in Victoria, Australia (Clift, 1973).  
 Protocol analysis was used by Day (1986a) to arrive at an understanding of the 
methods used by investment analysts in their decision making.  Protocol analysis was 
conducted by presenting problems to the subjects of the study and requesting them to 
think aloud thereby allowing the researcher to record the procedure steps taken.  
Observation continued until the problem was solved.  In the protocol analysis method, 
further questions were asked to the subjects of the experiment to clear up any aspects or 
issues that needed clarification.  Day (1986a) observed that there was need for more 
detailed interim information including balances sheet figures.  He also identified that 
there was a lack of hard forward looking information in the chairman’s report.  
According to Day (1986a), reporting practice has some fundamental shortcomings that 
need attention. 
 21 investment analysts and 12 institutional investors were investigated by Bence 
et al., (1995).  The results of the study highlighted that investment analysts ranked 
annual reports fifth after preliminary announcements, personal interviews, interim 
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statements, and company presentations.  The institutional investor results revealed that 
they valued annual reports and personal interviews as the joint most important sources 
of information.  In a similar type of research in the UK, Barker (1998a) found that 
annual reports and accounts ranked third after direct contact with the company and 
analyst meetings.  Fund managers ranked annual report most important only after 
meetings with senior management. 
 A survey of 200 UK financial analysts and fund managers was conducted by 
Coleman and Eccles (1997).  They investigated how adequately specific information 
items were reported.  They found that cash and earnings data were adequately reported 
and six other valuable measures.  Companies however failed to adequately report 
information relating to, market share, employee productivity, new product 
development, customer relations, product quality, research & development productivity 
and finally intellectual property. 
 Eccles et al., (1998) conducted a survey of 100 senior executives belonging to 
UK public companies.  In their survey they sought to find out the importance of 20 
measures that are used in the management of the business and the frequency of 
communication of these measures to financial analysts and investors.  Financial 
measures were considered to be the most important based on the results, these included 
cash flow, earnings, costs, and capital expenditure.  Other highly rated measures 
included market positioning factors such as customer satisfaction, market share and 
market growth.  There were some moderately important items according to the survey 
results and these included segment performance, employee satisfaction, customer 
retention, employee training levels & retention, employee turnover, product quality and 
new product development.  The less important items included research and 
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development investment, process quality, environmental compliance, intellectual 
property and research & development productivity.  
 Beattie and Pratt (2002) sought out to explicitly investigate the views of users of 
financial statements in relation to a comprehensive set of disclosure items.  Their survey 
investigated both professional and non-professional user groups.  They investigated 538 
individuals that use financial report by UK listed companies, the main categories of 
individuals included expert users, private shareholders, finance directors and audit 
partners.  22 follow up interviews were also conducted.  The respondents of the surveys 
were required to rate the usefulness of mandatory information categories for the 
purpose of investment decision making.  Based on the results of the study, the highest 
rated categories of information were those with information relating to financial 
information, strategy and objectives, management discussion and analysis, background 
and innovation value drivers.  In general Beattie and Pratt (2002) found that the 
absolute usefulness of information items attributed by finance directors tended to fall 
below that of users, with audit partners falling between the two positions. 
 
3.7.2 Survey of Individuals 
 The main areas that were investigated by researchers when assessing individual 
investors constituted a wide range of information.  One of the areas was to assess 
whether or not individual investors understand accounting terminology that is used in 
explaining financial statements. Another was assessing what areas of the annual reports 
individual investors read.  Another was to investigate the usefulness of the items of 
information that individual investors read and ranking them in order of how 
instrumental they were in assisting the investment decision process. 
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 In a New Zealand study by Wilton and Tabb (1978), they surveyed 300 
shareholders.  The shareholders were sampled through a process of random selection 
from registers of two New Zealand companies.  The survey results indicated that the 
most read sections of the annual report were the chairman's report and the profit & loss 
account, in that order.  According to the survey results, the auditor’s report was the least 
read section of the annual report.  Similar results were exhibited by Winfield (1978) in a 
survey of 850 individual shareholders of a Western Australian.  Winfield (1978) 
reported that the chairman/directors' report was the most read section followed by the 
profit and loss accounts.    Other similar results include Anderson (1979) in another 
Australian study and Lee and Tweedie (1975) in a UK study.  
 The studies by Baker & Haslem (1973) and Chenhall & Juchau (1977) required 
individual investors to rank information items found in the annual report.  The ranking 
was assigned on a likert scale of 0-5, where 5 represented very important information.  
The final rankings that were used for the analysis were based on the mean of the 
individual rankings of the items that were in the survey results.  From the two studies it 
was found that individual investors ranked forward looking information more highly 
than historical data. 
 In a slightly different stream of analysis; Chang and Most (1977) investigated 
the preferred sources of information by individual shareholders in order for them to 
make investment decisions.  The study which surveyed 1034 individual shareholders 
concluded that annual reports were the most preferred source of information for 
investment decisions.  Other sources of information that were deemed important were 
newspapers and magazines.  Tips and rumours were also investigated as an information 
source for investment decision purposes but were found not be a preferred source 
among individual shareholders.  The results by Chang and Most (1977) were in line 
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with the findings of Winfield (1978) who also concluded from his study that annual 
reports and the financial press were the two most important sources of information for 
investment decisions as judged by individual investors.  However Baker & Haslem 
(1973) and Chenhall & Juchau (1977) did not find annual reports to be the most 
important sources of decision information by individual investors. 
 Proshare (1999) conducted a survey on the use of the annual report by 
investigating 1000 telephone interviews of private investors.  Approximately 92% of 
the subjects claimed to read annual reports.  Based on the survey results, there are nine 
sections that were consistently read by those who read the annual report.  The nine 
sections included information relating to dividends, summary information, profit and 
loss, balance sheet, shareholder information, chairman’s statement, director’s earnings, 
operational reviews and the chief executive’s report.  AICPA (2000) undertook a 
national investor poll in which they asked 600 investors whether they thought the 
provision of new information types would be necessary.  Based on the results of the 
enquiry, 875 agreed with the provision of measures of the value of new services and 
products; 83% agreed with forward looking financial information that was auditor 
reviewed, 79% agreed with consistent and audited performance indicators that could be 
comparable across the sector, 78% agreed with corporate responsibility information; 
76% agreed with measures of the value of innovation; 75% agreed with high frequency 
financial information and 73% agree with measures of intangible assets. 
 
3.7.3 Studies of Market Reaction to the Release of Annual Reports 
 Companies that are listed on a stock exchange often disclose more information.  
Theory suggests that this assists market participants in accurately valuing the stocks of 
any such company.  Studies on market reaction date back to the sixties and are still on-
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going as evidenced below.  Over the years, many studies have investigated evidence of 
whether the market reacts to the release of information about the company and in this 
case through the release of annual reports.  
 An early study by Ball and Brown (1968); for example, sought to find out 
whether information released in the Wall Street Journal and subsequently in annual 
reports was used by investors.  Ball and Brown (1968) therefore investigated whether 
prior knowledge of company performance would be sufficient in order to make 
abnormal returns.  The study by Ball and Brown (1968) implemented a time-series 
model of earnings expectations.  In the model, the following year's earnings were 
determined to be equal to the current year’s earnings.  Through the use of a regression 
model, Ball and Brown (1968) assumed that the change in a firms earnings was 
consistent with its historical association with an aggregate market index of earnings.  
Two portfolios were then formed in which the actual earnings were compared with the 
estimates developed.  Positive
8
 and negative
9
 forecast error firms were arranged into 
separate portfolios.   These portfolios were formed twelve months before the release of 
the actual earnings figures.  The idea was to assess whether investors can make use of 
this prior knowledge to earn abnormal returns. 
 Ball and Brown’s (1968) results indicated that positive forecast error firms 
outperformed the market while negative forecast errors firms performed worse than the 
market.  It was found through the study that the majority of changes in stock prices 
occurred in the first quarter of the year.  Towards the periods of earnings releases, it was 
found that there was minimal movement in share prices suggesting that time delays 
almost totally discounted actual earnings releases.  The end result was that it was 
                                                          
8
 Firms for which the actual earnings exceeded the expected earnings. 
9
 Firms for which the actual earnings were less than the expected earnings. 
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impossible to make abnormal returns based on the earnings as stated in the annual 
reports when they were released. 
 It was however argued by Beaver (1968a) that annual reports contain useful 
investor information.  Beaver (1968a) observed stock price and stock volume reaction 
using time series analysis.  Beaver (1968a) concluded that earnings reports possessed 
information content.  The price and volume reactions indicated that the expectations of 
investors were altered by the release of the earnings reports.  Changes in equilibrium 
prices also demonstrated changes in the behaviour of the market in general. 
 The information content of disclosures was tested in the UK by Rippington and 
Taffler (1995).  The four releases investigated in their study were the (1), the 
preliminary announcement (PA); (2), annual reports and accounts (ARA); (3), annual 
general meeting (AGM) and (4), interim report (IRs).  The results from their study 
revealed that all four contained information content but preliminary announcements and 
interim statements convey the most substantial amounts of new information.  Based on 
the results, it was argued in the study that annual reports seem to contain less 
information content to market participants in comparison to the other three mediums.  
The issue was therefore investigated further.  Rippington and Taffler (1995) matched 29 
firms with large annual reports and accounts outlier residuals with similar number of 
firms but low residuals. In this stage of the research, any financial press comments that 
related to the annual report and accounts were scrutinised and note was taken for any 
stock price sensitive information.  According to the data, an average of 1.34 items were 
identified per company and 60% of them related to the chairman’s statement and 
balance sheet, this was compared with just one such item for the control group 
(Rippington and Taffler, 1995). The conclusion from this part of the study was that 
119 
 
despite the subjective analysis, there is evidence to support the argument that there is 
information content in the annual reports and accounts of some firms. 
 Gajewski and Quere (2001) examined the market reaction to annual earnings 
announcements on the French capital markets.  In the study, they compared actual with 
expected earnings by financial analysts.  The results from the study revealed that 
positive unexpected earnings lead to positive abnormal returns, while negative 
unexpected ones cause negative returns.  These results confirmed earlier findings by 
Gajewski (1999) that revealed that trades significantly increase around earning 
announcements.  The study was conducted on the Paris Stock Exchange.  In a Swiss 
study, Caramanolis-Cotelli et al., (1999) investigated the influence of disclosure 
quality on the market reaction to annual reports.  The proxy used for disclosure 
quality in this study was a measure that was computed by the Swiss Financial 
Analyst Federation (SWAF).   The results revealed a positive relationship between 
this variable and absolute abnormal stock returns.  Caramanolis-Cotelli et al.,  (1999) 
suggested based on their results
10
 that “good firms” may be perceived to adopt 
policies that exhibit high quality disclosure to signal their nature to the market. 
 Under the topic of delays in the publication of the annual report it has been 
noted that there is information content in the annual report information because 
numerous studies (such as Bamber and Stratton, 1997, Cloyd et al., 1998, Lennox, 
1999, Teoh, 1992) concede that delays in the publications of these reports have an 
impact on share prices.  Dardor (2009) in a study that focused on annual report 
publishing delays in Libya supports this argument. Libya for example does not even 
have a capital market, shares in companies are primarily owned by companies that 
                                                          
10
 The influence of disclosure quality was significant for positive abnormal returns only. 
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are state owned but they still look to the annual report for information.  Dardor 
(2009) then goes on to state that although this being the case, delays in the publishing 
of the annual report affect the decisions of banks, the tax authority, and the auditing 
authority.  This finding supports the argument that annual reports bear information 
content.  In addition to the suggestion by Dardor (2009), it was posited by Owusu-
Ansah (2000) that the timeliness of financial reporting is a significant characteristic 
of accounting information.  He goes on to suggest that if the reports are not published 
early then the information embedded would be useless to decision makers.  It may 
also on this premise be suggested that annual reports hold information content, if 
they did not then timeliness would be an irrelevant area of research in terms of the 
release of the annual reports. 
 The issue of information content is however an on-going area of research both 
in the UK and abroad. As part of this section it is also worth noting that the studies 
discussed only provide a cross section of the issue as it is not possible to discuss all the 
previous studies on market reaction to the release of annual reports.  The main reason 
for the need for further research can be attributed to the diverging results on the reaction 
to the release of annual reports.  Firth (1981) in the UK for example suggests that 
annual reports have some incremental value whilst Rippington and Taffler (1995) 
suggested that annual reports have less information content compared to other mediums 
such as primary announcements and interim statements.  Ball and Brown (1968) in the 
USA indicated through their study that annual reports have very little information 
content as opposed to Beaver (1968b) and Cready & Mynatt (1991) who argue that 
annual reports have some incremental value for capital market participants. The 
following section analyses the non-capital based theories. 
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3.8 KPIs and Qualitative Characteristics of Useful Financial 
Information 
3.8.1 KPIs and their Usefulness in Financial Information 
The introduction of the requirement to report on key performance indicators by 
the Companies Act 2006 is a response to the need to improve the usefulness of 
financial reports to their users.  “KPI’s are factors by reference to which the 
development, performance or position of the business of the entity can be measured 
effectively. They are quantified measurements that reflect the critical success factors 
of an entity and disclose progress towards achieving a particular objective or 
objectives,’ (ASB, 2006b, RS1 paragraph 4).  From the definition, it may be seen that 
the objectives of the inclusion of KPIs in annual reports are in line with the 
objectives of financial statements according to the IASB.  “Financial statements 
should provide information about the financial position, performance and changes in 
the financial position of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making 
economic decisions” (I.A.S.C., 1989, praragraph 12)11. 
The reporting framework for KPIs recommends the following items to be 
included when describing them: Definition and calculation, Purpose, Source of 
underlying data, Reconciliation to financial statement information (where 
applicable), Quantified target, Quantified data, and whether changes have been made 
to the source or calculation of data.  The simple yet effective approach in the 
reporting of KPIs seems to be in place in order to allow various users to have an 
understanding of the critical success factors of the reporting entity regardless of their 
financial sophistication.  KPIs may therefore be found in both the full annual report 
                                                          
11
The statement however adopted by the IASB in 2001, was originally printed as part of the 
Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (1989). 
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and in summary financial statements that are mainly directed at private individual 
investors.   
 
3.8.2 Qualitative Characteristics and their Usefulness in Financial Information 
As this chapter is about the information needs of annual report users; this 
section discusses briefly the guidance according to the IFRS of what the qualitative 
attributes of financial information are.  The general idea therefore being that 
information disclosed in annual reports following these guidelines will therefore be 
more useful to annual report users.  To aid in the usefulness of the annual reports to 
its users, the IFRS Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2010 was 
approved by the IASB.  Among other issues raised in the framework, a particularly 
relevant issue is that of the qualitative characteristics of useful financial information.    
This section simply explains how changes within financial reporting are developing 
in a manner that streamlines information to stay relevant.  This section explains the 
quality aspects that provide a framework for financial reporting such that information 
retains value to all users thus meeting their information needs.  The qualitative 
characteristics of useful financial reporting identify information that would aid users 
in making decisions about the reporting entity.  The IFRS (2010) asserts that the 
qualitative characteristics have equal application to financial information in general 
purpose financial reports as well as to financial information provided in other ways 
according to sections F QC1 and QC3.  Six items are identified as fundamental 
qualitative characteristics. 
First, Comparability of information is important to users of annual reports in 
order to compare the financial statements of an entity over time so that they can 
identify trends in its financial position and performance.  Users must also be able to 
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compare the financial statements of different entities (I.F.R.S., 2010, F.39-42).  
Second, financial information needs to be Understandable.  Information should be 
presented in a way that is readily understandable by users who have a reasonable 
knowledge of business, economic activities and accounting; they must willing to 
study the information with reasonable diligence (I.F.R.S., 2010, F.25).  Third, 
Relevance in financial reporting refers to information which influences the economic 
decisions of users.  This process is normally done through the provision of 
information in financial statements that helps in (a), evaluating past, present, or 
future events relating to an entity and (b), confirming or correcting past evaluations 
they have made (I.F.R.S., 2010, F.26-28).  Information in financial statements needs 
to satisfy both
12
 aspects of relevance.   
Fourth, Reliability is an important characteristic.  Information in financial 
statements is reliable if it is free from material error and bias and can be depended 
upon by users to represent events and transactions faithfully (I.F.R.S., 2010, F.31-
32).  It is important to note that there is sometimes a trade-off between reliability and 
relevance.  Reliability is affected by the use of estimates and by uncertainties 
associated with items recognised and measured in financial statements.   The fifth 
and sixth items are Verifiability and Timeliness.  Verifiability aids the users of 
financial information in ascertaining the faithful representation of financial reporting 
information.  Verifiability also assumes that different user groups if financial 
reporting information could somewhat reach an agreement in the interpretation of 
reported information (I.F.R.S., 2010, F QC26).  Finally information is deemed timely 
                                                          
12
 (a) Materiality, information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic 
decisions of users (IFRS 2010, F.29) and  
(b) Timeliness, in order to be useful, information must be provided to users within the time period in 
which it is most likely to bear on their decisions (IFRS 2010, F.43). 
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if it is available to decision makers in such a time that it is capable of influencing 
their decisions (I.F.R.S., 2010, F QC29). 
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Figure 2: The Qualitative Characteristics of Financial Information 
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3.9 Summary and Conclusion 
 This chapter was aimed at discussing the users of the annual reports and what 
information they seek from reporting entities.  This chapter commenced by analysing 
the objectives of financial reporting.  In this section the major conclusion was that 
although there are variations based on different cultures and jurisdictions, the main 
objective of financial reporting is however to provide users with information that is 
useful to them for making investment decisions.  At this point there was the strong 
question of who these annual report users are.  Having looked at some accounting 
literature about the different users of annual reports, several user groups were suggested 
in the extant.  Some of the studies investigated suggested that there were two main user 
groups of annual reports, shareholders and creditors.  Other studies, for instance  Gray 
and Roberts’ (1989) suggested that there were more than just shareholders and creditors 
who use annual report information.  This finding about the existence of several annual 
report information user groups is consistent with empirical evidence produced by UK 
studies.  
 The studies identified in the literature reviewed were further investigated to 
assess the information needs of the users of annual reports.  The majority of the 
arguments suggested in this section pointed that the relationship of the users groups 
with the company determined their information needs.  Along this line of argument, it 
was found that suppliers for example would seek information that would assist them in 
deciding about the best lines of credit that can be made available to the company.  
Equity investors for instance would seek information that is related to the likely 
movements in the prices of equity stocks, future dividends and management efficiency.  
 After having looked at the information needs of users of annual reports, the 
following discussion looked at the similarities and differences in the information sought 
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by different users in separate groups as well as different users within the same group.  
There was conflicting evidence suggested in the different studies that were analysed for 
this part of the chapter.  Some studies reported that the information sought by different 
user groups was similar while some reported that there were significant differences in 
the information needs of different users.  Some of the studies that suggested that the 
information sought by different user groups was substantially similar were criticised for 
demonstrating some form of bias.  Within such studies, the groups that were 
investigated did not cover a broad scope of user groups.  Those studies that reported 
that there were significant differences in the information needs of different users had on 
average investigated a wider range of information users.  The studies that suggested that 
there were substantial differences in the information needs of different user groups also 
pointed out that those different users have different levels of comprehension of financial 
reporting information hence have a different understanding.  Following the trend of 
understanding the information in annual reports, the researcher continued to look at 
these differences in the levels of understanding as a separate section.  Two studies in the 
UK for instance Lee and Tweedie (1977, 1981), provided evidence that private 
shareholders and some institutional shareholders did not understand accounting 
information provided in the annual report. 
 This situation was escalated by privatisation policies which were adopted in the 
1980's which had led to an increase in the number of private shareholders with little or 
no understanding of accounting information.  It was therefore argued that the 
Companies Act 2006 recognised this lack of understanding of the full annual report 
among private shareholders in the UK.  In response, the Companies Act 2006 s.426 
(Option to provide summary financial statement) provided within regulation, the option 
for listed companies to send out an abridged version of the annual report to shareholders 
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who would wish for such an option as opposed to the full annual report.  The abridged 
version proved to be less confusing and easier to understand for private shareholders 
who in the majority of cases are not financially sophisticated individuals.  
 The usefulness of annual reports to their users was then examined.  The main 
sets of users identified for the investigation were individual shareholders, financial 
analysts and corporate bodies.  There were mixed findings over the usefulness of annual 
reports among corporate bodies and financial analysts.  According to Clift (1973), it 
was found that financial analysts and corporate bodies used annual reports as a major 
source of information for their decision making purposes.  On the other hand, studies 
like Mason (1971) indicated that annual reports were not substantially useful to the 
same user groups for the same purpose.  The existing evidence was also conflicting for 
usefulness of annual reports to individual shareholders for instance Baker and Haslam 
(1973) indicate that annual reports are not useful to individuals in investment decision 
making whilst Chang and Most (1977) indicate that annual reports were their main 
source of information in order to make investment decisions. 
 The final section discussed in this chapter was the aspect of KPIs and the 
qualitative characteristics of financial reporting information.  Judging from the latest 
developments in financial reporting, it appears that regulatory bodies within accounting 
continue to uphold increasing the usefulness of financial reporting information.  The 
definition and objectives of KPIs according to ASB (2006) compared to that of the 
objectives of financial reporting according to IASC (1989) demonstrate congruency.  
The IFRS (2010) also highlights six qualitative characteristics that clearly try to address 
the problems of the annual reports being directed to a wide and varied audience.  The 
qualitative characteristics play two main roles, the first being to recommend to 
providers of financial information to disseminate useful material.  Secondly to provide 
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information from which readers can reach a consensus over the interpretation of 
reported information despite the annual report users’ diverse backgrounds. 
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4 Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the motivations why management disclose 
information in their annual reports.  This chapter will assist in explaining the 
motivations for KPI disclosures after reviewing the underlying theories that explain 
the disclosure of information in annual reports.  Disclosure of such information will 
be a signal of the fulfilment of their responsibilities to the market and the 
stakeholders at large.  The first section 4.2 of this chapter will discuss the main aims 
and theoretical background behind market related information in annual reports.  
Non-market related disclosures will be discussed in section 4.4. 
Under capital market based theories, the chapter discusses the signalling 
theory, capital needs theory, management talent signalling theory and the efficient 
markets hypothesis (EMH) over section 4.2.1 to 4.2.4.  Information disclosure and 
the cost of capital are discussed in section 4.3.  The second half of the chapter 
discussing non-capital market based theories discusses the agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, stewardship theory, theory of constraints 
(TOC) and political costs theory over sections 4.41 to 4.4.6 respectively.  The 
chapter closes with a summary of the discussions and draws some conclusions. 
 
4.2 Capital Market Based Theories 
The previous chapter identified and discussed the users of annual reports and 
their information needs.  The literature strongly indicated a pre-occupation with 
financial markets.  From the literature in Chapter 3 it was suggested that annual 
report disclosures by finance directors are to an extent influenced by financial 
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analysts.  Equity investors and analysts for instance are primarily interested in capital 
market information to aid them with their investment decisions.  Gray et al. (1995, p. 
46-47) add to this argument by stating that “... more generally, accounting 
information is a mechanism for conflict resolution between various stakeholders for 
both explicit and implied contracts, for example, between shareholders and 
bondholders, and even between the firm and society.”  Based on the above, it is a 
reasonable expectation to anticipate companies to disclose information that is market 
related. 
There are several arguments that have been put forward in the past to suggest 
that listed companies are likely to disclose market related information (Iatridis, 
2008a, Wang et al., 2008, da Silva Monteiro and Aibar-Guzmán, 2010, Gamerschlag 
et al., 2011).  Ronen and Livnat (1981) suggest that managers will disclose market 
related information if they believe that it would increase the wealth of the reporting 
firm’s shareholders equally in agreement with Iatridis (2008a).  Horton and Serafeim 
(2010) suggests that market information will signal good news about the company.  
Diamond (1985) suggests that if traders were to face lower costs for acquiring 
company information, risk sharing is improved by making traders’ beliefs more 
homogeneous.  Barry & Brown (1986) and Merton (1987) investigate Diamond’s 
(1985) argument and reach the same conclusions that managers can reduce their cost 
of capital by reducing information risk through increasing the level of disclosure.  
Finally, it was suggested that increased market information disclosures will reduce 
information asymmetry which would in turn reduce the company’s cost of capital 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991, Healy and Palepu, 2001, Cheng Chee Mun et al., 
2011, Deborah and Patricia, 2012).  The proceeding sections assess accounting 
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theories that may explain disclosures.  Theories that are relevant to private limited 
companies are discussed under non-capital based theories. 
 
4.2.1 Signalling Theory 
When problems arise because of the existence of information asymmetry in 
the capital markets, signalling may be used to alleviate them.  Information 
asymmetry may be reduced by firms through releasing information to less informed 
stakeholders such as a company releasing the annual report to its shareholders.  The 
theory was first developed in economics (e.g. Akerlof, 1970, Spence, 1973).  It was 
mainly used where customers were imperfectly informed about products and services 
available on the market.  Signalling is a general concept that may be applied in any 
market that is characterised by an information imbalance.  
Signalling has been used in previous studies to explain managers’ interests in 
voluntarily disclosing information about the prospects of the reporting entity to the 
capital market (Ross, 1979).   They argued that capital markets provide an objective 
evaluation of management performance through the prices placed on company shares 
by financial markets.  Good managerial performance drives share prices up, the 
reverse is also true.  This evaluation however, is only based on the information 
available to the market.  Share prices are driven down by the market in the case of 
high information asymmetry.  The general perception is that lack of disclosures 
reflects that there is bad news being withdrawn from the market.  Increased 
disclosures have the effect of raising the company’s share prices.  There is also an 
associated likelihood of management compensation to increase as a result of good 
performance.  Ross (1979) suggests that companies without news are also 
encouraged to report in a bid to distinguish themselves from ‘lemons’ as Akerlof 
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(1970) put it.  Companies whose shares are undervalued would incur an opportunity 
loss unless they disclose information
13
 to the market which then adjusts the 
company’s share price. 
Bar-Yosef and Livnat (1984) argued that auditor involvement in company 
affairs might be a signalling tool.  They suggest that engaging an external auditor by 
high valued firms signals the quality of the information disclosed.  Secondly they 
argue that companies that use large audit firms signal their superior cash flow status 
by using this expensive service.   Okcabol and Tinker (1993) suggest that external 
auditors are unlikely  to approve the disclosure of information that would mislead the 
market therefore their engagement symbolises good quality information disclosures.  
The signalling theory however fails to account for non-financial motivations for 
suppressing information disclosure (e.g. Okcabol and Tinker, 1993).  One of the 
main non-financial issues that can be identified is the protection of competitive 
advantage.   Elliott & Jacobson, (1994a) support this argument by suggesting that 
information disclosures on items such as earning projections, research and 
development and segmental information pose the possibility of threatening the 
reporting entity’s competitive position.  Non-disclosure of information therefore 
opens a loophole in that suppressing information may not always reflect that there is 
bad news about the company, it may just be a case of protecting competitive 
position.  Investors would need to make rational judgments.  Management generally 
disclose information with which the benefits outweigh the costs, both financial and 
otherwise.  Finally, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) in their study on disclosures among 
                                                          
13
 Such information may be viewed as knowledge to change the perceptions of the stakeholders and 
more importantly, the perceptions of capital market participants.  The prudence and accuracy of 
information disclosed in such situations may be questionable.  
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companies listed on the Portuguese stock exchange suggest that proprietary costs 
vary according to the industry within which they operate. Companies that are in the 
same industry therefore tend to have similar levels of disclosures in order to avoid 
negative appreciation by the market (competitive pressures). This argument they 
posit is in line with the signalling theory. 
 
4.2.2 Capital Needs Theory 
Arguments that higher levels of disclosure reduce the cost of capital have 
been identified as early as 1957.  Horngren (1957) posited that well-informed 
analysts and investors are likely to influence a favourable impact on the company’s 
share prices.  Shores (1990) suggests that investors are faced with investment 
decisions and must do so based on the amount of information they possess.  This 
situation therefore entails that there is a level of risk involved as there is normally 
some form of uncertainty over available information.  Increased information about a 
reporting entity plays the role of reducing the level of uncertainty that investors face 
in the decision making process.  Higher transaction costs for trading shares of a 
company are normally associated with information asymmetry too.  This situation 
gives rise to an increased required rate of return and pushes current equity stock 
prices down.   Many authors have argued that managers who increase the 
information available on the market about their company tend to reduce the levels of 
information asymmetry (Botosan, 1997, Sengupta, 1998, Lambert et al., 2012, Akins 
et al., 2012).  The reduction in information asymmetry should have the effect of 
maximising the value of the reporting firm.  
Botosan (1997) suggested that reducing investor uncertainty through 
increased disclosures would encourage them to accept a lower rate of return which 
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filters down to the company in the form of a lower cost of capital.  Plumlee (2002) 
further proposes that the cost of equity is inversely related to the level of market risk.  
Sengupta (1998) reports a similar inverse relationship but with the costs of debt in 
that study.  Li (2010) in a later study of 6456 European Union (EU) companies added 
that not only increased disclosure but dissemination of information that is 
comparable are the two main mechanisms behind the reduction of cost of equity.  
Piotroski (2000)  provides evidence that additional segment disclosures increase the 
market capitalisation of a firm’s earnings.  
 Securities with wide bid-ask spreads have been found to have a higher cost 
of equity capital (Yoon et al., 2011).  This normally occurs due to investors claiming 
compensation for the high transactions costs and in turn demanding a high return on 
investment.  In general, riskier
14
 companies tend to have larger bid-ask spreads.  
Coller and Yohn (1997) show that management forecasts reduce the bid-ask spread 
while Welker (1995b) and Healey et al. (1999) found an inverse relationship between 
disclosure quantity and quality with the size of bid-ask spreads.  Tauringana (1997) 
suggests that reporting entities that disclose more information can reduce the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread and reduce their cost of equity capital. 
 Sancetta (2008) and Byrd et al., (1995) among others; in their studies found 
that companies that hold meetings with financial analysts tend to see their company 
shares rise subsequent to such meetings.  A new share issue within such companies 
would entail that the business entity would acquire larger net proceeds and in turn a 
lower cost of capital.  Byrd et al., (1995) also found that in situations where analysts 
and investors are not well informed, it is likely to have an unfavourable impact on 
                                                          
14
 Where risk is determined by the amount of information about the company available to the 
market. 
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that company’s share price.  There is therefore the likelihood of a ripple effect 
between a lowering of the company value and an increase in the cost of capital.   
Healy and Palepu (1995, 1993) advance the argument and suggest that the same 
situation applies not only with raising equity but also in the issuance of public debt.  
They hypothesise that investors’ perceptions of a firm are important to corporate 
managers who anticipate issuing public debt and equity in the short term.  Such 
managers are essentially incentivised to make increased disclosures in the annual 
reports to counter the information asymmetry problem and consequently reduce the 
cost of capital (Lambert et al., 2007, Hughes et al., 2007, Lambert et al., 2012, 
Armstrong et al., 2011). 
 The cost of capital is vital to any business seeking additional capital funds.  
Investment financing decisions are therefore aligned with disclosure policies of the 
reporting entity.  The majority of firms that seek to issue equity shares or public debt 
would attempt to reduce the costs of capital through increased disclosures.  The 
disclosure of information allows the capital market’s efficiency in lowering the cost 
of capital.  Atrill (1986) and the ASB (1997) for example suggest that it does not 
only end there.  The reporting entity has a duty to provide regular updates about the 
company in order to help investors in their assessment of future cash flows and 
indeed projecting future financial performance.  Such information provision is 
thought to reduce uncertainty thereby lowering the investors’ required return 
(Bergman and Roychowdhury, 2008, Iatridis, 2008b, Hassan et al., 2011a). 
 Companies that frequently raise equity from the market are likely to 
disclose more information than companies that do not (Cooke, 1989a, Abdul Halim 
and Baxter, 2010, Whiting and Woodcock, 2011).  This line of thought is however 
contrary to those who argue that companies would disclose all material information 
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anyway to capital markets even in the absence of disclosure regulations.  Some firms 
rely on financial institutions in order to raise capital.  In such situations, information 
is normally disclosed privately such that only the financial institutions have all the 
material information about the reporting entity.  Some UK evidence proves that 
financial institutions already know the information that is disclosed in annual reports 
via private information disclosure by companies seeking private financing from them 
(Holland, 1997, Holland, 1998).  In Finland it was found that listed companies that 
relied on financial institutions for their financing needs reported less information in 
their company reports (Schadewlitz and Blevins, 1998). 
 
4.2.3 Management Talent Signalling Theory  
 Investors determine the value of a firm through their perception of the 
management’s  adaptability to the economic environment within which the firm 
operates (Trueman, 1986).  The idea he proposed was that talent managers wish to 
demonstrate their prowess by making voluntary earnings forecasts.  This would be 
performed as a bid to disclose their ‘kind’ according to Trueman (1986).  The aim of 
the forecasts would be to provide investors with a positive assessment of the abilities 
of the management. The forecasts made, mainly predict changes within the economic 
environment within which the relevant company operates and would therefore aid in 
selecting appropriate production plans.  It may be suggested that earnings forecasts 
may indicate a strong position for the company in the future and this may entail a 
stronger share price being interpreted by the capital markets. 
 Mangena (2004) suggests that “the earlier investors infer that the managers 
have received information, the more favourable will be their assessment of the 
managers’ ability to anticipate future changes and the higher will be the firm’s 
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market value.”   Managers of reporting entities use annual reports as their main 
reporting tool in signalling their ability in responding to the economic environment.  
The reporting of information by management to investors through annual reports 
does not only signal their adaptability but also details their perceptions and what 
actions they are taking, for example the altering of production plans.  The reporting 
of such information to investors in annual reports aids in reducing uncertainty in the 
capital markets and strengthens the company’s share prices (Healy and Palepu, 
2001).   Tasker (1998) suggests that reporting such information by managers has an 
impact on their careers as it may reinforce their positions within the reporting entity 
and improve their prospects on the job market. 
 
4.2.4 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
 Annual report disclosures may be thought of as having an impact on company 
valuation.  This section on EMH looks to discuss whether markets react to disclosures.  
If markets are responsive to disclosures, then it is essential to analyse the EMH as this 
thesis looks to investigate factors that influence the level of disclosures made in annual 
reports primarily focussing on KPIs.  Throughout some of the discussion in this chapter 
and those in Chapter 3 (Annual report users and their information needs), it may be seen 
that some studies argue that annual reports are of minimal value to investors.   The 
general argument posited by such scholars is anchored on the timeliness of the annual 
report.  It is argued that annual reports come about too late for the information within 
them to have a significant effect on the market.  The question therefore becomes one of 
how efficient the market is, if annual reports are thought to be useful.  This chapter 
primarily aims to discuss the efficiency of the market.  If it turns out that the markets 
are efficient, the implication is that those who argue that the annual reports come out 
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too late will be vindicated.  On the other hand, if the markets are found not to be 
efficient, then the annual report will be significant in providing useful information to the 
market which influences company valuations.  Tauringana (1997) goes on to suggest 
that management would be justified in volunteering to make additional disclosures over 
and above those mandated by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  The 
following discussion therefore evaluates market efficiency in greater detail.  
 Fama (1970a) asserted that in accordance with the EMH, it is impossible to 
outperform the market.  According to Fama (1970a), EMH operates under four main 
assumptions.  The first being that there is utility maximisation, secondly that 
individuals are rational, thirdly; they have homogenous expectations and finally, 
information comes at no cost.  On close inspection, it may be seen that these 
assumptions of the EMH reflect that there is no information asymmetry in the agency 
relationship between investors and managers.  The implications under these 
assumptions of the EMH are that only normal returns can be made through 
investment on financial markets.  The return can only be normal because prices are 
adjusted through incorporating all available information instantaneously and 
accurately.   Though EMH does however recognise a degree of imperfection in the 
market, it is largely categorised under the mainstream economic school of thought.  
Fama (1970a) recognised that there is random movement in share prices when new 
information enters the market.  The movements are normally distributed such no one 
can make abnormal profits based on the new information.  Fama (1991, 1998) in his 
deduction also takes into account that some investors may over- or under-react to the 
release of information.  Table 5 summarises how Fama (1970b) theorised market 
efficiency under three information types based on their availability on the market. 
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Table 5: Forms of the Efficiency Markets Hypothesis 
 
EMH Form Information Type 
  
Weak Form Efficiency Information in past share price trends 
  
Semi-strong Form efficiency All publically available information 
  
Strong Form Efficiency All publically and privately available 
information 
  
 
 According to the table it may be seen that markets are deemed efficient in 
relation to the information set that it reflects the most. 
 
4.2.4.1 Weak Form Efficiency  
Through the weak form of market efficiency, it is impossible to make gains 
from predicting future prices through the analysis of past share prices.  Kyeyune 
(2010) explains that “technical analysis as an investment strategy for modelling 
future returns through trend analysis of past share prices does not result into future 
excess returns.”  Malkiel (1996) suggests that  affirmed, the randomness of share 
prices exposes investors to an equal chance of making excessive gains.  Malkiel 
(1996) also suggests that this applies to both the sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investor.  This assertion is independent of the past performance of the security on the 
market.  
There is however divergent evidence on the random walk theory.  Dickens 
and Shelor (2003) used stochastic dominance to confirm Malkiel’s (1996) conception 
that there is no difference in expertly picking or randomly picking stocks to invest in 
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on the S&P 500, DJIA, NASDAQ and the Russell 2000 indices.  Saad et al., (1998) 
found results that were contrary to the weak form efficiency or the random walk 
hypotheses.  They found that market prices tend to trend from intervals as short as a 
week.  Granger and Morganstern (1963) in their study on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) found that long term price movements did not conform to the 
weak form efficiency but short term price movements supported the random walk 
theory.  
The research identified on testing weak form efficiency in the UK dates as far 
back as 1953.  Kendall (1953) examined the presences of weak form efficiency in the 
UK Actuaries Index of industrial share prices for the London Market.  Kendall 
(1953) performed an estimation of the correlation coefficients between price changes 
of share prices at different periods.  The results of the study demonstrated irregular 
changes in share prices thus supporting the random walk theory.  Other studies in the 
UK post 1953 empirically conformed to the random walk theory (e.g. Brealey, 1970, 
Cunningham, 1973, Dryden, 1970) using trading data.  It must however be noted that 
some studies in the UK display results that diverge from the random walk theorem 
across the FTSE All Share, 100, 250 and 350 (Opong et al., 1999). 
The correlation tests for independence in the study by Opong et al., (1999) 
did not exhibit an identically distributed and independent pattern.  They concluded 
that the movements on the indices were not purely random because cycles tended to 
appear than in what would typify a true random model.  Belaire-Franch and Opong 
(2005) provided further evidence suggesting that UK FTSE indices do not follow a 
random walk through the use of both parametric and non-parametric tests.  They 
suggested that high analyst following and high liquidity levels explained the 
relatively lower level rejection of the random walk for the FTSE 100 compared to 
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other indices.  There are also studies that provide evidence for the size effect with 
regards to the random walk theory on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for 
example Mills and Jordanov (2003).   According to their study results, they found 
that the largest securities had the highest potential to reject the random walk 
hypothesis as opposed to the smaller securities.  Mills and Jordanov (2003) however 
stated that their results were only applicable to the tested sample.  They suggested 
that the results could not be superimposed to explain EMH in different market 
settings and at different time periods.  
 
4.2.4.2 Semi-Strong Efficiency  
Semi-strong form efficiency is mainly concerned with how quick and how 
accurate financial markets adjust share prices based on the release of new 
information in such a way that it is impossible for investors to make abnormal 
returns based on the information.  Fama, et al., (1969) is one of the earliest empirical 
works documented on semi-strong efficiency.  He examined the impact of 
information implied by stock splits on share prices in the US.  The results of the 
study revealed that information was instantaneously incorporated in share prices 
upon its release such that abnormal returns were not a possible yield after the 
announcements.  Franks et al., (1977) in the UK conducted some of the early tests in 
the country.  In the study by Franks et al. (1977), information about 152 mergers was 
predicted three months prior to the event.  Abnormal returns did not accrue as a 
result of publication of the information on the mergers due to the anticipation of the 
news, this symbolised that the market was semi-strong efficient.   It was also 
suggested that there would not be any miniature returns as these would be cancelled 
out or rather absorbed in transaction costs. 
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Fama (1970b) suggested that neither technical nor fundamental analysis can 
be used to outperform the market.  Under semi-strong form efficiency, the release of 
annual reports would adjust share prices based on the information encapsulated, 
however the information may not be the basis of yielding abnormal returns from any 
investments based on it.  In reference to the current study it may be argued that if the 
market is semi-strong efficient, the release of KPI information within annual reports 
should yield abnormal returns equal to zero for investors. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) explained in their study that agency arises when 
investors relegate the role of utilising their funds to managers.  The investors’ equity 
may however be devalued if the managers make self-interested decisions in which 
they expropriate investor funds inappropriately, for example through exorbitant pay 
packages.  One of the ways in which this phenomenon can be reduced as suggested 
by Healy and Palepu (2001) is through the signing of optimal contracts between the 
managers and the owners of the business.  Such contracts may assist in reducing 
information asymmetry through the requirements of managers to disclose 
information about the firm’s performance.  Via this process investors may better 
assess the management’s performance in maximising their investment return.  
Corporate governance mechanisms may be put in place such as using a board of 
directors to monitor the management on behalf of the shareholders of the company.  
In such an instance, information asymmetry may be reduced by management 
reporting its performance to the board and the board assesses the performance on 
behalf of the shareholders. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest another option of mitigating the agency 
problem.  They suggest the use of information intermediaries.  Information 
intermediaries refer to using the services of personnel such as financial analysts and 
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rating agencies.  Such personnel often engage in the collection of information to do 
with the misuse of funds by management, such information would in turn help in 
reducing information asymmetry as managers would aim to keep their shareholders 
informed about their performance in a bid to retain their positions and a possible 
increase in remuneration.  The role of information intermediaries may at times be 
enhanced through regulation.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) argued that even in a semi-strong 
efficient market, management would give preference to providing disclosures such as 
information on KPIs in a bid to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs.  
The disclosure of information by management would assist with avoiding the costs 
that would be otherwise involved in drawing up and enforcing contracts as well as 
political costs that may be suffered in regulatory processes.  In support of this 
argument, several studies (e.g. Barry and Brown, 1985, Healy and Palepu, 2001) 
have backed the notion that that managers who engage in capital market transactions 
have an incentive to provide information such as KPI disclosures in order to reduce 
the information asymmetry and consequently the cost of capital.  
There are some studies that presented evidence that is contrary to the findings 
discussed above such as Fama et al., (1969) and Franks (1977).  Firth (1976) for 
example observed abnormal share price movements prior to the announcement of 
take-over bids.  It was suggested that that this finding may have been due to the 
leakage of information prior to the announcements.  Although leakage was suggested 
to be the main probability of the phenomenon, the possibility of predictions made by 
investors was also considered.  This overall finding hinted at market inefficiency 
however the cases found to exhibit this phenomenon were far and wide apart.  
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Other studies such as Ball (1978) and Bernard & Thomas (1989) observe 
post-announcement drifts in share prices after a new piece of information is 
published.  Ball (1978) suggested that such drifts may be the outcome of 
misspecification of market equilibrium by omission of a component in the 
computational model.  Alternatively Ball (1978) suggested that it may be the result 
of failures in market efficiency in  incorporating new information in the adjusting of 
share prices.  In the study by Ball (1978), it was suggested that information 
processing frictions and the high cost of using new information may have deterred 
the market’s ability to adjust prices according to the predictive potential of the news.  
Although Ball (1978) was more inclined to suggesting that the market inefficiency 
brought about the post-announcement drifts.  Bernard and Thomas (1989) however 
found it hard to suggest the cause of the drifts thus the lack of understanding of 
autocorrelation between quarterly returns within the market.  Drifts could be a result 
of misspecification in measuring abnormal returns and not necessarily evidence of 
market inefficiency.  Fama (1991) also disagreed with the notion that participants did 
not understand earnings movements.  He suggested that close analyst following of 
share price movements could not simply point out to the inability to understand 
movements.  
 
4.2.4.3 Strong Form Efficiency  
In a strong form efficient capital market, it would be possible to make 
abnormal gains from an investment.  In such a market share prices are adjusted 
through both public and private information being taken into account.  In a strong 
form efficient market, even those who engage in insider trading would not be able to 
make an arbitrage advantage.   Strong form efficiency and semi-strong form 
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efficiency markets may be likened to each other in that in both types, financial 
reporting would have no effect in adjusting share price returns as these would already 
be taken into account in the adjustment.  Strong form market efficiency also assumes 
that there are no legal barriers impounding the public disclosure of private 
information.   Such a market would not require any regulation as the market operates 
at optimal efficiency without the risk of market failures.  Huddart et al., (2001) 
nonetheless suggest that regulation of public disclosure of private information 
undermines the effectiveness of strong form efficiency in the real world.  
Previous studies that have tested strong form market efficiency have 
suggested that markets are inefficient for example Jaffe (1974) and Lorie & 
Niederhoffer (1978).  Their tests checked for the presence of abnormal returns from 
insider trading.  Based on these findings, it largely entails that individuals can make 
use of price sensitive private information to outperform the market.  Jaffe (1974) 
argued with evidence from his study that individuals can make use of inside 
information to make abnormal returns and even when the information used becomes 
public knowledge, abnormal returns can be made from using the same information 
for months henceforth. 
Seyhun (1986) agreed with the arguments posited by Jaffe (1974) but 
however did not find supporting evidence based on their study.  Seyhun (1986) 
argued after the findings suggested that Jaffe’s (1974) results may have been 
influenced by the methodology implemented in the study.  Further to Seyhun’s 
(1986) arguments, they further argued that the size effect had an effect on insider 
trading.  It was concluded that large securities have lower average returns than small 
securities because they were more prone to insider selling while small securities 
showed greater proportion of insider buying.  
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Jaffe’s (1974) findings that the stock exchange is strong form inefficient was 
also supported by Pope et al., (1990) in a UK study.  They investigated the level of 
returns that were a result of the of the directors’ share dealings.  The results of the 
findings reflected that an investment strategy that was based on directors’ share 
dealing would yield abnormal returns save by transaction costs and bid-ask spreads. 
 
4.2.4.3.1 Market for Information  
Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) suggest that the assumptions of EMH are 
considered to be unrealistic given that participants are human.  It must be considered 
that some of these participants may not behave rationally because naturally human 
beings have diverse expectations.  The other matter that requires to be put into 
consideration is that there are different levels to the access of information as well as 
different abilities to assess the information that will have been accessed.  Information 
asymmetry is brought about in the market for capital through the presence of agency 
between investors and managers.  Further information asymmetry is also brought 
about by the diverse characteristics of the participants in capital markets.  KPIs for 
instance may cover a variety of areas such as financial KPIs (e.g. revenue, operating 
profit, earnings per share etc.) and non-financial KPIs (footfall, carbon footprint, 
reported incidents & accidents etc.).  These different categories and types of KPI 
disclosures all have a different audience and understanding depending on the 
information user.  This issue ties in with the discussions in Chapter 3 when exploring 
the similarities and differences in the information sought by users of financial 
reporting information. 
Gonedes (1976) follows up by explaining that EMH inadequacy is largely 
brought about by the heterogeneity of market participants’ expectations and the 
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consequent exclusive and expensive use of financial disclosures.  Demsetz (1970) 
and Gonedes (1975) suggest that disclosures are perceived by capital markets as a 
commodity that is demanded and supplied due to its ability to manipulate share 
prices.  Gonedes and Dopuch (1974) offer criticism over the semi-strong market 
efficiency’s assumption that all available information is spontaneously and correctly 
reflected in share prices at no cost by market participants having homogenous 
expectations resultantly denying any participant the opportunity to yield abnormal 
returns.   Management in this kind of market will supply information disclosures to 
investors in a bid to reduce agency costs and also raise capital at lower costs on the 
market for capital.  
 
4.2.4.3.2 Market for Corporate Control  
Parkinson (1993) explained that the effectiveness of the market for corporate 
control is determined by the market’s efficiency or rather the efficacy of the EMH.   
In the market for corporate control, share prices will promptly and accurately reflect 
the performance of the management whether it is good or poor.  Declining share 
prices will be perceived as poor managerial performance.  This will lead to the call 
for a replacement of managers if the poor trend continues.  Management therefore 
aim to ensure optimal performance in a bid to retain their positions.  Deakin and 
Singh (2008) suggest rejection of the EMH due to the ineffectiveness of the market 
for corporate control based on market crashes, for example the  1987 US stock 
market crash, the Asian exchanges crash in the 1990s and the bursting of the 
technology securities in 2001.  The argument that can be put forward here is that the 
effectiveness of the market for corporate control is questionable as it relies on the 
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EMH and should have been able to identify the crashes before they came into 
fruition and therefore avoided. 
Information arbitrage efficiency (IAE)
15
 and fundamental valuation efficiency 
(FVE)
16
 need to be in place in order for market efficiency to occur according to 
Tobin (1984).  It may however be largely assumed that developed markets 
demonstrate IAE.  The presence of FVE is seriously questioned by the market 
crashes mentioned above (Singh, 1999, Deakin and Singh, 2008).  Kyeyune (2010) 
suggests that the 2008/9 bank and market crises and subsequent government bailout 
of US and UK banks confirm the argument above.  Kirkpatrick (2009) asserts that 
corporate governance mechanisms have been assigned the blame for the 2008/9 
banking crisis and market failures.  These corporate governance mechanisms mirror 
the significance of the market for corporate control on capital markets.  In the case of 
KPIs, it may be argued that IAE does not exist unless such disclosures are not left for 
the annual report alone, for instance when KPIs are reported on the company 
website.  FVE may exist and information reporting excellent performance may be 
thought of as that which secures management in their positions.  
In light of the disclosure of KPIs in annual reports, such information is 
disclosed by the agents to the investors who are expected to decode the information.  
Under FVE, it is expected that these investors incorporate the KPI disclosures in an 
accurate and instantaneous manner.  Should this happen, then the information is 
reflected in the share prices which aligns with the strong form market efficiency 
hypothesis.  It would therefore be impossible for market participants to yield 
                                                          
15
 Information should be immediately disseminated and decoded correctly by the market and its 
participants without bias such that an abnormal arbitrage advantage cannot be made. 
16
 Any disclosure made should be correctly and immediately incorporated into the share price of the 
firm to which the information relates.  In such a case abnormal returns should not made. 
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abnormal returns based on the disclosure of KPI information by managers.  On the 
basis of the discussion above, it may be suggested that IAE and FVE mutually 
explain the role of disclosures for investment decision making. 
 
4.3 Information Disclosure and Cost of Capital 
 Companies that are listed on the London Stock exchange for example, would 
be thought to offer more disclosures in a bid to be competitive in raising funds.  They 
would be competitive on two fronts, firstly by trying to raise as much money as 
desired and secondly by raising capital at the lowest cost possible.  Investment 
behaviour can be theorized under uncertainty. 
Investors view any returns from their securities investments as consequential 
to their ownership of a business entity.  Tauringana (1997) explains that these returns 
on their investments are perceived as expected values of subjective probability 
distributions.  Investors measure the level of risk involved in their investments 
through the use of some measures of dispersion in a security’s expected returns.  The 
correlation between various other securities therefore measure the level of risk 
involved.  When investors decide to put a stake in a security, they tend to favour a 
higher expected return for any level of risk or a lower level of risk for any given 
expected return.  Finally, there is a positive relationship between a security’s value 
and its expected returns.  The security’s value would have a negative relationship 
with the risk levels associated with the returns. 
 Where firms increase their disclosures to the capital markets, it is thought that 
the level of uncertainty in relation to the prospects of the reporting entity is reduced.  
This action will have the effect of improving the subjective probability distributions 
of a security’s expected returns in the mind of the investors.  When uncertainty is 
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mitigated by extra disclosures, it follows that the level of risk also follows suit.  It 
has been noted in the past that firms that are consistent top performers will constitute 
the pinnacle of the industry data and general economy data utilised in making 
judgements with respect to the firm.  Choi (1973) therefore suggests that these 
aspects coax investors to pay more for a firm’s securities and in turn this reduces the 
firm’s cost of capital.  Horngren (1957) states that analysts will generally  follow 
firms that offer more disclosures compared to those that do not and this 
consequentially leads to higher price to earnings (PE) ratio due to their favourable 
attitudes towards such companies.  Analysts who are kept well informed also tend to 
have a dampening effect to startling news about a firm that they closely follow 
leading to higher stock prices for the relative firm over the long term. 
Looking at other studies, it becomes clear that the relationship between 
information disclosure and costs of capital have a relationship but only subject to 
other considerations.    Botosan (2006) for example suggests that although greater 
disclosure reduces the costs of capital, further investigation is still required on the 
assumption that public disclosure mitigates information asymmetry.  She suggests 
that caution needs to be taken on empirical evidence that has used private and public 
information as complements.  In a bid to eliminate concerns such as a small sample 
size and endogeniety of disclosure from their study, Zhang and Ding (2006) 
investigated the relationship between information disclosure and costs of capital 
using data from the Chinese capital market.  Apart from using a large sample size, 
one of the issues they addressed in their study was the fact that the Chinese capital 
market is a unique institutional arrangement which makes the disclosure exogenous.  
Their study confirmed a negative relationship between disclosure and cost of capital 
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which is also exhibited by other academics (e.g. Botosan, 1997, Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991, Botosan, 2006). 
Contrary to the studies above, Armstrong et al., (2011) examined when 
information asymmetry among investors affects the costs of capital over and above 
standard risk factors.  They hypothesised in their study that information asymmetry 
has a separate effect on a firm’s cost of capital only when the markets are imperfect.  
Armstrong et al., (2011) found that there is a positive relationship between 
information asymmetry and a firm’s cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors 
in conditions where markets are imperfect.  Their overall findings seem to suggest 
that the market structure or rather the degree of competition has a significant effect 
on determining the relationship between information asymmetry and the cost of 
capital. 
 
4.4 Non-Capital Market Based Theories 
 The section above covered discussions on the theoretical motivations for 
management of listed companies to disclose information to users of the annual 
report.  The following section considers the disclosure of social
17
 and stewardship
18
 
information by management of companies that are privately owned.  It is thought that 
due to the difference in ownership, the audience of disclosed information is bound to 
differ in a variety of ways.  Section 4.5 therefore discusses the motivations for 
disclosures of non-capital market related information in the annual reports by the 
                                                          
17
 Social information here refers to annual report disclosures that are of interest to pressure groups 
and communities at large. 
18
 Stewardship information here refers to annual report disclosures regarding financial performance 
that is primarily directed at the shareholders of the reporting company.  This information may 
however be useful to other users of the annual report as discussed in the previous chapter. 
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management of privately owned business entities.  It is however important to 
consider that in section 3.5, it was discussed that there are also a lot of similarities 
between the information needs of private company information with those of public 
company information.  For this reason there are cross linkages, capital market related 
theories only relate to listed companies but non-capital market related theories relate 
to both listed and unlisted firms. 
Choi and Mueller (1992) argue for the disclosure of non-capital market related 
disclosures.  They suggest that there is an ever expanding need/demand of 
information from the public at large about company policies and actions.  Non-
market based theories discussed below explore how information is used to monitor 
stewardship and the discharging of the social responsibility function by the 
management of the reporting entity.  This information therefore provides better 
insight into the motives of KPI information and other disclosures.  Disclosure of such 
information will signal of the fulfilment management’s responsibilities to 
information users for instance the general public. 
 
4.4.1 Agency Theory 
An agency relationship exists between the shareholders (or owners/investors) 
and/or creditors (as principals) and the management of the company (as agents). 
There are two different forms of agency relationships.  Those between the suppliers 
of capital (shareholders/investors/creditors) and company managers, shareholder-
manager relationships and debt holder-shareholder manager relationships.  Miller and 
Sardais (2011) suggest that under the agency theory; executives in organisations tend 
to use their superior information as a means to exploit the owners of that 
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organisation.  The exploitation may be alleviated by the effective monitoring and or 
incentives for those agents/executives. 
The agency theory dates back to the work of Berle and Means (1932).   
Eisenhardt  (1989) explains that the agency theory is based on the assumption that 
individuals are self-interested and boundedly rational.  Looking at how the agency 
theory is defined, it can be seen that there is bound to be conflict between the agents 
and the owners of organisations.  One of the key features of the agency theory is its 
specification of the costs associated in the relationship between owners and agents.  
The costs involved may be those of controlling the agents such as bonding and 
monitoring costs.  Other costs include those of failing to control the agents such as 
residual losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  These costs are illustrated in Figure 3.  
The agency theory hence attempts to find the most efficient manner in governing the 
principal agent relationship (Letza et al., 2004). 
 According to the Figure 3, the y-axis and the x-axis measure costs and control 
respectively.  Increased control brings about additional costs as illustrated by Curve 
A.  Additional control also brings about the reduction in residual losses as depicted 
by Curve B.  The Curves A and B therefore represent incremental costs and 
incremental benefits respectively.  According to the Figure 3, Curve A and B 
intersect at point X; it is at this point that the marginal benefits and marginal costs of 
control break even.  To provide a clearer explanation of the graph, point C0 is an 
arbitrary point that has been plotted.  At this level (C0); it may be seen that an 
additional unit of control (£cost) is smaller than the benefit of an additional unit of 
control (£benefit).   At this level before point X, additional control may be exerted at 
extra costs but the benefits will be proportionally larger. 
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 Figure 3: Costs Associated with the Principal-Agent Relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Dalziel et al. (2011 p.5) 
 
 From the graph it may be summarised that before point X; principals who 
increase their control in their business through additional monitoring, for example 
better mitigate the risks associated with managerial opportunistic behaviour that may 
be demonstrated by agents.  The level of opportunism continues to dwindle as 
control increases, however after point X the costs relationship reverses
19
.  This 
                                                          
19
 There are several ways in which too much control can be exerted.  Some examples include 
excessive reporting requirements, rigid checks, and too many layers of supervision and over 
X 
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relationship may be brought about by the fact that too much control can be very 
costly; however it will be monitoring non-events because the agents will have very 
little room to exercise opportunism.  The area shaded D symbolises the gains to 
principals that occur when control effectively reduces residual costs prior to the 
break-even point.  The area E represents the losses that the firm might suffer when 
control is too high (i.e. to the right of point CX).   
 The agency relationship described above was defined by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) as a relationship in which an individual/s engage others to perform a service on 
their behalf.  The service was thought to involve decision making which would have 
been delegated by the principals to the agents.  Agency theory is concerned with the 
principal-agent problem in the separation of ownership and control of the firm (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), between different suppliers of capital (Smith and Warner, 1979), 
and in the separation of risk bearing firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Although 
extensive research on the agency theory was extended by Jensen and Meckling (1976); 
earlier evidence indicates that Smith (1776, p.700) originally raised the issues that are 
brought about by the separation of ownership and control.  Smith (1776) argued that 
directors of companies could not possibly exercise the same level of anxiety and 
vigilance that a principal/owner of the company would exercise.   It may be suggested 
that negligence would prevail to a certain extent in such a setting. 
 In agreement with Smith (1776); Berle and Means (1932) also echoed similar 
sentiments regarding the separation of ownership and control.  They asked the question, 
“Have we any justification for assuming that those in control of the modern corporation 
will choose to operate it in the interests of the owners?”  The suggestion in their 
                                                                                                                                                                    
monitoring of executive compensation.  The Controller’s Report (2004) and Manzi (2007) for 
example document some of these in their criticisms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
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response was that the level to which agents operate in the interest of the owners depends 
on the level of their (agents) own self interests.  The agents’ interests will also be 
influenced by the political, economic and social power they possess.  The conclusion 
made by Berle and Means (1932, p.132) was that there are bound to be greater 
differences between the owners interests and those of the stewards of the entity where 
agents are primarily motivated by pecuniary benefits.   
 Later studies by Baumol (1959) and Marris (1964) suggested that the financial 
compensation that managers are awarded is positively proportional to the size of the 
firm within which they operate.  The two studies hypothesized that agents operate firms 
in such a way that maximise sales growth rates as opposed to profits.  Monsen and 
Downs (1965) developed a theory of large managerial firms in which they offered two 
main hypothesis to aid their illustration of the agency problem that was brought about 
by the separation of ownership and control.  Firstly, they suggested that principals wish 
for their business entities to be managed in such a way that provides a steady income 
flow from dividends and an appreciation of the company stocks on financial markets.  
They secondly suggested that managers behave or rather act in a way as to maximise 
their lifetime earnings (Monsen and Downs, 1965, p.225). 
 Jensen and Meckling (1976) furthered the proposals by Monsen and Downs 
(1965) on agency theory’s managerial utility maximisation.   Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) in their study compared the behaviour of managers based on the level of residual 
claims on the firms they manage.  Precisely they compared those managers with 100% 
residual claims to when they had sold a fraction of those claims to outsiders.  Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue in their study that where owner managers have a 100% 
stake in the business, operating decisions are attributable to them as opposed to agents.  
They further suggest that the operating profits accruing from the owner-manager 
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decisions are likely to be more than those that are attributable to the owner if the firm 
was managed by agents.  It may be suggested that a lack of congruency in motivating 
factors may lead to this situation.  Agents are likely to manage a business but with the 
view to ensure that their personal interests are met such as prestige, a decent wage, 
reputation and other benefits among many.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
the decisions made by agents encompass a variety of considerations in terms of benefits 
to the agents.  Such benefits include pecuniary returns and other non-pecuniary returns 
that are derived from aspects of entrepreneurial activities such as the physical 
appearance of office and attractiveness of secretarial staff among others.  Further Jensen 
and Meckling (1976, p.312) suggest that,  “the optimum mix (in the absence of taxes) of 
the various pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is achieved when the marginal utility 
derived from an additional dollar of expenditure (measured net of any productive 
effects) is equal for each non-pecuniary item and equal to the marginal utility derived 
from an additional dollar of after tax purchasing power (wealth)". 
 Essentially the argument purported by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is that if an 
owner manager where to sell their equity claims within their company, agency costs are 
likely to be generated as a result of a divergence of interests between the new equity 
holders (outside owners) and those of the agents.  Jensen and Meckling (1976)  argue 
that where a manager owns 95% of an entity, they are likely to expend resources to the 
point where the marginal utility derived from a dollar's expenditure of the firm's 
resources on such items equals the marginal utility of an additional 95p in general 
purchasing power (i.e. their share of wealth reduction) and not one pound.   Under the 
agency theory it may be seen that owners and managers are bound to have diverging 
interests as they have different motivations.  This divergence in interests can be 
mitigated by the use of incentives (such as a healthy compensation), monitoring costs 
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and bonding costs that are designed to curb the opportunistic behaviour of agents.  
Bonding costs are incurred not only to deter agents from taking harmful action but also 
to put measures in place that will ensure appropriate compensation for the agents should 
they take actions that is harmful to the principal.  These costs in relation to the benefits 
derived are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 Despite the use of devices to reduce the divergence of interests between 
ownership and management, they cannot be completely ousted.  This continued 
existence of divergence is probably one the main fuelling factor as to why the agency 
theory is widely used and in relevance to this research, used in explaining the extent of 
disclosures in annual reports primarily to stakeholders.  Tauringana (1997) suggests that 
the agency theory has also been used to explain disclosures by firms on their social 
responsibilities as corporate citizens.  Kolk and Pinske (2010) for example stated that 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures by multinational companies due 
their complexity and visibility are important and there is generally a high demand for 
them to be transparent and disclose information on such issues.  Disclosure may be a 
manner in which information asymmetry may be reduced and resulting in the 
consequent reduction of monitoring costs.  Stakeholders however have different 
information needs as explained in Chapter 3 and call for greater information demand 
(e.g. McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) to mitigate agency costs.  Annual report 
disclosures such as KPIs may be perceived as reflective of a management approach 
that is adoptable to a dynamic and multidimensional business environment.  The 
following sections dissect the agency theory and discuss it from two perspectives 
namely the shareholder-manager and the debt holder-shareholder-manager 
perspectives.  This approach has been adopted in order to elaborate further on the 
theory as it is one of the most important considerations in disclosure studies. 
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4.4.1.1 The Shareholder-Manager Agency Problem 
Following the section above, the shareholder manager problem is given a 
closer look to articulate the two main issues of concern.  Berle and Means (1932) in 
their study suggested agency theorists perceive managers as entities who prioritise 
pursuing their own interests at the expense of the shareholders and the shareholders’ 
interests depending on the extent of their dispersion (shareholding).  Berle and 
Means (1932) mainly propose an argument that the separation of ownership and 
control is brought about by the lack of a controlling block of ownership in the 
company and a trend towards the delegation of the administration of the company to 
professional managers rather than shareholders.  It may be suggested that the 
separation of ownership and control creates and/or exacerbates the agency problem 
in two main ways. 
First; the expected cost of compensation is bound to be increased simply 
because managers cannot diversify employment risk as easily as shareholder can 
diversify investment risk.  Managers may therefore exercise greater conservatism due 
to the greater compensation risk that is borne.  The conservatism behaviour may for 
instance, be  exhibited through the nature and choice of projects they choose to 
partake in order to avoid endangering career security and compensation levels 
(Mangena, 2004). 
Second; information asymmetry may be brought about as the managers 
familiarise with the business/company.  This familiarity may assist the management 
in disclosing only the information they wish to be known by the shareholders and in 
turn leaves the shareholders unable to evaluate the extent and quality of the 
manager’s efforts (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2011, Fama and Jensen, 1983, Cormier et 
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al., 2010).  Managers essentially have privileged access to the information 
concerning company outcomes due to their daily involvement as opposed to 
shareholders (see Eisenhardt, 1989, Mangena, 2004).  Often there is a rift between 
managers and shareholders particularly on the revelation of negative outcomes.  This 
possibility and speculation of negative outcomes on the part of shareholders often 
fuels agency costs. It may on the other hand be suggested that the factors mentioned 
above provide management with a platform to engage in behaviours that may 
otherwise be contrary to the primary interests of the shareholders. 
 
4.4.1.2 Debt holder-Shareholder-Manager Agency Problem 
The advantages of monitoring are dependent on the structure of the firm in 
addition to the composition of manager and shareholder’s financial claims.  It has 
been suggested that assets owned by companies are more likely to be financed by 
debt (see Myers, 1977, Alves and Martins, 2010, Su, 2010).  In this it may then be 
reasonable to assume that agency problems also exist between debt holders and 
shareholder-managers (executive directors). 
Many authors in the past including Smith & Warner (1979), and Watts & 
Zimmerman (1986) for example, have expressed that the presence of debt in the 
capital structure induces shareholder-managers to take actions that tend to reduce the 
value of the firm.  Such actions could be the taking on of high risk capital projects 
and the issuance of more senior debt with the proceeds being used in the payment of 
dividends.  Issuance of additional senior debt with the view to issue dividends with 
the proceeds serves to reduce the possibility of having sufficient financial resources 
to pay off the lower priority debt during phases of financial difficulty.  The resultant 
is a benefit to the shareholder manager (see Mangena, 2004).   Healy and Pelapu 
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(2001) suggested in their study that in the case of high risk capital projects, a good 
outcome would disproportionately benefit the shareholder-manager while a bad 
outcome would be disproportionately borne by the debt holders.  
The researcher has identified two main platforms which may be used to 
explain the agency theory.  Firstly is the shareholder manager relationship and 
second, the debtholder-shareholder manager relationship.  The agency theory though 
widely used in the accounting academic arena is not free from criticism. 
 
4.4.1.3 Criticisms of Agency Theory  
 The agency theory as stated above is a theory that is widely used but is also 
subject to critics particularly over some of its assumptions.  One of those assumptions is 
that agents will in most circumstances act in their self-interest.  Those who criticise this 
notion suggest that agents are surrounded by too many variables in a dynamic business 
world that there is very little room for them to exercise their personal interests.  The 
competitive market forces in the business world are believed by many to constrain 
agents such that they will not always necessarily act in a way to satisfy their wants but 
in such a way that they execute their duties rightly.  Marris (1964) and Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) for instance have argued that any substantial deviation by the agents 
from the goal of profit maximisation could result in a decline in the stock price of the 
business entity they run.  As a result of such price declines or underperformance, it is 
highly likely that the principals of that underperforming business will look to oust the 
underperforming managers. 
 Along the same line of thought it may also be suggested that where an entity 
declines in value, then it will become a takeover target.  Such a prospect is against the 
interest of the management hence they are bound to perform their duties with 
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reasonable diligence.  It is reasonable to assume that takeover threats are bound to 
stimulate more effective monitoring mechanisms.  Hindley (1970) however suggests 
caution to be taken with  actions of that nature.  Caution should be taken because 
effective monitoring of managerial behaviour largely depends on an efficient market for 
corporate control Hindley (1970).  Efficient market of corporate control in this sense 
would refer to those in which control is not difficult to exert and at the same time where 
the transaction costs are low relative to the value of a controlling interest.  Williamson 
(1963) in support of the agency theory states that capital transactions are too costly on 
the capital markets therefore profit maximisation is always a top agenda for agents. 
 Singh (1971) presented evidence that the market for corporate control is at least 
partially ineffective. Scherer (1980) conducted research on market control as a 
monitoring tool for management’s opportunistic behaviour.  It was concluded through 
the research that there is very weak support judging by the evidence that take-overs 
generate effective disciplinary mechanisms against departure from profit maximisation.   
 Another school of thought suggests that the market for managerial talent is a 
disciplinary platform for managers (e.g. Alchian, 1968, Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, 
Fama, 1980). Taking the study by Fama (1980, p.289) for example; it was stated that 
“the firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of 
devices for effectively monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its 
individual members. In addition, individual participants in the firm, and in particular its 
managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their 
services, both within and outside the firm”.  Tauringana (1997) takes a view that was 
also acknowledged by Fama (1980, p.306) in an earlier study.  The view was that the 
market for manager is an effective mechanism for discipline but it depends on the 
165 
 
extent of managerial compensation for their services to the firm.  There is however 
limited empirical evidence to support this viewpoint. 
 Tauringana (1997) also points out in his study that the evidence to support his 
argument that management will act in the best interest of the shareholders only seems to 
hold water if the management generally have a stake in the company they manage 
themselves.  This ownership of shares by management has been seen as a mechanism 
that has been more successful in aligning the interest of the management with those of 
the owners of the entity (principals).  Empirical evidence for this line of thought has 
been demonstrated in some studies that analysed and showed a positive  association 
between stock market reaction and the adoption of long-term managerial plans (e.g. 
Brickley et al., 1985); short term managerial compensation plans (e.g. Tehranian and 
Waegelein, 1985) and golden parachute agreements (e.g. Lambert and Larker, 1985). 
 In the criticism of the agency theory, it is important to go back to the roots of 
the concept.  It is desirable to acknowledge that the theory did not stem from business 
studies but from legal precepts.  The legal precepts seem to suggest that management 
may not always act in their own interests.  This is because agency was originally a legal 
concept defined as a duo party relationship in which the principal authorised an agent to 
act on their behalf.  Metzger et al., (1986) explain that the principle of agency implied 
and imposed loyalty duties on the bearer (agent).  Clark (1985) described it as a 
“fiduciary duty of loyalty” which would if treated correctly deter management from an 
abuse of trust
20
.   Duska (1992) reiterates that the agency-principal relationship in 
commercial ventures was anchored on loyalty and the concept of agency theory simply 
and logically implies loyalty.  Duska (1992) suggests that in the adaptation of the 
                                                          
20
 Abuse of trust in this context refers to situations where the agents behave in a way that is contrary 
to the interests of the principal. 
166 
 
agency concept to economics is the stage where the notion of loyalty to an extent 
became obsolete.  Economists dropped the view of loyalty in support of the view of the 
human being as self-interest rational maximize.  It has been largely suggested that these 
facets are exclusive of each other.   Duska (1992) does however concede some of the 
arguments for the agency theory and states that “ there is an extent to which Smith 
(1776) and his followers are right. Human beings are essentially selfish and will not 
always look out for the interest of others but there are times when they will set aside 
their own interest and act on behalf of others.” 
 The agency theory has also been criticised in the past because it assumes 
utility maximisation.  The two main reasons put forward in the argument against these 
assumptions are simply because first, utility maximisation is not a variable that is easily 
measureable.  Second, it is difficult to determine whether individuals are maximising 
their utility.  Davidson and Suppes (1957) argue that the arguments that have been 
posited are based on unreal situations.  They suggest that the literature on agency has 
been theoretical rather than empirical.  In their study (Davidson and Suppes, 1957),  
they state that “ the weight of the evidence under these unreal conditions, most people 
choose in a way that is reasonably consistent with the axioms of the theory; that is, they 
behave as though they were maximising the expected value of utility and as though the 
utilities of the several alternatives can be measured. When these experiments are 
extended to more realistic choices that are more obviously relevant to real life 
situations, the difficulties multiply.”  It may thus be suggested according to the 
statement above that the real world is so complicated that the theory of utility 
maximisation has very little relevance to real life choices. 
 From the arguments it may be seen that the agency theory is applicable to 
several fields ranging from law, accounting, business and economics among others.  
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The agency theory is also one that is directly applicable to disclosure studies such as 
this one.  In the case of disclosures, an example is a case in which management are 
compensated on the basis of the profit reported by the company at the end of the trading 
period.  In such situations according to supports of the agency theory; management will 
wish to adopt accounting methods that will display the maximum profit levels possible 
so that their compensation packages for that trading period are bumped.  On the other 
hand for those who criticise the theory and support that loyalty may actually exist, the 
suggestion is that management may wish to be prudent and disclose less profits but 
effectively running the business in an organic and sustainable manner on behalf of the 
principals. 
Although the agency theory has attracted vast criticism in accounting and 
management theory, some scholars have actually posited challenges to these critics.  
Wiseman et al., (2011) for example make strong criticisms of those academics who 
argue that the agency theory’s value and context is pillared on the premise that 
agents are egocentric  and seek only to maximise their wealth at the expense of the 
principal.  They argue that the flexibility of the theory actually allows for it to be 
applied across a variety of “non-traditional settings where the key elements of 
agency theory, such as self-interest, information asymmetry, and the mechanisms 
used to control agency costs can vary beyond the narrow assumptions implied in 
traditional agency-based research.”  Wiseman et al., (2011) therefore suggest that the 
agency theory can be extended to other diverse settings using a deductive approach.  
This is thought to be achievable through formal recognition and incorporation of the 
institutional context surrounding principal agent relationships into agency based 
models.  Wiseman et al., (2011) go on to suggest that once recognition and 
incorporation is assumed, then it gives academics a platform to extend the agency 
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theory in a variety of contexts (particularly the social context) as opposed to claiming 
that it is a narrow streamlined theory which assumes that agents are egocentric.  The 
agency theory is however an on-going and important topic of debate among 
academics and the arguments cannot be exhausted in one work.  The following 
sections will provide a summary and conclusion to the chapter.  
 
4.4.2 Stakeholder Theory 
 A stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984).  However Clifton and Amran 
(2011) define stakeholders as those individuals who have a legitimate claim on the 
business.  Stakeholders may either be internal or external.  Internal stakeholders are 
those with a direct affiliation with the firm for example, employees, management, 
owners, customers, suppliers and so on.  External stakeholders are those individuals 
or groups that have an indirect affiliation with the business such as the government, 
local community and the general public.  It has been suggested that each of these 
individuals or groups that form stakeholders may be perceived to be supplying the 
business entity with critical resources/contributions (see Seuring et al., 2008, 
Laplume et al., 2008). It was suggested (Hardwick and Letza, 1999) that the 
stakeholder theory does not attempt to place an order of importance to a company’s 
various stakeholders, they are however perceived as of premier importance in terms 
of maximising shareholder wealth.  The stakeholders expect their interests to be 
satisfied in return.  A practical example is for a shareholder to provide a firm with 
capital and in return expect the risk adjusted return on their investment. 
Other stakeholders include creditors who provide financing to firms that seek 
funding.  In return creditors will require loans to be paid back on maturing normally 
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at a premium.  Employees and managers offer the firm with their physical and human 
capital commitments, they also offer their time.  In return, employees and 
management anticipate adequate compensation and working conditions.  Customers 
who are among the internal stakeholders of business entities provide them with 
revenues and expect good quality products and value for money in their purchases.  
Suppliers provide inputs and expect a fair deal in the form of competitive prices for 
the inputs they provide businesses.  External stakeholders include the local 
community and the government for example; they provide firms with locations to set 
up enterprise, local infrastructure and favourable tax treatments.  In return these 
groups anticipate businesses that set up as decent corporate citizens; they also expect 
the business entities to enhance the communities and the quality of life in the area. 
 The stakeholder theory was pioneered by Ansoff (1965).  He suggested that 
companies tried to balance the conflicting demands of the various stakeholders as 
their major goal.   Letza et al. (2008) in a later study further point out that the theory 
assumes that while stakeholder interests have to be joint, it is the management’s 
responsibility to provide guidance for stakeholder relationships ensuring as much 
value as possible is created for the stakeholders.  On the other hand, an 
organisation’s continued existence requires the support of its stakeholder’s hence 
their approval must be sought.  It has been suggest that organisations adjust their 
activities in order to attain this approval (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2009).    
It may be seen that companies try to meet the needs of their various 
information users through disclosures in annual reports.  Due to the wide ranging of 
stakeholders, it is expected that companies disclose a wide range of information to 
try and meet the needs of these various stakeholders as discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3.  Companies in their reports tend to disclose information covering several 
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facets, for example social disclosures, environmental disclosures, financial 
disclosures, intellectual property disclosures and KPI disclosures.  The information 
disclosed by companies, assists stakeholders in assessing various aspects about the 
company, for example effectiveness, efficiency of the management, corporate 
citizenship, adherence to regulation, performance, position and future prospects of 
the firm among other issues. 
 
4.4.3 Legitimacy Theory 
 Legitimacy theory also assists in explaining the motivations for disclosures.  
This theory asserts that corporate disclosures react to economic, social and political 
factors.  These disclosures are perceived as a response to legitimise their actions 
(Cho and Patten, 2007, Tilling and Tilt, 2010, Guidry and Patten, 2012).  The 
legitimacy theory is based on the foundation that businesses operate in society 
through a social contract.  These social contracts bind it to perform its business 
objectives in a socially desirable manner and in return get approval in the fulfilment 
of its agendas to ultimately ensure its going concern.  Riverte (2009) argues that any 
societal institution, businesses included; operates through social contracts of one 
form or another, whether implied or expressed. 
Shocker and Seithi (1974) are in agreement, but in their earlier paper further 
suggest that there is no permanent fixture with regards both sources of institutional 
power and the needs for its services.  The legitimacy theory in this case hence 
assumes that the firm in question will have to satisfy two aspects of the theory.  The 
first is that the business entity will need to demonstrate that there are societal needs 
for the services it provides.  Secondly it will need to demonstrate that the groups or 
individuals that are stakeholders to the company have the society’s approval of its 
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business activities.  Companies that make disclosures such as KPI, CSR and 
environmental disclosures will assist in ensuring the continued survival of the 
reporting entity.  The legitimacy system does not revolve around the social 
usefulness of the entrepreneur; but rather the entrepreneur is channelled into socially 
useful activities as a result of competitive forces in the system that form a social 
control tool (Abbott and Monsen, 1979, Russo and Perrini, 2010). 
 
4.4.4 Stewardship Theory 
 This theory dates back to the 1950s and stems from branches of organisational 
sociology and psychology.  Mclleland (1961) and Herzberg et al. (1959) explain that 
under the stewardship theory, firstly managers are seen to be individuals motivated by 
the need to achieve.  Second, they are also seen to be individuals who gain a lot off 
inner satisfaction through successful performance of challenging tasks.  Finally, 
managers are generally seen as individuals who would consequentially gain recognition 
from their peers and bosses through exercising responsibility and authority in their 
duties.  Letza and Sun (2002) state that “managers have a wide range of motives beyond a 
simple self-interest, such as achievement, recognition and responsibility needs, the intrinsic 
satisfaction and pleasure of successful performance, respect for authority, social status, and 
work ethics. Thus, the separation of ownership from control does not inherently lead to a 
goal and interest conflict between shareholders and managers.”  In support of this notion, 
Barney and Hesterly (2010) in defining the theory explain that, under the stewardship 
theory, if managers were left to their own, they would act as responsible 
stewards/caretakers of the assets they control.  They argue that the main difference with 
the agency theory as argued earlier is that under agency, managers are assumed to act in 
their own self-interest at the expense of the owners of the business entity. 
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 When managers have served a corporation for relatively lengthy periods of 
time, they tend to identify themselves with those corporations.  They also feel that they 
have played essential roles in shaping the form and direction that the firm takes.  Their 
key roles under stewardship is thought to yield within them a blend of self-esteem 
combined with corporate prestige.  Under the stewardship theory, even where managers 
feel that there is very little personal reward in embarking on certain corporate tasks, 
they will most likely carry out the tasks with a sense of duty, that is, normatively 
induced compliance (Etzioni, 1975, Abeysekera, 2010, Matoussi and Chakroun, 2008).  
The stewardship theory takes the stance that motivation is not a problem within 
organisations; managers are therefore not opportunistic shirkers but wish to perform the 
duties at hand as good caretakers of corporate assets.  One may view managers under 
the stewardship theory as “corporate concierges”.  As with most things, there are limits; 
one wonders how far managers are willing to go in order to fulfil their corporate 
responsibilities.  
 One of the issues that are perceived to be a determinant of management 
performance is the organisational structure within which they operate.  Donaldson 
(1985) states that some organisational structures promote management’s autonomy 
while others are restrictive; this will have an impact on organisational performance.  
Different structures in different organisations determine the extent of autonomy, level 
of authority, role expectations and code of conduct among other restricts.  Such 
frameworks have different levels of impact depending on the work ethic and style of the 
stewards of that organisation.  It is more likely under the theory that management with 
total freedom will exhibit superior performance and this may have an impact on what 
information they disclose among their KPIs in the annual report.  
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4.4.5 Theory of Constraints 
Goldratt (1990) developed the theory of constraints (TOC) as an overall 
philosophy in management.  The TOC recognises that in attaining goals, there are 
always restrictions that cause friction in the attainment of those goals.  Rahman 
(1998, p.337) suggested that the TOC can be summarised in two criteria.  Firstly, in 
that every system will have at least one constraint.  Rahman (1998) supports their 
argument by suggesting that if constraints were absent then every organisation would 
make unlimited profit from their operations.  Goldratt, (1988, p.453) defines 
constraints as “anything that limits a system from achieving higher performance 
versus its goal”.  The second criteria suggested by Rahman (1998) in summarising 
the TOC was that the existence of constraints present organisations with 
opportunities to improve.  However it is through lifting of these constraints that 
organisations see improvement. 
In relation to KPIs, several constraints can be identified in the selection, 
preparation, measurement and disclosure of KPIs in annual reports.  Rahman (1998) 
suggested that every system has at least one constraint.  KPIs on one hand measure 
the critical success factors of the organisation.  Under the TOC relative to KPIs it 
may be suggested that one of the key issues is that too many things are measureable.  
The management needs to choose what items to report in their annual report as key to 
the organisations success.  Several steps can be taken to lift the constraints that lead 
to difficulty in the identification and reporting of KPIs.  Management may choose to 
place limitations on the count of items to be identified as KPIs, management may 
wish to identify what items are deemed within the industry to companies operating 
within that industry, and the items that drive the success of the company may also be 
identified.  These performance drivers are the information items that would 
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constitute material facts in accounting language.  It may be suggested that while 
constraints may be viewed as positives, one needs to identify them as exemplified for 
KPIs.  It is only with that kind of information that one may lift these constraints and 
achieve the intended organisational goals. 
 
4.4.6 Political Costs Theory 
 Disclosures among UK companies may be explained in terms of the political 
costs theory.  Political costs are wealth-redistributions to the government and the 
wider economy from the business entity (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007, Reverte, 2009, 
Dal-Ri Murcia and dos Santos, 2012).  Theories surrounding political costs seem to 
take the view that politicians maximise their own utility.   Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) carried out significant research in the area of political costs and assert that the 
political sector has power to effect wealth transfers among various groups.  The 
corporate sector is vulnerable to these wealth redistributions according to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978).  Lobby groups often have incentives to vote against the actions 
of business entities that act against the will of the corporate society and the public at 
large.  It has been suggested that collective actions may be taken to lobby for the 
nationalism, expropriation, break up or regulation of an industry or corporation 
(Stigler, 1971, Georgiou, 2005). 
Companies however, have a variety of tools that they may utilise in order to 
mitigate political costs against their business entity.  Actions that may be taken by 
corporations include social responsibility campaigns in the media, government 
lobbying and selections of accounting procedures to minimise reported earnings.  
Reporting of minimised earnings for example, reduce the level of attention drawn to 
high earning corporations.  Such corporations are generally perceived as monopolies 
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by the public.  Management therefore can anticipate and reduce the political costs 
associated with the nature of the company that they run. An example of a political 
cost is that which is imposed by labour unions through increased disclosures to high 
earning business entities. 
 Abbott and Monsen (1979) argue that the general public and government 
regulatory agencies pressurise companies to disclose social responsibility 
information.  In their study, they conducted surveys and found that public confidence 
in business declined 51% in the 1960s and 35% in the 1970s.  This view by the 
public is thought to have come about from the basis that businesses were seen to be 
failing to fulfil their specialised roles in the society through legitimate means.  
Abbott and Monsen (1979) therefore suggest that corporate responsibility disclosures 
for instance, are a tool implemented by businesses in a bid to counter the public 
perception that business actions are illegitimate.   Epstein et al. (1976) in a study in 
the US noted that the SEC was exerting pressure on companies to report on social 
responsibility.  During the time of Epstein et al’s., (1976) study, they witnessed this 
increase in pressure and could foresee eventual requirements to report on social 
disclosures. 
 The same situation might be likened to that of the UK with regards the 
requirement to report on KPIs.  In the UK, the Companies Act (2006) requires 
corporations to disclose their KPIs in their business review (BR) has led to increased KPI 
disclosures. 
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 As this research is about key performance indicator disclosures, the purpose of 
this chapter was to consider and discuss the motivation of management for disclosing 
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information about their companies in the annual report.  This study is investigating both 
public listed companies and private limited companies; therefore the theoretical 
framework covered in this chapter discusses both the capital market based and the non-
capital market based theories. 
 Under capital market based theories, four models were discussed and these 
included the signalling theory, capital needs theory, management talent signalling 
theory and the efficient market hypothesis.  Just to summarise one of the models for 
example.  Under the signalling theory it was discussed that management may wish to 
signal to the capital market about the state of their company.  When management 
believe that the shares of their company are undervalued, they may disclose information 
about their company in the annual report revealing their trading results and future 
prospects for instance.  The disclosure of such information would likely assist investors 
in making a fair assessment of the actual state of affairs with the company therefore 
revaluing their shares and making the stock values appreciate.  Through signalling by 
disclosures, companies may therefore reduce the information risk associated with the 
shares of that company.  Other things being equal it may be also found that investors 
may require a lower rate of return.  Tauringana (1997) suggests that although widely 
accepted, it has never been empirically proved that information disclosure lowers the 
risk levels that the company is susceptible to. 
 The non-capital market based theories that were covered in this chapter include 
the stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, stewardship theory, theory of constraints, 
political costs theory and the agency theory.  The agency theory for instance, explained 
that agents are viewed as caretakers of the business on behalf of a principal.  Agency 
costs however arise due to the separation of ownership and control between the 
principals and agents.  Proponents of the theory suggest that agents are often disloyal 
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and pursue their self-interest during the course of running the business.  Critics of the 
theory suggest that the theory is streamlined and does not take into account the diverse 
context of the business environment as well as the social context of the principal agent 
relationship.  It was argued in the chapter that annual reports are an important means 
of helping to reduce the agency problem by providing information that is necessary 
and timely for continuous monitoring of management activities. Other matters that 
were discussed in this chapter covered information disclosure versus the cost of capital 
and market reaction to the release of annual reports. 
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5 Hypotheses Development 
5.1 Introduction 
 This research is about the extent of KPIs disclosure and in addition about the 
relationship between disclosures and other corporate governance and company 
specific characteristics.  After having discussed in chapters 2 and 4 respectively 
about the existing literature and the theoretical framework, it can be seen that there is 
no single theory to explain disclosure (see van der Laan, 2009, Reverte, 2009, 
Nurunnabi and Hossain, 2012).  This chapter is thus concerned with the development 
of hypotheses relating to the association of the extent of KPIs disclosure with 
corporate governance mechanisms (proportion of non-executive directors, audit 
committee size, board meetings, financial expertise, board size and director share 
ownership) and company specific characteristics (company size, gearing, profit ratio, 
liquidity ratio, multinationality, listing status and multiple listing status).  
Zimmerman (1987) suggested that research must be based on a model to 
direct the researcher to those facts that are considered important to collect and report 
on.  It is important to apply a theoretical framework because theoretical structures 
facilitate in organising the researcher’s assessment.  They provide a systematic 
channel to understanding the study while avoiding an over reliance on intuition 
(1992).  Applying a theoretical framework to the research question assists in 
sharpening the focus of the enquiry (Baiman, 1990).  
 The number of variables that have been considered for this chapter have been 
guided through literature in order to avoid subduing the statistical significance of the 
model (e.g. Field, 2009, Lorek and Willinger, 1996).  The recommendations taken 
from literature primarily focus on the relationship between the number of variables 
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and the sample size to be considered in the regression model
21
.  Lorek and Willinger 
(1996) suggest that too few or too many independent variables may lead to a weak 
predictive performance of the model employed.   Having considered the literature in 
the area, a decision was made to consider only those variables that were understood 
to be the most important ones (Wang and Claiborne, 2008).  Another 
recommendation adopted in this KPIs disclosures study is that every variable 
included in the model should have an independent contribution to ensure a high 
predictive power of the model employed (see for example Donnelly and Mulcahy, 
2008, Cramer, 1972).  It may further be suggested that when variables possess 
individuality, then the risk of multicollinearity is also reduced.  These were however 
assumptions made by the researcher based on analyses of previous studies as the 
importance of variables can only be determined after testing the hypotheses 
developed. 
The hypotheses formulated in this chapter relate to both private limited and 
public listed companies.  The rationale behind disclosures between the two sets of 
companies is similar in many cases with some exceptions.  Market related 
motivations for disclosure are not relevant to private limited companies as they 
enable the markets to reflect a fair price for the relevant company’s stocks.  Other 
differences are recognised in the case of corporate governance mechanisms where 
private companies have notably smaller boards compared to public listed companies 
therefore the explanatory power of the proportion of non-executive directors and 
board size for instance may be restricted. 
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 Discussed in detail in Chapter 6 (Data and Methodology). 
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The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows.  The next section 5.2 
briefly addresses corporate governance as the disclosure category for the proceeding 
independent variables.  Under that, sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.6 discuss the variables 
proportion of non-executive directors; audit committee size, board meetings, 
financial expertise, board size and director share ownership independent variables 
respectively.  The next category covered is company specific characteristics in 
section 5.3.  Company size, gearing, profit ratio, liquidity ratio, multinationality, 
listing status and multiple listing independent variables are explored in sections 5.3.1 
to 5.3.7 respectively.  
 
5.2 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance factors and their relationship with the extent of 
disclosures have been studied for a while now.  They are thought to be instrumental 
in reducing agency problems between managers and shareholders as discussed in the 
previous chapter
22
 (see Barako, 2004, Bathala and Rao, 1995, Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990).  Aripin et al. (2008) suggest in their study that corporate 
governance mechanisms are essential tools in the moderation of the self-serving 
activities and intentions of agents.  Taking the UK as an example, the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) has set out a UK Corporate Governance Code which 
outlines corporate governance guidance which is binding to companies within the 
FTSE 350 category.  Corporate governance is a global phenomenon both within 
practice and research, Australia for example, recommends through the Australian 
Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Council
23
 that all Australian companies that 
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 Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
23
 Australian Stock Exchange, ASX henceforth. 
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are listed on the main stock exchange should adopt
24
 key governance attributes.  
Such recommendations were put forward with the view that governance mechanisms 
may have the effect of reducing the magnitude of the problems that arise due to the 
separation of ownership and control as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
For the purpose of this study, the strength of corporate governance is measured 
by five mechanisms as aforementioned: (1) proportion of non-executive directors 
(Tauringana and Mangena, 2009, e.g. Aripin et al., 2008), (2) audit committee size 
(e.g. Cormier et al., 2010), (3) board meetings (e.g. Laksmana, 2008b), (4) financial 
expertise
25
 (e.g. Kelton and Yang, 2008) and (5) board size (Cormier et al., 2011).  
The studies analysed in this hypotheses development cover several disclosure types, 
however they have been chosen because they have been found to be relevant in the 
argument for the disclosure of KPIs in the annual report.  One of the reasons that 
make some of the disclosure findings below relevant is due to the analogous nature 
of the various groups of users of financial reporting information, a topic discussed in 
grander detail in Chapter 3. 
 
5.2.1 Proportion of Non-Executive Directors 
 Corporate governance mechanisms have become of more importance in 
disclosure studies, in that light, the role of non-executive directors has become more 
apparent in studies due to their function in company conduct.  The task of such 
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 Upon adaptation it is required by the ASX listing rules that these governance attributes are 
disclosed in the annual reports of the relevant companies.  There is however a “comply or explain” 
clause similar to that held by The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) whereby any deviance from 
the recommendations must be explained.     
25
 The finance experts proxy in this study is measured as the percentage of experts on the board and 
not just those on the audit committee as in Kelton and Yang (2008). 
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directors is usually advisory as delineated in the Cadbury Report, (1992, Section 
2.1).  Part of the report stresses the requirement for non-executive directors to bring 
independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources, 
including key appointments, and standards of conduct.  Tauringana (1997) suggested 
that non-executive directors bring wider business knowledge to the company such as 
better ideas and current best practice they possibly will have acquired while 
conducting duties for other companies.  From this perspective it may be suggested 
that a large proportion of individuals who possess these attributes will contribute to 
an increased extent of disclosure in the annual reports of the relevant companies 
because they will have a greater influence on the directorship board as a whole.  
 Tauringana and Mangena (2009) on the UK media sector found that there 
was a significant negative association between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and the extent of KPI disclosures (at the 5% level or better).  Their findings 
were contrary to their predicted positive association.  One of the possibilities they 
suggested would explain the results was that the measure used for the variable did 
not differentiate between independent and non-independent non-executive directors.  
In a situation where a company has a high level of non-independent non-executive 
directors, the non-executive directors can be expected to be influenced by managers 
and therefore in the long run fail to encourage KPI reporting in the annual report. 
Some studies (Zourarakis, 2009, Barako et al., 2006a) suggest that the 
presence of non-executive directors on the board is a vital element in addressing the 
issues that are brought about by the agency problem.  The suggestion here is 
therefore that a higher proportion on non-executive directors on the board can be 
reasonably thought to be an influencing factor of increased disclosures.  He et al. 
(2008, p.28) in their study “…conclude that board independence is the most effective 
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deterrent of fraudulent financial reporting.”  In support of this argument, a previous 
study by Beasley (1996) pointed that among firms that were found committing 
financial statement fraud, the percentage of non-executive directors in such firms 
was smaller.  The firms that were never found to have committed financial statement 
fraud were those with, on average, a larger percentage of non-executive directors.   
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find a significant and positive association 
between the percentage of independent board members and voluntary disclosure in a 
Singapore study.  However these results contradicted an earlier study in the same 
country.  Eng and Mak (2003) from their study found that the percentage of outside 
directors was negatively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure by firms 
trading on the Singapore Exchange (SGX).  It is however important to note that Eng 
and Mak (2003) do not differentiate between grey
26
 and independent
27
 directors.  
Felo (2009) suggests that board independence and audit committee independence 
seem to have a similar influence on disclosure decisions.  Ultimately it is the 
management that make the final decisions on the levels of disclosure in the annual 
report, however it may be seen from the studies discussed above that board 
independence evidenced by empirical results is associated with the extent of 
disclosures.   
Chen and Jaggi (2000) investigated the relationship between independent 
directors and corporate disclosure.  They found that a higher proportion of 
independent directors positively and significantly influence the level of corporate 
disclosures.  This relationship is expected because the directors in question are 
generally independent of the day to day operations of the firm (Patelli and Prencipe, 
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 Refers to non-independent non-executive directors. 
27
 Refers to independent non-executive directors. 
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2007).  Independent directors may also naturally be expected to be more inquisitive 
than executive directors.  When they attain information, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that they will wish to relay it to the stakeholders of the firm due to their 
alternate perspective of information asymmetry compared to executive directors.  
Independent board members are an important tool for checking and enhancing the 
effectiveness of the board of directors as a group (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, Eng and Mak, 2003, Pettigrew and Mcnulty, 1995). 
The reasons for increased disclosures in the annual reports may appear to be 
stronger for public listed companies than for privately owned companies primarily 
due to a larger shareholder base for the former.  The underlying influences for the 
disclosure of KPIs for example, would be similar in both cases because they cover a 
vast majority of shareholder groups despite ownership structure.  Similar groups that 
are reported to may range from local government, the public, customers and 
employees among many.  On the basis of the above discussions, the following 
hypotheses were formulated: 
 
H
1a
: The proportion of non-executive directors is a positive determinant of the 
extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
 
H
1b
: The proportion of non-executive directors is a positive determinant of the 
extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports of large UK public listed companies.  
 
H
1c
: The proportion of non-executive directors is positive determinant of the 
extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports of the pooled companies.  
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5.2.2 Audit Committee Size 
According to the Financial Reporting Council (2008), first-rate corporate 
governance should contribute to better company performance by assisting the board 
of directors in a manner that is of best interest to their shareholders.  Vulnerability 
and poor performance are a consequence of the board of directors not executing their 
job to the best of their ability.  The combined code also emphasises that good 
governance should facilitate efficient, effective and entrepreneurial management that 
can deliver shareholder value over the longer term. 
Under the same category of corporate government mechanisms; the audit 
committee is another important variable for monitoring managerial opportunism.  
Audit committees act as overseers for the directorship boards on matters of corporate 
governance and financial reporting among their main roles.  In this role, the audit 
committee monitors management and both the internal and external auditors in order 
to protect the interests of the company’s shareholders (Cadbury Report, 1992, 
DeZoort, 1997, Ho and Wong, 2001c).  The investors are therefore alerted of internal 
activities through additional disclosures that will establish a sense of security as 
some may view the audit committee as a body that scrutinises or rather assesses the 
management’s accountability. 
Forker (1992) also argued that the existence of an audit committee may 
improve internal control and is regarded as an effective monitoring device for 
improving not only the quantity but the quality of disclosures.  Although he posited a 
significant positive association with disclosure quality, his results suggested that the 
relationship was weak.  In a Hong Kong study, Ho and Wong (2001) found similar 
results to Forker (1992), which suggested that the relationship between the presence 
of an audit committee and the extent of disclosures was weak. 
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From an agency theory perspective, members of the audit committee ensure 
transparency by internal auditors, external auditors and management among other 
responsibilities.  When the various levels of management perform their jobs properly, 
they subsequently look after investors’ interests; the presence of an audit committee 
member ensures that these roles are conducted to a high level of competency.  The 
presence of a larger audit committee size may better protect shareholder interests.  
Where there is a larger committee there is a stronger likelihood that such boards will 
disseminate an increased level of information that would influence stakeholders in 
making their decisions.  Presence of an audit committee may also reduce the 
likelihood of the board withholding undesirable financial reporting information. 
It may be suggested that a larger audit committee is more persuasive to the 
management to expose the risks that the company is facing.  Such a situation is also a 
remedy for the future in terms of avoiding the embarrassment of disclosing such 
information which may depict the management as of inferior competence to users of 
annual report information.  This improved situation would be reflected in the share 
price and in the long run avoid company collapse such as in the Enron corporation 
scandal revealed in October 2001.  Transparency brought about by the presence of an 
audit committee promotes long term confidence in corporate governance and 
reporting. 
One issue that was however noted is that the majority of the studies that 
produced empirical results on audit committee size were based on public listed 
companies.  Private limited companies have also been noted to have smaller boards 
and in some cases only one or two members only.  As a result, the existence of an 
audit committee in private limited companies is thought to have a minimal influence 
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on the disclosure of KPIs.  On the basis of the above considerations on audit 
committees, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
 
H
2a
: Audit committee size is a positive determinant of the extent of KPI disclosures 
in the annual reports of private limited companies. 
 
H
2b
: Audit committee size is a positive determinant of the extent of KPI disclosures 
in the annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
2c
: Audit committee size is a positive determinant of the extent of KPI disclosures 
in the annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.2.3 Board Meetings 
The number of board meetings held during the year is another measure of the 
effectiveness of the board.  The frequency of the meetings held during the trading 
period provides a reflection of the level of the diligence and vigilance of the board in 
carrying their monitoring duties according to Persons (2006).  Khanchel (2007) also 
points out that meeting frequency is an element of strong corporate governance and 
is consistent with the agency theory.  Vafeas (1999) points out that if a firm is 
efficient in setting frequent board meetings then it will likely attain economies in 
agency costs.  Frequent board meetings therefore illustrate how active the board is.  
A more active board is thought to act as an effective monitoring mechanism in 
mitigating agency conflicts (Xie et al., 2003).  In line with the earlier discussions in 
section 4.4.1 of this thesis, Nelson et al., (2010) point out that where monitoring is 
increased then there is a reduction in information asymmetry and agency costs, 
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thereby increasing disclosures.  It is reasonable for boards to increase the level of 
meeting frequency when there are situations that require significant supervision and 
control (Shivdasani and Zenner, 2004). 
Conger et al., (1998b) suggests that frequent board meetings would enhance 
board effectiveness hence, its ability to address stakeholders interests which, in turn, 
may positively affect disclosure decisions. Other authors have pointed out that 
frequent board meetings result in better communication  and sharing of information 
among the company directors  (Shivdasani and Zenner, 2004).  Better 
communication through increased meeting frequency would allow for a better 
distribution of workloads as well as board committee assignments.  Such situations 
are thought to lead to increased transparency and more effective board decisions 
(Laksmana, 2008a, Aburaya, 2012).  Laksmana (2008a) argues that board meeting 
frequency is associated with the quality of disclosures.  Aburaya (2012) suggests that 
boards that meet more frequently have the ability to devote more time to issues such 
as social and environmental responsibility.  There is a possibility that where boards 
have fewer meetings then they are likely to be less effective.  The situation of having 
fewer meetings reduce the  ability of boards to build their collective strength (Demb 
and Neubauer, 1992). 
Kent and Stewart (2008) found that the quantity of disclosure was positively 
associated with the frequency of board meetings.  When a board of directors have a 
meeting, they assess their corporate governance commitments, with emphasis on 
ensuring quality governance and transparency in reporting in the annual report.  It 
has been suggested in many studies that boards which meet frequently are more 
likely to perform their duties more diligently and effectively and in turn enhancing 
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their level of oversight (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Conger et al., 1998a, Vafeas, 1999, 
Yatim et al., 2006) 
Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) highlight in their study that there is a 
need for better understanding of all elements that determine board effectiveness 
including board meetings.  It has been reported that a board having more time to 
meet leads to increased transparency (Laksmana, 2008a).  Their study indicated that 
board meeting frequency is positively and significantly associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure of compensation practices.  However there are some studies that 
have investigated the impact of board meeting frequency and did not find a 
significant relationship (Cormier et al., 2010).  Nelson et al. (2010) also found that 
there was no significant association between board meetings and the nature and 
extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies.  
Based on the analysis above it may be concluded that board meeting frequency 
increases the level of monitoring.  Increased monitoring enhances the effectiveness 
of corporate boards and in turn promoting transparency, consequently reducing 
information asymmetry.  It can also be concluded that higher meeting frequency has 
an impact and allows for more time to be devoted to disclosures such as KPIs and 
CSR among others.  Frequency of board meetings within both private and public 
listed companies is likely to have the same effect on the levels of disclosures in the 
annual reports of the relevant companies.  The following hypotheses were thus been 
formulated: 
 
H
3a
: The frequency of board meetings positively and significantly influences the 
extent of KPI disclosures in the annual reports of large UK private limited 
companies. 
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H
3b
: The frequency of board meetings positively and significantly influences the 
extent of KPI disclosures in the annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
3c
: The frequency of board meetings positively and significantly influences the 
extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.2.4 Financial Expertise 
 Prior studies have found that capital markets react positively to the 
appointment of non-executive directors with financial expertise particularly to the 
audit committees (e.g. DeFond et al., 2005).  Such findings suggest that finance 
expertise on the audit committee is perceived by the market as enhancing the 
quantity and quality of disclosures in annual reports, the same argument would hold 
for having finance experts on the board of directors in general.   
 Some research revealed that audit committee finance expertise can positively 
explain the extent of information disclosure (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005).  The 
finding may suggest that audit committee financial expertise is effective in 
alleviating the problem of information asymmetry.  Other studies assessed finance 
expertise in audit committees and reported a negative relationship with financial 
fraud (Abbott et al., 2000), earnings management and earnings restatement (Klein, 
2002).  It may be suggested that only independent directors with financial expertise 
are related to more transparent disclosures. Gray directors with accounting expertise 
are related to less transparent disclosures in company annual reports. 
In the UK, the Corporate Governance Code 2010 states that it is important 
that boards include a mix of industry, financial, and risk management experts. In the 
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US it is a prerequisite for firms to have at least one financial expert on the audit 
committee if they are to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ).  This 
requirement clearly suggests that financial experts are likely to address the relevant 
and appropriate questions to the management and identify mishaps concerning the 
firm’s financial reporting not only in the UK but abroad too.  This will also have a 
bearing on financial reporting when there are more financial experts on the executive 
board.  Several researchers (Felo, 2009, Abbott et al., 2004, Bédard et al., 2004, 
Davidson et al., 2004, DeFond et al., 2005, Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2007, Chan 
and Li, 2008) have backed this notion.  It may be further suggested that the board of 
directors are very instrumental in the construction of the financial report hence it is 
important to have finance experts on the executive board.  Finance experts on the 
audit committee and on the board of directors may be perceived as backers of 
disclosure transparency.  
This ideology may be supported by the findings of DeFond et al. (2005) who 
assert that there is a positive stock market reaction to the appointment of outside 
financial experts to the board.  This reaction may be down to the fact that financial 
experts will be more diligent and efficient at addressing those issues that affect 
stakeholder returns.  According to the signalling theory (as per discussions in 
Chapter 4), when such issues are addressed, companies will wish to disclose their 
better positions in the annual report (Orens et al., 2009). 
Felo (2009) found that there is a significant and positive association between 
financial experts and the level of disclosure transparency.  Building on these findings 
it may be suggested that where there are finance experts on the board, transparency 
might also entail that the board disclose more information in order to paint a true and 
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fair picture of the state of the business in the annual report.  In this context 
transparency might also be explained as a system in which the management of the 
firm withhold less information to the stakeholders.  It is hence reasonable to expect a 
positive correlation between the number of finance experts and the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports.  The following hypotheses were thus developed: 
 
H
4a
: The proportion of financial experts is a positive determinant of the disclosure 
of KPIs in annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
 
H
4b
: The proportion of financial experts is a positive determinant of the disclosure 
of KPIs in annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
4c
: The proportion of financial experts is a positive determinant of the disclosure 
of KPIs in annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.2.5 Board Size 
Cornier et al. (2009) observed a weak relationship between board size and the 
extent of governance disclosure in a Canadian study.  Their findings suggested that 
governance disclosure may serve as a complement of a firm’s governance 
mechanisms in reducing stock market asymmetry.  The other reason suggested for 
the weak relationship in this Canadian study was that legal protection of investors is 
very high in Canada.  Any disclosure about corporate governance for example, will 
be perceived by investors as credible therefore the anticipation of complementarities 
between governance disclosure and information asymmetry. 
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 The general direction of the relationship between board size and the extent of 
disclosure is unclear. Some studies have found a positive relationship between the 
board size and firm performance (Chiang and Lin, 2007, Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) 
and some have found a positive relationship with board monitoring (Anderson et al., 
2004, Williams et al., 2005) and others a relationship with the directors’ ability to 
monitor and control managers (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Jensen, 1993).    On the 
other hand some studies have indicated that smaller boards are better and more 
efficient at disseminating their duties (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, Jensen, 1993, 
Beasley, 1996). 
A larger number on the board of directors has in the past been argued to help 
in the mitigation of information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi, 2000).  Even older 
studies in the 80’s have suggested that a larger board of directors is thought to reduce 
uncertainty and withholding of information (Birnbaum, 1984).  Although Zahra et 
al., (2000) suggest that smaller boards of directors are bound to process information 
about the performance of managers more efficiently.  According to this argument it 
may be suggested that smaller boards may perhaps be more efficient at scrutinising 
and assessing company situations and in turn result in lesser disclosures.  The 
thoroughness of smaller boards may be thought of as reduced than larger boards 
where more ideas would probably be floated around.  It may also be suggested that 
larger boards are bound to hold a higher meeting frequency to assure congruency as 
there is a higher mix of diverse backgrounds in a larger board population. 
As argued above it may then be further suggested that the consequent 
meeting frequency will result in increased disclosures.  On the other hand, in this line 
of thought, it falls that larger boards would be more vigorous at scrutinising company 
situations.  This is because larger boards may likely consist of several individuals 
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from different backgrounds who would bring a diversity of skills.  They would also 
more likely address areas that they are specialist in.  Such a setting would result in a 
bigger push for disclosures to a diverse shareholder base in both the cases of private 
and public listed companies.  Mohamed et al. (2009) add to this argument by 
suggesting in their study that as a board increases in size, their collective experience 
and expertise also increases resulting in the need for information disclosure to be 
higher.  On the basis of the above arguments, the following hypotheses were 
formulated: 
 
H
5a
: Board size positively and significantly influences the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
 
H
5b
: Board size positively and significantly influences the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
5c
: Board size positively and significantly influences the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.2.6 Director Share Ownership 
Smith et al. (2005) posited that the power of stakeholders to influence 
management is a function of the resources they control and these resources are 
crucial to the company.  It therefore makes sense to suggest that ownership structure 
is influential to the level of monitoring and consequently, the disclosure levels as 
proposed by Eng and Mak (2003) in their study on corporate governance and 
disclosures.  There are several factors that may be suggested for the variation in 
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results regarding the association of director share ownership with disclosures, some 
of the main ones being differences in the research context, socio-economic and 
political environments (García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010).  Cormier et al. 
(2005) and Lakhal (2005) for instance found a negative and significant association 
between director ownership and disclosure.  On the other hand, Eng & Mak (2003) 
and Craswell & Taylor (1992) did not find any significant association. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that a higher level of ownership by the 
board of directors tends to cause them to have the same interests as shareholders thus 
inclining them to protect shareholder interests.  The result is a reduction in a conflict 
of interests between the board and the shareholders, and in turn a reduction in the 
agency costs (Leftwich et al., 1981).   It is logical to assume that board members with 
higher levels of shareholding within a firm may be associated with higher levels of 
participation in company operations (Wright, 1996).  This phenomenon threatens the 
monitoring quality and is detrimental to the quality of financial reporting.   
Forker (1992) and Kosnik (1990) suggest that the board may tend to reduce 
their motivation to favour shareholders’ interests over their own and in the long run 
may not pressurise managers as much as they should do to disclose higher levels of 
information in the financial reports.  The provision of additional information from 
the management to shareholders about directors’ decisions reduces agency costs 
(Craswell and Taylor, 1992, Eng and Mak, 2003, Pernilla et al., 2010).  The general 
idea proposed is that the marginal benefit to individual shareholders of obtaining the 
same information is less than the marginal cost for the same stakeholder group 
obtaining that data.  The increased director share ownership thus increases the 
marginal benefit gained from additional information disclosed and inversely reduces 
the marginal cost as posited by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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Healy and Pelapu (2001) suggest that directors are likely to push for a higher 
amount of disclosure when they own shares in an entity in order to meet restrictions 
imposed by insider trading regulation and also to increase the liquidity of the 
company’s stocks. Insider trading restrictions also incentivise managers to make 
further disclosures to correct any perceived undervaluation before the expiration of 
stock option awards.  Increased levels of director share ownership may most likely 
lead to the board aiming to protect their shares.  However, the direction of the 
hypothesised relationship is tentative.  This occurrence will lead to a two tailed 
argument that the board, as they are the preparers of the annual report may (i), 
increase disclosure to reassure investors of future prospects such as during seasonal 
dips in performance which will later be ironed out or (ii), reduce the level of 
disclosures which are detrimental to the share price of that firm. 
It can be suggested that the predicted relationship between director ownership 
and the extent of disclosure is negative because the conflict between shareholders 
and directors increases as directors' share ownership decreases.  Based on the 
discussion above it is difficult to predict the direction of the relationship between 
director share ownership and disclosure.  Cornier et al. (2005) suggest that firms with 
closely-held ownership
28
 are expected to have less information asymmetry between 
management and dominant shareholders (Cormier et al., 2005).  Such shareholders 
can be expected to have access to the information they need.  One may therefore 
suggest that this governance system is the opposite of what can be expected in large 
public listed companies in which it is difficult for smaller, more passive investors to 
                                                          
28
 Such as private limited companies in this case. 
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attain information hence rely on disclosures.  On the basis of the above discussion, it 
has been hypothesised that: 
  
H
6a
: Director share ownership negatively and significantly influences the extent of 
KPI disclosures in the annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
 
H
6b
: Director share ownership positively and significantly influences the extent of 
KPI disclosures in the annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
6c
: Director share ownership positively and significantly influences the extent of 
KPI disclosures in the annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.3 Company Specific Characteristics 
5.3.1 Company Size  
It has been suggested under the legitimacy theory that larger companies use 
increased disclosures to respond to social expectations because they have more 
stakeholders than in smaller companies (Suttipun and Stanton, 2012).  Studies 
analysing company size as an explanatory variable for disclosure started as early as 
1961 by Cerf and several other studies followed thereafter such as Buzby (1975), 
Cooke (1989a), Wallace et al., (1994a); Depoers (2000), Watson et al., (2002a) and 
Tauringana & Mangena (2009) among many.  Watson et al. (2002c) suggested that 
large companies are more likely to disclose more ratios compared to smaller 
companies.  Their study was based in the UK.  While still on the subject of UK 
studies, Brammer and Pavelin’s (2006) results revealed that larger firm were more 
likely to make voluntary environmental disclosures.  In a Kenyan study, Barako et al. 
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(2006b) found that the size of companies was one of the main factors influencing the 
level of disclosures made by the reporting entity.   
This research therefore also predicts that company size will be significantly 
associated with disclosure of KPIs in the annual reports.  Firms protect their 
competitive advantage by increased disclosure as opposed to the case for smaller 
firms (Wei-ping, 2008).  Larger firms are expected to make more disclosures than 
smaller ones.  The process of gathering analysing and publishing information can be 
quite costly hence it is those firms that are larger that are expected to disclose more 
information as they are expected to have more resources.  Larger firms find it 
cheaper to accumulate information due to their larger revenue (Hossain, 2008, Jean-
François and Marc, 2008, Angeloantonio and Francesco, 2010).  Larger firms can put 
up with the marginal costs of extra disclosure.   
 On the same note it has also been argued that it is the larger firms who are 
more likely to afford to employ the expertise of accounting practitioners and thus 
more likely disclose more information than small companies (Watson et al., 2002a).  
Large companies require sophisticated management information systems because of 
their complexity and they often operate multi product chains over a large 
geographical expanse across international borders.  It is the management information 
systems that are employed to meet the needs for managerial control as well as the 
needs of creditors (Buzby, 1975, Cooke, 1989a, Cooke, 1991).  This phenomena is 
important to reporting because the speed of reporting is vital if the information is to 
be of any value to investors (Atrill, 1986, ASB, 1997).  A sufficient quantity of 
information is required to be disclosed for investors to fully appreciate the operations 
of the company.  
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The political costs theory suggests that large business entities are susceptible 
to political attacks, the like of societal demands for greater regulation by means of 
higher corporate taxation levels, nationalisation and price controls among many 
(Reverte, 2009).  Large companies are therefore sensitive to political costs and try to 
curb the likely consequences by disclosing more information  (Firth, 1979).  On the 
contrary the opposite has been argued on the basis that if companies disclose high 
profit margins for example, then the government may wish to intervene by imposing 
higher taxation tariffs.  On this basis, it has been posited by some (Wallace et al., 
1994a) that the relationship between size and disclosure is in fact negative. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posited that agency costs increase in parallel to 
outside capital and further Leftwich et al. (1981) and Cooke (1989a) suggest that the 
proportion of outside capital tends to increase with company size.  Larger 
companies’ management find that greater disclosure is more beneficial for example, 
in the case of raising capital (Aripin et al., 2008).  Jensen & Meckling (1976) offer 
their support to this argument through reaffirming that larger companies have a 
higher proportion of outside capital and higher agency costs. 
The potential benefits from shareholder-debt holder manager contracting 
would also increase with firm and information size.  Larger companies may tend to 
be stable and profitable on average, they are also likely to be of more investor 
interest than smaller companies in terms of information dissemination.  Large 
companies are also thought to face greater information demand from financial 
analysts and the financial press as suggested by Barry & Brown (1986) and Schipper 
(1991). 
  Smaller companies may believe more strongly than larger companies that 
more disclosure could endanger their competitive position as their simplex 
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operations may easily be duplicated by stronger entrants into the market and take 
over their market share (Singhvi and Desai, 1971b, Meek et al., 1995a, Raffournier, 
1995).  As a result there is a reasonable expectation that larger companies have a 
tendency of disclosing more information than what a smaller firm would.  Dye 
(1985) in a similar fashion offers a conceptual analysis of why managers may choose 
to withhold information, arguing that information may be perceived as proprietary 
and that disclosure of such information may result in the entrance of competitors into 
the market, consequently driving profits down.  Zourarakis (2009) suggests that 
larger companies partake in more activities than smaller ones.  The suggestion in the 
study is that such larger companies have more information to report to external 
parties with the aim of reducing agency costs. 
A positive association between company size and the level of disclosures has 
also been found in several intellectual capital disclosure studies (Bozzolan et al., 
2003, Bozzolan et al., 2006, Guthrie et al., 2006, García-Meca et al., 2005, Oliveira 
et al., 2006, Petty and Cuganesan, 2005).  Petty and Cuganesan (2005, p.47) for 
example; support the same argument posited by (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971b); 
they suggest that the cost of gathering and preparing detailed information can be 
reasonably expected to be lower for larger companies with superior resources and 
expertise as aforementioned.  It may also be suggested that larger companies are 
more visible and are therefore required to offer more attention in their 
communication with stakeholders.  Large companies are generally more susceptible 
to adverse reactions from a wide range of stakeholders therefore it is important for 
them to be vigilant with their disclosures. 
 Generally, there are several studies that confirm the association between size 
and disclosures from across the globe.  Examples include (Singhvi and Desai, 1971a, 
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Buzby, 1975) in the USA; (Watson et al., 2002c) in the UK; (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987) in Mexico;  (Cooke, 1989b) in Sweden; (Wallace et al., 1994b) in 
Spain; (Ho and Wong, 2001a) in Hong Kong; (Hossain et al., 1994a) in New 
Zealand, there are many others that have not been covered here as it would be 
difficult to exhaust the list.  Brammer and Pavelin (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004) 
argue that larger companies tend to be spread over larger geographical territories 
compared to smaller ones.  For this reason, it is reasonable that the stakeholders 
groups are equally as diverse and consequently their information needs.  Increased 
reporting may be seen as an effective method of building and maintaining good 
reputation and relationships.  In a study of ICD, Branco et al., (Branco et al., 2011) 
found that company size had a significant positive association with ICD in annual 
reports which was consistent with their hypothesis and other previous studies 
(Bozzolan et al., 2003, Bozzolan et al., 2006, García-Meca et al., 2005, Oliveira et 
al., 2006, Petty and Cuganesan, 2005) as discussed above.  Based on the discussions 
on the influence of company size, it was hypothesized that: 
 
H
7a
: Company size positively and significantly influences the extent KPI 
disclosures in the annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
 
H
7b
: Company size positively and significantly influences the extent KPI 
disclosures in the annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
7c
: Company size positively and significantly influences the extent KPI 
disclosures in the annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
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5.3.2 Gearing 
  Gearing describes a company’s financial structure and measures the long-
term risk implied by that structure (Wallace et al., 1994a, Wallace and Naser, 1995).  
Gearing is the measure of financial leverage, demonstrating the degree to which a 
firm’s activities are founded by owners’ funds versus creditors’ funds.  It has been 
posited by many studies (Fama and Miller, 1972, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Smith 
and Warner, 1979, Mangena, 2004, Tauringana and Mangena, 2009, Aljifri and 
Hussainey, 2007) that firms with higher levels of debt incur higher agency costs.  It 
may be suggested that an effective manner in which to reduce agency costs is to 
increase the level of disclosure.  Many (Watts, 1977, Holthausen, 1981, Leftwich et 
al., 1981, Chow, 1982) have argued that when wealth transfers from debt holders to 
shareholders, the gearing levels increase.  The logic stems from the fact that when 
debt-holders start price protecting themselves, shareholders and managers are 
incentivised to increase the levels of monitoring, such as through disclosing more 
information in their annual reports. 
Agency theory predicts a positive association between financial leverage and 
financial disclosure.  Many academics (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Watts, 1977, 
Chow, 1982, Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) have suggested agency problems 
associated with gearing are likely to increase as the proportion of the company’s 
capital contributed by debt holders increases.  In the presence of debt, managers are 
incentivised to disclose information or investment policies that will increase the 
share value of the relevant company such as the issuance of additional debt and the 
funds utilised in the payment of dividends (Smith and Warner, 1979, Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  However the end result is likely to increase agency costs in the 
form of a higher cost of debt (Kelly, 1983, Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  
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 Stakeholder and stewardship theories are used in part to explain gearing 
against the extent of disclosure.  It is logical to assume that companies with higher 
gearing levels have a higher number of creditors.  From that perspective; firms would 
disclose more information to these stakeholders, in other words, the companies have 
a duty of accountability.  Stewardship is therefore when those companies disclose 
how any money advanced to them was utilised.   
 On the whole, results on the association of gearing and disclosure extent are 
inconclusive.  Some studies have found a significant positive relationship (Belkaoui 
and Kahl, 1978, Malone et al., 1993, Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007, Zourarakis, 2009), 
while others have found no significant relationship (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, 
Wallace et al., 1994a, Wallace and Naser, 1995, Hossain et al., 1995, Raffournier, 
1995) and some have found a negative relationship (Bradbury, 1991, Tan and Tower, 
1997, Schadewlitz and Blevins, 1998).  On the balance of the two tailed argument, 
the following hypothesis was thus formulated: 
 
H
8a
: Gearing positively and significantly influences the disclosure of KPIs in 
annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
 
H
8b
: Gearing positively and significantly influences the disclosure of KPIs in 
annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
8c
: Gearing positively and significantly influences the disclosure of KPIs in 
annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
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5.3.3 Profitability 
Information asymmetry may exist between two parties in the transaction 
process consequently resulting in adverse selection (Song, 2012).  The signalling 
theory asserts that companies would disclose more information to distinguish their 
superior financial performance from companies exhibiting poor operating results 
(Nurunnabi and Hossain, 2012).  It may be suggested that highly profitable firms 
may be perceived as of sound governance.  The level of profitability is an important 
determinant of the extent of disclosures in annual reports.  As earlier mentioned that 
those firms that are less desirable to take up investment within are dubbed lemons 
(Akerlof, 1970).  According to the signalling theory; those firms that have higher 
profit levels are expected to disclose more information in a bid to distinguish 
themselves from other underperforming entities and simultaneously this information 
will be reflected in the share prices of listed firms. 
In the case of private limited firms, there are other models that reflect the 
good performance of the company such as the Times Top Track 250.  Highly 
profitable private limited firms will appear on this list and this signals a strong 
message to potential investors and debt holders among other stakeholders.  Through 
employing the agency theory (as discussed in Chapter 4), it can be argued that 
managers of very profitable companies will disclose detailed information in order to 
support the continuance of their positions and compensation arrangements (see 
Barako et al., 2006a, Zourarakis, 2009, Inchausti, 1997).  This would apply to both 
private and public listed entities as covered by this research.  Singhvi and Desai 
(1971b) suggest that if a company’s profit margin is higher than average, then 
management are likely to disclose more information in order to assure shareholders 
about their strong financial position. 
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 Profit margin signals the company's capacity to absorb rising costs therefore a 
higher profit ratio parallels a higher propensity of absorbance according to Buzby 
(1975).  In such situations, Buzby (1975) posited that the management of such a firm 
will disclose information that reveals the firms capacity to cushion any damage that 
might arise as a consequence of the spiral on costs, this would in turn provide 
assurance on long term performance in both privately and publicly owned 
companies. 
 A company that has a low profit margin is likely to try and disguise that fact 
by providing less in the way of disclosures in the annual report.  The opposite for this 
situation is also true i.e. where a company has high profit margins; they are likely to 
disclose more information to make their strong position apparent to stakeholders.  On 
the same note some high profit ratio firms tend to disclose more information in a bid 
to self-regulate, i.e. to justify their profit ratio and avoid any regulatory intervention 
that stifles their strong position and even to assure consumers that they are not being 
overcharged (Ng and Koh, 1994). 
 On the contrary, some academics have suggested a negative relationship 
between profit ratio and the extent of disclosure, for example Chen et al. (2002) state 
that in the event of losses stakeholders will notice the change in disclosure pattern 
and it may have a devastating effect on the firm’s prospects of securing investment.  
Hayn (1995) and Collins et al. (1997) also suggest that investors assume that loss 
making companies cannot be sustained for a prolonged period and they price their 
shares accordingly.  However what could possibly happen according to the signalling 
theory perspective is that such firms may disclose even more information in their 
annual reports to reassure investors that they are not heading for liquidation or rather 
their losses are temporal as is the case reported by Wallace and Naser (1995) on 
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Hong Kong companies when they suggested that they view such disclosures as their 
part of accountability to stakeholders under the agency theory.  On the balance of the 
above arguments, the following hypothesis was formulated:  
 
H
9a
: Profit ratio positively and significantly influences the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
 
H
9b
: Profit ratio positively and significantly influences the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports of large UK public listed companies. 
 
H
9c
: Profit ratio positively and significantly influences the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.3.4 Liquidity Ratio 
 Liquidity ratio expresses a company's ability to repay short-term creditors 
out of its total cash.  Its association with the extent of disclosure has been examined 
in a number of studies (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978, Wallace et al., 1994a, Tauringana, 
1997).  It is the management’s intention to inform creditors of the utilisation of their 
resources and inform short term creditors that they will receive their money back in 
good time/when due.  According to Wallace and Naser (1995), regulatory bodies as 
well as investors and lenders are particularly concerned with the going concern status 
of the companies they invest within.  
 Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) investigated company characteristics and the depth 
of disclosures in a Canadian study.  They suggested that companies that have a high 
liquidity ratio are expected to disclose more information in their annual reports about 
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their position for the simple fact that they are sound, have nothing to hide and would 
like to reassure their short term creditors.  This argument is one that holds for both 
privately and publicly owned companies as the main stakeholders of liquidity 
information are largely similar between the two groups of companies. 
Wallace et al. (1994a) suggest the contrary stating that if liquidity is 
perceived in the market as a measure of performance, a company with a low liquidity 
ratio may have an incentive to disclose more information to explain its weak 
performance than a company with a high liquidity ratio.  Wallace et al., (1994a) 
based this assumption on that a problem of low liquidity may be a temporal one as is 
the case for seasonal businesses.   
Tauringana (1997) disagrees with this notion and suggests that firms with low 
liquidity may wish to disclose less information about their situation for the fear that 
their creditors may demand their money.  In the same fashion, companies with low 
liquidity may tend to shy away from that fact in their annual report for the purpose of 
jeopardising their prospects of securing short term credit in the future.  
 Gathering from the debate, high liquidity and low disclosure may trigger 
management disapproval from investors due to under-utilisation of liquid resources, 
for this reason management may offer more disclosure in a bid to justify their 
company’s high liquidity position.  It may be suggested that companies may disclose 
more information if they are in positions of high liquidity.  The following hypotheses 
were formulated: 
 
H
10a
: Liquidity ratio significantly and positively influences the disclosure extent of 
KPIs in the annual reports of large UK private limited companies. 
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H
10b
: Liquidity ratio significantly and positively influences the disclosure extent of 
KPIs in the annual reports of large UK public listed companies.  
 
H
10c
: Liquidity ratio significantly and positively influences the disclosure extent of 
KPIs in the annual reports of the pooled set of companies.  
 
5.3.5 Multinationality 
It may be suggested that disclosing information about a geographical segment 
(multinationality
29
) is limited by the existence of relevant costs as confirmed by 
professional and academic literature (see Tauringana and Mangena, 2009, Barako et 
al., 2006a, Zourarakis, 2009, Oliveira et al., 2006).  Consideration should be placed 
on the costs of preparing and disseminating segment information.  Segment reporting 
is a complex operation because of a number of technical issues that are vital such as 
transfer prices, segment definition and overhead allocation among many. 
The nature of the problem has however been recognised for instance in the 
United States where the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a 
standard that provides for a detailed disclosure framework (Gray, 1978).  In the same 
study by Gray (1978), he found that 95% of the largest EEC multinationals which 
operated in at least 2-3 countries, provided an additonal segmental reporting section 
in their annual reports hence increased disclosure.  When companies operate in other 
countries, they are bound by the regulation within those foreign countries.  The 
regulations may be relevant to the particular industry, size of enterprise and/or 
foreign entrants among many possibilities of binding restriction.  It may be suggested 
                                                          
29
 As defined in Chapter 2, multinationality in this study refers to companies that have substantial 
operations outside GB. 
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that due to these additional regulations, firms operating in other geographical 
segments present additional disclosures in their annual report. 
Locals may also wish to invest in such companies and due to the dispersion 
of investors; monitoring costs may increase as a consequence of agency cost 
increments via the dispersion of investors particularly in the case of publicly owned 
companies.  The higher monitoring costs may be alleviated by increased disclosures 
as afore mentioned.  Other stakeholder groups such as the local government and local 
community, customers, employees, creditors etc., are also likely to demand further 
disclosures from FDIs
30
 in the case of both privately and publicly owned companies.   
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) suggest that more internationalised companies 
will attempt to demonstrate to their stakeholders that they are a good company 
therefore make increased disclosures.  They further state that even when such 
multinational corporations are not listed they attempt to show good levels of 
disclosure in their annual reports.  Companies that go multinational are bound to face 
new demands for information beyond those faced in the home country (Meek et al., 
1995a).   Okike (1998) reinforces this argument by highlighting that standards issued 
by organisations such as IFAC and IASC have a direct impact on the level of 
disclosure. She therefore finds that multinationality is a determinant of increased 
disclosure.  In another study in the same year, Craig and Diga (1998) suggest that 
companies with a presence in the international market are likely to increase their 
level of disclosures.   It may be suggested that the drive for increased disclosure due 
to multinationality is a consequence of the need to raise capital at the lowest possible 
cost (capital-need hypothesis).  Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) further suggest that 
                                                          
30
 Foreign Direct Investment 
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when users of accounting information read the annual reports of companies with 
multinational operations, they often expect them to follow similar formats to reports 
of companies operating within that country only, as a result of this expectation; firms 
with multinational operations tend to disclose increased information to suit local 
information user requirements.  The multinational companies are at the same time 
expected to adhere to the usual reporting practices of their home countries.  On the 
basis of the above discussion, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
 
H
11a
: Multinationality is a positive determinant of the disclosure of KPIs in the 
annual reports of large UK privately owned companies. 
 
H
11b
: Multinationality is a positive determinant of the disclosure of KPIs in the 
annual reports large UK publicly owned companies. 
 
H
11c
: Multinationality is a positive determinant of the disclosure of KPIs in the 
annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.3.6 Listing Status 
 Many studies (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Depoers, 2000) have suggested 
that listed companies are likely to provide a greater amount of disclosure in their 
annual reports compared to the non-listed companies. All companies are bound by 
certain regulation regarding the level of financial reporting disclosures.  The reason 
why listed companies would disclose more information than unlisted companies is 
that listed firms are subject to further stock exchange regulations that go beyond the 
generic regulations such as the Companies Act 2006 and accounting standards (Firth, 
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1979).  Firth (1979) further explains that the provision of additional information for 
instance, according to the LSE rules stimulates activity with the relevant companies’ 
equity stocks to give more confidence to investors and prospective investors.  
 An argument posited by Cooke (1989a) in his empirical study on disclosures 
by Swedish companies was that there is a relationship between listing status and 
disclosure. In the study he argues that agency costs spiral when there is a divorce 
between ownership and control, listed companies have in general a higher number of 
shareholders compared to private companies thus agency costs are expected to be 
higher.  There is a likelihood that agents will use superior information which they 
have more access to in comparison with their principals, to their (agents’) advantage.  
They will use this information to their advantage because it is difficult for principals 
to monitor the behaviour of the management based on the limited information they 
have access to.  It is logical to expect listed companies to disclose more information 
than unlisted companies as the former are expected to have higher agency costs due 
to the higher number of shareholders.  As companies aim to reduce these agency 
costs, and given that disclosure assists in reducing agency costs then listed 
companies are expected to disclose more information in their annual reports. 
Finally, in cases of perceived undervaluation of company equity stocks on the 
LSE for example, insider trading rules incentivise management to make further 
disclosures before the expiration of stock option awards.  This action will signal to 
investors about the company’s favourable prospects than the then current market 
perceptions.  Management believe that additional disclosures assist companies in 
hedging against the risks that make it difficult for investors to differentiate whether 
poor performance is down to poor market conditions or poor management.  Such 
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disclosures have an impact on the relative company’s cost of capital by reducing it.  
On the basis of the above arguments, the following hypotheses were developed: 
 
H
12
: Stock exchange listing status is a positive determinant of the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.3.7 Multiple Listing 
Following on from the arguments posited in the section 5.3.6 above, Cooke, 
(1989a) and Gray et al. (1995), among others, suggested that multiple listed 
companies are more likely to have higher levels of disclosure than those companies 
which are only listed on the domestic stock exchange/country of registration.  First, 
the need for companies to raise capital (at the lowest possible cost) on international 
capital markets leads to higher disclosure according to the capital needs hypothesis 
(Choi, 1973, Spero, 1979, Welker, 1995a, Sengupta, 1998, Botosan, 1997).  When a 
company operates or rather is listed in the stock exchange of another country (i.e. 
other than its domestic stock exchange), the local investors are likely to have limited 
knowledge of that particular company hence would logically have higher information 
requirements in order to make their investment decisions regarding buying, holding 
and/or selling shares even more so in cases of multiple listing. 
Increased levels of disclosure in the annual report by multiple listed firms 
would therefore help in cushioning uncertainty among investors.  Cooke (1989a) 
suggests that such a situation where investors are receiving increased levels of 
disclosure will stimulate a healthy demand for a company’s shares and in turn the 
market will portray a share price that is reflective of intrinsic value of the company.  
It may also be suggested that in such a scenario, a multiple listed entity is likely to 
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receive higher proceeds at a lower cost of capital in the case IPOs
31
, rights issues and 
additional share issues. 
The second reason is associated with agency costs (i.e. monitoring problems) 
which are likely to be higher (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Depoers, 2000).  Due to 
the dispersion of shareholding unlike a domestic listed only firm, it would make 
sense to suggest that monitoring costs would be higher and disclosure would 
alleviate the moral hazard problem  as suggested by Schipper, (1981) and Cooke, 
(1989a).  
Finally, stock exchanges have their own set of rules that companies listed on 
it should abide by.  It falls that a firm with multiple listing will therefore be required 
to go by an increased set of rules and in turn increased levels of disclosure 
requirements.  Choi (1973), Meek & Gray (1989) and Cooke (1989a, 1991, 1992) 
also support this argument that companies that are listed on both a foreign stock 
exchange and domestic stock exchange may need to observe the disclosure rules of 
two or more stock exchanges thus forcing them to make increased disclosures.  A 
point to note however is that this assumption of disclosure increments parallel to the 
quantity of stock exchanges a firm is listed on does not always hold.   There are cases 
where a company has multiple listing status but where international listings/stock 
exchanges have less stringent disclosure regulations than the domestic stock 
exchange (Saudagaran and Biddle, 1992).  The assumption is therefore based on the 
premise that foreign stock exchanges will have more extensive disclosure rules, and 
if the opposite is true then there should not be dissimilarity in the level of disclosure.  
                                                          
31
 Initial public offering. 
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The extent of disclosure is only expected to increase where any additional stock 
exchange listing rules require more disclosures than the domestic stock exchange. 
Different techniques in disclosures studies have however yielded different 
results following empirical studies on the association of multiple listing status with 
disclosures.  Cooke, (1989a, 1991), Hossain et al., (1994b), Meek et al., (1995a), 
Hossain et al., (1995), Depoers, (2000) found a significant association using 
multivariate analysis but not while using univariate analysis, as in Tauringana’s 
(1997) UK study.  On the balance however it has been hypothesised that: 
 
H
13
: Multiple listing is a positive determinant of the extent of KPI disclosures in 
annual reports of the pooled set of companies. 
 
5.4 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter developed testable hypotheses which will form the foundation of 
the methodology and empirical analysis to be described in the chapters to follow.  
Part of the purpose of this chapter was to build on the discussions from the previous 
chapters on the literature review and theoretical framework for the study.  The 
independent variables identified will be tested in order to determine their association 
with the extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports.  The hypotheses developed 
concern corporate governance mechanisms (proportion of non-executive directors, 
audit committee size, frequency of board meetings, financial expertise, board size 
and director share ownership) and company characteristics (company size, gearing, 
profit ratio, liquidity ratio, multinationality, listing status and multiple listing).  
Notably the inclusion of performance ratios in the hypotheses development was due 
the ASB’s (2006b) recommendation of considering complementary and 
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supplementary information to accounting documentation which aids investors and 
other stakeholders in their understanding and decision making.  
The hypotheses discussed in this chapter were developed through a mix of 
logical deductions and interpolations from accounting theory particularly the 
signalling and agency theories.  Several reasons were provided on the basis of the 
arguments posited for the direction (positive or negative) of expectation in terms of 
significant association of the independent variables with the extent of KPI 
disclosures in the annual reports.  The hypotheses 1-11 that have been developed 
cover large UK private limited companies, large UK public listed companies and the 
pooled set of companies.  Hypotheses 12 and 13 are restricted to large UK public 
listed companies only as they are specifically streamlined for companies that have an 
affiliation with stock exchanges. 
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6 Data and Research Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of how the data for the research 
was selected and collected.  The latter part of the chapter explains the manner in 
which the data was manipulated in order to reach the concluding remarks.  Previous 
studies such as Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Beattie et. al., (2004b), Barako et. al., 
(2006a) and Tauringana & Mangena (2009) were analysed in order to assert several 
items such as (1) the optimum sample size to draw reasonable conclusions, (2) what 
variables are to be used to assess their relation to the disclosure of KPIs and (3) what 
selection methods were used by previous researchers.  The points above are however 
just a few of other considerations; such as whether to use a weighted index or not as 
argued by Cooke (1989a) that information is of different importance to different 
users and a decision on how the independent variables are to be operationalized 
needs to be made. 
The chapter is organised as follows; Section 6.2 explains the study sample.  
This section describes how the sample of companies was selected. Sections 6.3 and 
6.4 cover a background to disclosure measurement and then focus on the disclosure 
index techniques employed. The theoretical justification of using the disclosure index 
is covered in section 6.5.  The manner in which the annual reports were scored is 
discussed in section 6.6 followed by section 6.7 which looks at the methods of 
estimating the dependent variables.  The operationalizing of the independent 
variables is covered in section 6.8.  Sections 6.9 and 6.10 provide a background to 
hypotheses testing and the choice of statistical tests respectively.  The chapter then 
closes with a summary and some concluding remarks in section 6.11. 
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6.2 The Study Sample 
6.2.1 Selection of Companies 
 It is impractical to scrutinize all likely subjects in an experiment.  There is 
need to draft up a sample from which inferences will be drawn.  The results are then 
applied to the general populace.  Previous research posits that inferences based on a 
sample may be fairly precise because a well-selected sample may accurately reflect the 
characteristics of the population (e.g. Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976, Qu, 2011). 
In this study, the cross section for the empirical analysis is a sample of 410 
companies.  205 of these are large private limited UK companies and the other 205 
are large UK public listed companies of which information about them was drawn 
from their 2008 annual reports.  The first stage of the sampling process involved 
drawing up two lists of the largest UK private limited firms and the largest UK 
public listed companies.  The company lists were extracted from two main sources 
namely the London Stock Exchange (LSE) FTSE 350
32
 list of statistics for 2008 and 
the Sunday Times Top Track 100 and Top Track 250
33
.  All the companies that fell 
under the industrial benchmark classification (ICB) 8000
34
 were eliminated.  Both 
lists were then entered into Microsoft Excel and the random sampling tool was used 
to select 205 companies from each category (large private limited and large public 
listed companies). 
                                                          
32
 The list of public listed companies was compiled from this list. 
33
 The list of private limited entities was compiled from the two Sunday Top Track lists. 
34
 This benchmark represents financial services securities such as banks and insurance firms.  They 
are subject to industry specific disclosure requirements that do not apply to the other companies 
from the remaining industries included in this research. 
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Five private limited companies were further eliminated and replaced for not 
filing their Annual reports with the Companies House for the required period.  All of 
the annual reports for public listed companies were acquired from the relevant company 
website and Northcote Data
35
 except for three where a request was emailed and they 
were sent in the post within one week.  As for the annual reports for private limited 
companies; fifteen reports were acquired from the companies’ various websites.  Email 
requests were then sent to the individual companies requesting their 2008 annual reports 
and nine attached their report in an email, fourteen were sent in the post after the email 
request and seven were sent through the post after a telephone request.   
 The remaining 160 annual reports required for the research pertaining private 
limited companies were purchased from the Companies House at an average cost of £1 
per document
36
.    It took approximately three weeks to acquire all the annual reports 
intended for the study.  During the scoring process, eight public listed company 
annual reports and two private limited company annual reports were further 
eliminated and replaced due to provision of insufficient information for the study for 
example where information about, director share ownership, board meeting 
frequency and financial experts on the board were missing.  The total sample summed 
up to 410 annual reports (205 private limited companies and 205 public listed 
companies) which were used for the pooled companies’ analysis. 
 
                                                          
35
 Northcote Data (www.northcote.co.uk) is an online research tool that provides company 
information namely Financial Reports, Webcasts and Press Releases. 
36
 For some companies, the reports spanned over 2 or 3 documents which all cost £1 per such 
required document. 
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6.2.2 Justification of the sample  
One of the main considerations to be made was on choosing the appropriate 
proportion of predictors to the sample size.  An extensive amount of literature was 
considered for example Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Number of Predictors to Sample Size in Regression 
 
       Field, A. (2009 p.223) 
  
The above guide may appear to oversimplify the quandary but the important 
matter taken into consideration is that the sample size required actually depends on 
how well the predictors calculate the outcome and how much statistical power is 
desired in order to detect the effects (Field, 2009).  The above graph is however also 
very important because it takes into consideration previous research conducted 
(Cohen, 1988, Miles and Shevlin, 2004) on the sample sizes required to achieve 
different levels of power desired to detect these effects and how strong the 
relationship that is being measured is.  For the purpose of this research, the medium 
effect is desired as there is a fairly large sample. 
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The effect is of medium size because there are other variables that may affect 
disclosures such as a change in management structure but are outside the scope of 
this particular research.  It is impossible to cover every possibility hence a realistic 
and reasonable approach has been adopted.  According to this research a total of 
thirteen predictors have been used for the public listed and private limited company 
samples.  Taking the case of public listed companies for example (205 entities), 
Figure 4 would depict that thirteen predictors would entail that the model employed 
would be in closest proximity to the line depicting the medium effect. 
Rules of thumb are ubiquitous in regression studies and the most common 
that has been taken into account for the purpose of this study is a recommendation by 
Babyak (2004).  He stated that “for linear models, such as multiple regressions, a 
minimum of 10 to 15 observations per predictor variable will generally allow good 
estimates.”  He however does not state any upper limits.  This study however is well 
within the remits of this recommendation as in all three cases (private limited 
companies sample, public listed companies sample and pooled companies sample); 
the minimum ratio of 10-15 observations per predictor has been met. 
 
6.3 Theoretical Justification of the Disclosure Index 
This study aims to assess the nature and extent of KPI disclosures in the 
annual reports of large UK private limited and public listed companies.  Beattie et el. 
(2004b) and Weber (1985) assert that a disclosure profile needs to serve the purpose 
for which it is designed.  Financial disclosures are an abstract concept and there is 
thus difficulty in measuring them directly; however in support of the earlier 
mentioned argument, disclosures can be measured in accordance with how well they 
fulfil their purpose(Wallace and Naser, 1995).  Beattie et al. (2004a) suggested that it 
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is feasible to inference disclosure scores based on their usefulness to investors.  
Elliott and Jacobson (1994b) conceptualised that the main audience for narrative 
disclosures in company reports are investors since the information embedded in them 
enhances their knowledge for the purpose of investment decision making.  It has 
however been argued before that there is no one correct framework that is agreed 
upon to conceptualise, articulate and collect empirical evidence about the reporting 
practices of companies particularly through interim and annual reports Gray and 
Haslam (1990).   
KPIs in annual reports capture short-term seasonal, random, scheduled, cyclic 
and mostly recurring financial and non-financial fluctuations in company 
performance.  Based on these different roles of KPIs, the selection of a particular 
form of external reporting for the annual report relies on its level to aid the investor 
future results as suggested by Green (1964).  A replication of the internal 
performance monitoring framework was employed as  recommended by Boesso and 
Kumar (2007) because of its effectiveness in day-to-day running of the business.  
Such a framework does not only illustrate the performance of the organisation based 
on functional aspects of the business but also allows for easy navigation through the 
narratives.  In the same way disclosures of KPIs in annual reports are centred in the 
BR section of annual reports and offer users easy navigation through the information 
which allows them to assess performance based on functional clustering. 
 
6.4 Scoring of Annual Reports 
Upon gathering the annual reports for this study, the first stage was to 
measure the extent of disclosure as in previous studies (see for example Brüggen et 
al., 2009, Alvarez, 2011, Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2012b).  This was achieved by 
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scoring KPI disclosure levels against the constructed index.  The disclosure index 
was constructed on the assumption that annual reports are useful to many users.  As a 
result, the items included in the disclosure index were wide ranging and not confined 
to a specific user group as tried and tested in previous research (Abdul Halim and 
Baxter, 2010, Clarkson et al., 2008, Gamerschlag et al., 2011, Guidry and Patten, 
2012).  Upon reviewing previous studies (Cooke, 1991, Wallace et al., 1994a, Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007, Hassan et al., 2011b), it was decided not to attach weights to 
the items of disclosure in order to take into account their usefulness to different user 
groups because there usually is no difference between weighted and unweighted 
disclosure indexes (Spero, 1979, Mangena and Pike, 2005). 
Upon constructing the disclosure index, other independent variable items of 
disclosure were recorded from the annual reports.  The first category of independent 
variables collected was corporate governance mechanisms
37
 then followed by 
company specific characteristics
38
.  For all the information categories, the data was 
extracted from the 2008 annual report and when not clearly stated, the researcher 
extracted the figures from Thomson Analytics/DataStream. 
 
6.4.1 Problems associated with scoring annual reports  
 The scoring of the annual reports was not a straightforward procedure; there are 
certain problems that were encountered.  Some of the problems included (1), 
determining the relevance of certain disclosure items to certain companies;  (2), 
                                                          
37
 These included the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the audit committee size, 
the number of board meetings held during the trading period, the number of financial experts on the 
board, the board size and the proportion of share owned by the directors. 
38
 These included the company size, the gearing ratio, the profit ratio, the liquidity ratio, 
multinationality (i.e. whether the company had substantial operations outside the UK), listing status 
and multiple listing. 
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differentiation of when companies use different terms to refer to a similar item of 
disclosure; (3),  how to best quantify the items of disclosure; (4),  issues of consistency 
and accuracy among many others.  These are some of the main problems that were 
identified and for this reason; this discussion will only focus on these problems and not 
so much the minor issues. 
 The first problem of determining the relevance of disclosure items to particular 
companies has been argued for a long time because there are grey areas.  Some scholars 
(Cooke, 1989a) have argued that in the case of non-disclosure, it is not always clear 
whether the item is relevant or not.  Cooke (1989a), Tauringana (1997) and Li et al. 
(2008b) for instance, all decided to analyse the whole annual report in order to decide 
whether items were merely not disclosed or whether those items were not relevant to 
the company in question.  This procedure was particularly successful in these studies 
and has been adapted for this research.  This method of considering the annual report in 
its entirety was adopted for this study.  This can be evidenced through the 
comprehensiveness/word count methodology for instance, where the total number of 
words in the annual report was taken into account.  Considering all the words used in 
the annual report is an illustration that the annual report was analysed from cover to 
cover.  Part of the reasons why some companies may not disclose certain information is 
because of differences in the industries within which they operate.  A company in the 
oil and gas industry for instance, may place particular emphasis on environmental 
disclosures such as carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions whereas a recruitment firm may 
place emphasis on geographical expanse.  Different KPIs may thus bear different 
weightings of importance to different companies and even different industries as 
posited in previous research (PWC, 2006).  This phenomenon is mainly due to the 
relevance of KPIs to company or industrial objectives.  
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 The second problem in scoring annual reports was experienced when companies 
used different wording, expressions and phraseology yet referring to the same item of 
disclosure.  Some companies referred to a figure/monetary value as the profit, some 
historical profit and others profit after tax yet they were all referring to an amount that 
had the same basis calculation.  Another of these examples was when debt was referred 
to in the reports as gearing or leveraging.  It was necessary for a decision to be made on 
how to interpret these figures/terms objectively for this research.  Where calculations 
such as financial ratios were made, it was checked whether the formulae used were 
similar across different company reports.  In the case of gearing and profit ratio for 
example, the figures were obtained from Thomson Analytics
39
.  The use of a similar 
formula enables consistency in the data measurement.  Although this method does not 
necessarily solve the whole problem it allows for a transparent platform for scholars to 
understand how the procedure was undertaken and gives room for innovation based on 
the nature of the research in concern.  This procedure was used as early as Buzby 
(1974) and has been used through literature to date, it is the same method adopted in 
this research. 
 The third problem was about the manner in which disclosures are quantified for 
statistical purposes.  Copeland and Fredricks (1968) on evaluating disclosure of changes 
in common stocks suggested that one good way of measuring disclosures is by counting 
the number of items disclosed.  On the contrary this method was argued against 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991a) with a more subjective procedure of grading disclosures 
in three classes from poor to excellent.  The ideology may stem from the premise that 
                                                          
39
 Thomson Analytics is a finance database.  Figures and ratios extracted from this database had the 
same basis of calculations hence increased objectivity of the selected independent variables for this 
research. 
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researchers look for different things in any research article hence the measure of scoring 
used would be subjective.  It should also be relevant to the particular study rather than 
sticking with objective measures which may not be as robust in certain studies.  It has 
also been suggested that  measuring disclosures by counting data items is not a 
satisfactory solution due to the fact that there may be repetitions of certain numbers and 
words (Cooke, 1989a).  A method suggested by Firth (1979) and was later adopted by 
numerous researchers (Cooke, 1989a, Cooke, 1991, Milne and Adler, 1999b, Mangena 
and Tauringana, 2007a) thereafter.  The dichotomous method was employed as well as 
the comprehensiveness methodology similar to that used by Li et al. (2008b).  The final 
main problem identified in the data collection and methodology was that of consistency 
and accuracy.  It is often difficult to maintain the same level of accuracy due to the 
variability of the reported information, fatigue and other issues that set in as a result of 
the laborious tasks.  Although certain scoring rules are put in place and independent 
adjudicators were used, this is not a guarantee for consistency throughout the scoring 
process.  The use of independent adjudicators is discussed in further detail under 
validity and reliability of the methods employed. 
 The scoring rules are set by the researcher based on their interpretation of the 
information.  This process therefore results in the subjectivity of the scoring 
procedure.  The degree of subjectivity may be mitigated by referring to prior studies, 
using inter-coders and awarding of equal scores to disclosed items (e.g. Beattie et al., 
2004b, Meek et al., 1995a, Schadewitz et al., 2002b, Tauringana and Mangena, 2006b, 
Wallace and Naser, 1995, Watson et al., 2002a).  One may however argue that the 
attributes do not carry equal weightings.  On scoring for comprehensiveness for 
example, a score of one is awarded regardless of whether the KPI attribute refers to 
presence, comparison or reason for disclosure.  Using the selected method was found to 
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be strong in the sense that it eliminated the level of subjectivity when assigning scores, 
this in turn also made the job more objective for the inter-coders who already had a 
set of rules on making scoring decisions.  Some studies (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004b, 
Wallace and Naser, 1995, Kyeyune, 2010) recognise that rather than subjecting 
information items to subjectivity scores (for example: less important to most 
important, worse to best) it may be a better measure to score narratives based on the 
attributes disclosed hence making them less vulnerable to subjectivity.  Another 
support for awarding a similar score for each attribute identified is the argument that 
different scores for each attribute negate the rationale that the decision to disclose an 
information item is in recognition that each respective item is useful for decision 
making (Chau and Gray 2002). 
Some studies (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004b, Beattie and Thomson, 2007) 
acknowledge that consideration of attributions in measuring extent of disclosure is a 
time consuming process.  Judging by the time it already took to score the existing 
reports, it would add an extra strain on the time front if scores were to be weighted.  
A weighting test was conducted for two randomly selected annual reports and it was 
calculated that it would be considerably time consuming.  Attaching weights would 
also introduce great subjectivity. 
 
6.4.2 Weighting of Disclosure Items 
The two main scoring schemes found in the review by Jones and Alabaster 
(1999) were the weighted and unweighted dimensions.  Weighted scores (e.g. Beattie 
et al., 2004a, Schadewitz et al., 2002a, Wallace and Nasser, 1995, Fischer et al., 
2010) mainly measure the degree of specificity while unweighted scores (e.g. Meek 
et al., 1995b, Tauringana and Mangena, 2006c, Watson et al., 2002b, Kyeyune, 
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2010) are more of a dichotomous scale that seek the presence or absence of a piece 
of information.   
Cooke (1989a) once stated that different information would bear different 
importance to different users.  As a consequence of that disparity, decisions would 
have to be made by the researching entity on how the independent variables are to be 
operationalised.  One of the early disclosure studies by Cerf (1961) assigned weights 
by reviewing the literature and surveying the user group.  Buzby (1974, 1975) 
surveyed a number of subjects and took the resulting averages as the weightings 
whereas Cerf (1961) ended up with integers.  Judging by face value, one may 
instantly note that the methods of weighting may be different and hence tantamount 
to subjectivity.  An unweighted approach assumes that all information items are 
equally important.  It has been argued (Firth, 1980, Firth, 1979, Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987, Cooke, 1989a) that when there are a large number of items in the index 
as is the case with this study.  It is an expectation that the companies will be ranked 
in the same way regardless of weighting because both sets using weighted and 
unweighted generally display a similar trend in the results (Marston and Shrives, 
1991a). 
Gray et al. (1995) suggested that assigning weights is a subjective matter 
therefore unless the preferences of the researcher are well known, an objective 
approach may be more useful.  Marston and Shrives (1991b) suggest that quantifying 
disclosures may measure extent but not necessarily quality of information.  Beattie et 
al. (2004a) suggest that despite the problems that are brought about by quality 
measurement, a surrogate of disclosure quality can be achieved by attaching weights 
to information.   
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Finally, Spero (1979) posited that companies that are good at disclosing are 
generally good for both important and less important information hence attaching 
weights would be irrelevant.  A number of merits are attributed to the unweighted 
score.  Although Chau and Gray (2002a) conducted their study supporting the 
argument that all information items are of equal importance, they used weighted 
scores in their study.  Several empirical studies (e.g. Barako et al., 2006c, Wallace 
and Nasser, 1995) have found that there is no difference in the results for which 
either weighted or unweighted scores were used.  Numerous other studies have thus 
used an unweighted scoring system due to the similarity exhibited in the results of 
other studies (e.g. Chavent et al., 2006, Mangena and Tauringana, 2007b, Meek et 
al., 1995b, Tauringana and Chong, 2004, Tauringana and Mangena, 2006c).  This 
study has therefore adapted an unweighted index based on a balance of the 
arguments advanced in the area.  The subjective weights of different user groups 
would even each other out.  Beattie et al. (2004a) also made a similar observation 
that the ability to attach mathematical scores to disclosures does not necessarily 
mean that the quantities are true proxies for quality.  In the case of 
comprehensiveness which assesses the quality of KPI disclosures in this study; the 
researcher simply checked against whether the comprehensiveness attributes
40
 had 
been reported or not rather than attaching weights. 
  
                                                          
40
 The four attributes checked against include presence of KPIs, disclosure of the relevant amounts, 
disclosure of the reasons for change in the quantities and disclosure of KPI forward looking 
information. 
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6.5 Methods of Estimating the Dependent Variables 
Henceforth, the regression equation is discussed.  Variables included in the 
equation are discussed from the left hand side to the right hand side of the equation 
i.e. the dependent variables are discussed first, followed by the independent 
variables.  The following sections discuss how the dependent variables were 
estimated.  Beattie and Thomson (2007) highlighted in their study that several studies 
that involve disclosure measurement lack transparency, rigour, specificity and 
uniformity.  They point out that these deficiencies often lead to misleading evidence.  
This study on KPI disclosures makes use of three main measures to estimate the 
dependent variables namely the dichotomous system, the word count methodology 
and the comprehensiveness methodology.  Li et al. (2008b) in their study used 
similar measures to the ones used in this research for example the word count 
method and disclosure variety. 
 
6.5.1 The Dichotomous System 
As it is the scientific technique approach that is adopted in this thesis, the 
scoring of annual report KPI disclosures was quantified.  Using the dichotomous 
system for scoring the reporting of KPIs, the presence of a KPI in the annual reports 
was labelled [1] where a KPI disclosure was made and [0] where the company in 
question did not report any KPIs in the annual report.  The first stage of the scoring 
was to measure the extent of disclosure.   In the case of estimating the dependent 
variable based on the extent of disclosure; the selected index for each company was 
the difference between the summation of all the reported KPIs and the summation of 
irrelevant KPIs to that respective entity collected from the study sample of company 
reports as in previous study (e.g. Kyeyune, 2010, Hassan et al., 2011b, Acerete et al., 
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2011).  This method ensures that the level of disclosure is only calculated based on 
the attributes that are relevant to the entity in question. 
The applicability of disclosure items to the companies under scrutiny was taken 
into account in order to avoid penalising companies that did not disclose certain 
information items.  A similar scoring process was executed for both sets of 
companies (private limited and public listed).  The adjustment for non-applicable 
items has been exercised in some previous research (e.g. Cooke, 1989a, Lopes and 
Rodrigues, 2007, Tauringana and Mangena, 2009, Inchausti, 1997, Li et al., 2008b) 
as opposed to the method used by Chalmers and Godfrey (2004)
41
.  The total 
disclosure (KPISCORE) score arrived at for a company is additive as below: 
 
 
 
 
Where: d = one if the item d1 is disclosed; zero, if the item d1 is not disclosed 
n = number of disclosure items 
x = non-applicable disclosure items 
 
6.5.2 Word Count Methodology 
The use of the dichotomous scale as the scoring instrument for the disclosure 
index has been criticised before.  The criticisms have been due to the failure for the 
                                                          
41
 Companies that did not use derivatives and made no disclosures in that regard were considered to 
be non-disclosing firms.  In their study, they assumed that that the most companies use derivative 
instruments thus should disclose as such.  Non-adjustment of non-applicable items may be viewed as 
introducing a significant bias to the research. 
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scale to recognise the importance of information items although it has been counter 
argued that the importance of disclosure items is down to the researcher’s discretion.  
The dichotomous scale therefore does not indicate how much emphasis is given to 
particular content categories.  In order to overcome some of the problems associated 
with the index score.  This study introduces the word count methodology which 
captures the volume of KPI (KPIWC%)
42
 disclosures in the annual reports under 
scrutiny.  This is similar to the method used by Li et al. (2008b) in a study on 
intellectual capital disclosures. 
Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) suggested that using words would provide the 
maximum robustness in assessing disclosure because they are the smallest unit of 
measurement for analysis.  The coding using this method was therefore by taking 
what Beattie and Thomson (2007) term ‘pieces of information,’ i.e. phrases and 
words.  KPIWC% constitutes the total number of words that were used to describe all 
the KPI items reported in the annual report and the figure divided by the total number 
of words in the whole annual report.  Words that were used in annotating graphs and 
pictures were not included as part of KPIWC%.  In support of this method, it was 
noted that Krippendorff (2004b) stated that words were a preferred measure 
particularly where a researcher intends to assess the total space devoted to a theme or 
topic.  The total volume of words may also be used in judging the importance of that 
topic if one were to compare themes.  The word count methodology is a measure that 
has been identified in prior studies relating to the assessment of disclosure quantity in  
annual reports.  KPIWC% is a measure of importance of the theme in the annual 
report and the overall responsiveness by the corporate management as supported by 
                                                          
42
 Key performance indicators word count percentage. 
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Li et al. (2008b).  During the scoring process, it was noted that some firms scored 
low on the dichotomous scale (KPISCORE) but would have a high KPIWC%.  Such 
instances demonstrated that some management placed greater focus on explaining 
KPIs in their annual reports. 
 
6.5.3 Comprehensiveness Methodology 
Comprehensiveness is the final measure that was introduced to this study.  
This measure was devised because it was noted that both the dichotomous and the 
word count methodologies capture mainly quantitative attributes of KPI reporting in 
the annual reports of the companies under scrutiny.  The comprehensiveness method 
is split into four main sections which are (i), presence; (ii), amounts & comparison of 
past performance; (iii), reason for performance and (iv), the forward looking 
attribute.   
The attributes that were chosen as the measure for comprehensiveness all 
have their merits as far as usefulness is concerned to information users.  Firstly, 
presence; as per the KPI definition will indicate that disclosure of a KPI will provide 
information relating to the performance, position and development of the business 
hence providing further information to various stakeholders in order to enhance the 
decision making process.  Secondly, amounts and comparison of past performance 
will enhance users of annual reports by providing trends from which users can assess 
progress within the business over several years.  Third, reason for performance will 
enlighten users as to why the reporting entity has performed a certain way therefore 
they can make more informed decisions as well as inferences about the future.  
Fourth, the forward looking attribute provides information to users about the 
prospect of the reporting firm from the perspective of management.  Often this 
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information incorporates management’s plans for the direction in which they wish to 
take the company in the future. 
At the time of writing the thesis, the rhetoric in various disclosure studies 
(e.g. Beattie et al., 2004a, Hooks et al., 2000, Nielsen, 2004) is oriented towards 
explaining disclosure measurement by way of quality attributes.   This was 
informative on the various considerations, both theoretical and practical, concerning 
the development and application of a technique that is reliable.  Since many previous 
studies have used the term quality to refer to a variety of different attributes this 
study substitutes the term ‘quality’ with ‘comprehensiveness’ so that a distinction 
can be made and also to ensure clarity of communication.  Comprehensiveness is 
measured by the attributes listed below. 
 
Presence 
The comprehensiveness methodology involved four stages.  The first of these 
four stages was a check for presence of KPI disclosures.  Presence is a measure that 
is similar to that used by Kyeyune (2010) in which; each present ordinal score was 
awarded a score of [1] to represent that the respective KPI item at least appeared 
once in the annual report.  The total score that could be attributed to each company 
under scrutiny here would be the summation of the KPIs that are reported and 
identified in the annual report.  In cases where companies did not make any 
disclosures in their annual reports, the score of [0] would be recorded and the scoring 
process would be discontinued as it would be impossible for a company that recorded 
[0] for Presence to have any other score above [0] for the consequent 
comprehensiveness categories. 
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Where a company had a score of [5] for its presence for example; it would 
entail that the particular company disclosed five KPIs in its annual report.  All these 
five KPIs would then also be checked against amount, reason for change and forward 
looking disclosures.  The maximum attainable score for a company that disclosed 5 
KPIs for example is illustrated below: 
Company “x” 
∑ (KPIs disclosed in annual report)   5 
(Multiplied by) Total number of categories   4 
Maximum possible comprehensiveness score   20 
 
 
Amounts and Comparison of current with past performance 
In the annual reports that were analysed, it was noted that approximately 
99.25% of the reports that disclosed an amount against KPIs also disclosed 
comparisons with previous years.  For this reason, the variable was treated as one 
combined measure.  It is recommended in the guidance for the reporting of KPIs that 
a quantified measure should be attached to the KPI being reported (P.W.C., 2007).  
The Accounting Standards Board also recommend that while attaching a quantified 
measure to KPIs reported in the annual report, the quantified data should also show 
comparatives over several years (Accounting Standards Board, 2006).  Due to the 
guidance available, a decision was also made to take this comprehensiveness 
measure as singly (amounts and comparison). 
It may be suggested that the combination of amounts and comparison warrant 
them to be considered as one variable due to the increased precision of the measure 
as opposed to disregarding one of them.  The companies that did not disclose both 
parts of this variable were minute hence only those companies that reported both 
237 
 
parts were considered for the study and this totalled to approximately 99.25% of the 
original sample.  Every KPI that was disclosed by the relevant company in the annual 
report was therefore checked for amounts and comparison and the maximum possible 
score attainable was equal to the number of KPIs that were disclosed by the 
particular company in question. 
 
The Reason for Performance 
Following the checks for presence, amount and comparison; the next category 
for comprehensiveness checks on the same report was that of reason for 
performance.  Kyeyune (2010) used a similar method in which whenever the reason 
for performance attribute was identified in an information item, an ordinal score “R” 
was awarded.  In this study, it was noted that there were some repetitions where 
similar reasons were applicable to the same KPI item.  These repetitions were 
considered as individual items and awarded a single score for the reason disclosed.  
After awarding “R” to reasons for performance attribute in all information items, the 
ordinal scores were then converted into nominal scores by assigning [1] every time 
“R” was identified.  All the [1] scores were added up to give a total score for the 
reason for performance attribute.  The minimum possible score for this category 
would be where a company did not provide any reasons for the trends reported in 
their KPIs and the maximum score would have been where companies provide an 
explanation in the KPI trend for all the KPIs reported.  A company reporting five 
KPIs for instance would score a maximum score of five for the reason for 
performance attribute. 
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The Forward Looking Attribute 
Anticipatory statements regarding KPIs were also scored against as part of 
this study.  The main reason for deciding to include this measure is because it is 
recommended by the Accounting Standards Board (2006) that the Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR) should contain “prospective information about the 
development, performance and position of the company” in reference to KPI 
information.  The OFR RS1 recommends quantified targets to be stated where KPIs 
are reported.  It was therefore decided that this is a measure that is vital to the 
comprehensiveness of KPIs reported and should be considered as part of the study.  
Another recommendation on the disclosure of KPIs in annual reports stated that  
“either way, a forward looking orientation is essential for readers to assess the 
potential strategies to succeed, and to give them a basis against which to assess future 
performance” (P.W.C., 2007). 
Using a similar technique to that used for the reason for performance 
attribute.  An ordinal score “F” was awarded in the reports for where forward looking 
information was attached against reported KPIs in the BR section of the annual 
report.  The researcher then revisited and converted all the “F” scores to [1].  All the 
[1] scores per report were added up to provide the total score for forward looking 
disclosures pertaining KPIs in the annual report under scrutiny.  Similarly the 
minimum possible score for this category would be where a company did not provide 
any forward looking information against the reported KPIs and the maximum score 
would have been where companies provided forward looking information for all the 
reported KPIs. 
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6.6 Operationalizing the Independent Variables  
 Some of the variables in question can be measured in more than one way for 
example gearing and profitability; therefore it is necessary to establish and 
operationalizing mechanism.  Independent variables have been selected having paid 
attention to some of the problems associated with the scoring of annual reports and 
weighting of voluntary disclosure items.  The following section therefore identifies, 
defines and explains how the independent variables will be measured for the purpose of 
the research. 
 
6.6.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Six independent variables were analysed under corporate governance 
mechanisms.  These variables mainly relate to attributes regarding the board of 
directors ranging from its size to the frequency of board meetings held during the 
trading period of the (2008) annual report analysed in the study. 
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Table 6: Operisationalisation of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
 
Variable Proxy Measurement and Source 
PNED Proportion of 
non-executive 
directors 
Represents the number of non-executive directors as a 
proportion of the total number of directors on the board.  
This information was attained from the directors’ 
biographies in the 2008 annual reports. 
   
AUDSIZE Audit committee 
size 
Calculated as the total number of directors on the audit 
committee as a percentage of the total of board members. 
   
BOARDM Frequency of 
board meetings 
Represents the total number of board meetings held 
throughout the year to the 2008 annual report. 
   
FINEXP Proportion of 
finance experts 
Calculated as the number of board members with financial 
expertise/finance professionals as a percentage of the total 
board size as identified in the 2008 annual reports. 
   
BDSIZE Board size Constitutes the total number on the board of directors as 
identified in the 2008 annual report. 
   
DSHARE Director share 
ownership 
Represents the directors’ interests in the company under 
analysis.  The value is calculated as the percentage of 
voting shares held by the board members divided by the 
total issued shares.  The share quantity did not include any 
shares held in trust but included those held on behalf of 
family members. 
   
241 
 
 
6.6.2 Company Specific Characteristics 
Seven independent variables were analysed under company specific 
characteristics.  The main themes of the variables analysed under this category cover 
other themes related to the company such as corporate performance (e.g. profit ratio) 
and capital market related variables (e.g. listing status).  
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Table 7: Operisationalisation of Company Specific Characteristics 
 
Variable Proxy Measurement and Source 
COSIZE Company size This figure is a measure of shareholders’ funds according 
to the Statement of financial position for the period in the 
2008 annual report measured in billions (£bn). 
   
GEAR Gearing  ratio Calculated as long term debt divided by total assets from 
the 2008 annual report figures. 
   
PROF Profit ratio Calculated as net profit before tax and extraordinary items 
divided by turnover from the 2008 annual report. 
   
LQDT Liquidity ratio Calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities 
according to the 2008 annual report figures. 
   
MULTIN Multinationality Represents whether the company only operates within 
the UK or whether the company also operates 
internationally. The symbol [0] was used to denote those 
companies operating only within the UK and the symbol 
[1] to denote those companies operating internationally. 
   
LSTAT Listing status Variable was coded [1] if the company was listed on the 
LSE and [0] if not. 
   
MLIST Multiple listing Depicts where a company is listed on more than one stock 
exchange (LSE) and was coded [1] if so and [0] if not.  
This information was attained from Yahoo Finance which 
lists all the stock exchanges with which every company in 
question is listed. 
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6.7 Hypothesis Testing and Statistical Tests 
6.7.1 Hypothesis Testing Approach 
The purpose of the research is the main determinant of the approach on 
testing the hypotheses for the study.  One of the main objectives of this study is to 
investigate the relationships between KPI disclosures in annual reports of large UK 
companies with corporate governance and company specific characteristics.  The 
study aims to determine the explanatory power of these variables on KPI disclosures.  
Both comprehensive and quantitative measures have been synthesised for future 
statistical inferences.  Multivariate analysis has therefore been undertaken to indicate 
the collective contributions of a combination of independent variables to the 
dependent variable. 
 
6.7.2 Statistical Tests and Conditions 
There are two main streams of tests that can be performed and they are branched 
into parametric and non-parametric tests (Dardor, 2009, Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976, 
Field, 2009).  The application of each type of statistical procedure depends on the data 
meeting certain conditions.  Non-parametric tests are mainly based on a model that 
requires very general conditions.  They do not require a specific form of distribution 
from which the sample was drawn; the observations just require to be independent and 
the variables under the study need to have underlying continuity (Field, 2009).  The 
assumptions associated with parametric tests are stronger than those for non-parametric 
tests (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).  Noether (1991) and Field (2009) for instance 
suggest that non-parametric statistical methods are generally considered to be less 
powerful than parametric statistical methods.  The applications of parametric tests 
therefore require a number of more stringent conditions to be met.  Siegel (1956) 
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more specifically suggests that  the employment of parametric tests is based on four 
major assumptions. 
First, the observations must be independent, i.e. the selection of any one case 
from the population for inclusion in the sample must not bias the chances of any 
other case for inclusion, and the score which is assigned to any case must not bias the 
score which is assigned to any other case.  Second, the observations must be drawn 
from normally distributed populations.  Third, in the case of analyses concerning two 
groups, the population must have the same variance.  Fourth, the variables must have 
been measured on at least an interval scale, so that it is possible to interpret the 
results.  
Gaito (1980) argues against some of the preconditions specified by Siegel 
(1956).  Gaito (1980) believes that there are some misconceptions of the precondition 
and suggests that statistical procedures do not require specific scale properties.  Gaito 
(1980) states that "the numbers do not know where they come from."  In support of 
this assertion, Gaito (1980) refers to a number of statisticians and concludes that 
confusion between measurement theory and statistical theory has led to the 
persistence of this misconception.   Other authors such as Gregoire and Driver (1987) 
have empirically demonstrated that the use of parametric tests on ordinal data does 
not lead to great problems.  This has thus shed light on the argument by Gaito (1980) 
that there is overemphasis on the assumptions of parametric tests.  Davidson and 
Sharma (1988) however provide theoretical proof that there is no need for the 
measurements to be on an interval scale if the assumptions of normality and 
homogeneity are met. 
 Although logistic regression was used in this study for private limited 
companies, multivariate analysis in the form of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
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regression analysis was also employed.  The underlying assumptions of this method that 
have to be met before computing the statistical tests are discussed in further detail below.  
They have been grouped into four categories namely multicollinearity, normality, 
linearity and homoscedasticity.  
 
6.7.2.1 Multicollinearity 
When there is strong correlation between two or more predictors in a regression 
model then it is termed multicollinearity (e.g. Koutsoyiannis, 1972, Moore and Buzby, 
1972, Dardor, 2009, Tauringana, 1997).  When there are high levels of collinearity, there 
is an increased probability of predictors to be found as non-significant and thus rejected 
in the model (e.g. Kremelberg, 2011, Wright, 1997, Field, 2009).  Two tests will be 
carried out in this study to check for the existence of multicollinearity.  An examination 
of the correlation matrix to determine whether the independent variables were 
significantly correlated will be carried out first.  The general consensus among authors is 
that multicollinearity problems become harmful when the correlation coefficient exceeds 
0.8 to 0.9 (e.g. Judge et al., 1985, Kennedy, 1985, Myers, 1990, Gujarati, 1995, Field, 
2000, Pallant, 2001, Kyeyune, 2010).  
It has been suggested that a certain degree of multicollinearity can still exist even 
when none of the bivariate correlation coefficients is very large according to Myers 
(1990).  Field (2009) and Dardor (2009) suggest that this is because one independent 
variable may be an approximate linear function of a set of several independent variables.  
The second diagnostic that will be carried out involves an examination of the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF).  VIF merely indicates whether a predictor has a strong linear 
relationship with other predictors (Kremelberg, 2011).  Previous studies have suggested 
that VIF values should create a problem only when they reach values of 10 (Neter et al., 
1985, Myers, 1990). Some studies opt to use a diagnostic that involves an examination 
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of the Tolerance values.  The tolerance statistic is a reciprocal of the VIF.  Under 
tolerance statistics, values of below 0.1 indicate serious problems (e.g. Norusis, 2005, 
Field, 2009).  Some authors have however suggested that values below 0.2 are worthy of 
concern (Menard, 1995). 
 Multicollinearity introduces a range of problems for instance if two independent 
variables are collinear; they behave in a linear fashion, either negative or positive.  They 
behave as if there is a linear relationship between them.  Collinear variables generally 
move in the same direction as each other and pretty much behave like a single variable.  
One of the issues that arise in multicollinearity is that it becomes very difficult to 
separate the individual effects of each variable.  Tauringana (1997) for example, further 
suggests that collinearity produces unrealistically high standard errors on the partial 
coefficients.  He states that “the abnormally high standard errors are sometimes 
sufficiently large to cause the calculated t statistic to be smaller than the critical t 
statistic. This tendency towards reporting smaller t values often result in researchers 
mistakenly accepting the null hypothesis that the partial regression coefficient is 
effectively zero” (Tauringana, 1997, p.185).  In such cases it is very easy for results to 
show no association between the dependent and independent variables when in fact an 
association does exist. Another of the problems that arise from multicollinearity is that 
of the exceptional sensitivity of the data set being used in the estimation.  In such cases 
it becomes extremely difficult to replicate the results when a different data set is 
employed even though the variables are unchanged. Tauringana (1997) explains that 
where multicollinearity exists, it may be found that the partial regression coefficients 
estimated from one data set may be different from those estimated from another data 
set.   
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 The final major problem that will be highlighted in this study on 
multicollinearity is the fact that the results of the estimation are dependent on the exact 
specification of the model being tested.  Relatively minor changes in the specification 
of the model should not cause drastically different coefficients but in the existence of 
multicollinearity, a minor change in the model being estimated that would normally 
have very small effect on the parameter estimates would generate grossly different 
results when independent variables are collinear (Tauringana, 1997).  Two ways to deal 
with collinearity would be to get another data set on the same variables that have no 
multicollinearity or to enter the collinear variables one at a time (forward stepwise 
regression) and observe the explanatory power of each model. 
 
6.7.2.2 Normality 
Histograms and normality probability plots were constructed in order to 
assess the magnitude of the problems associated with the normality of the data in this 
study.  The plots can be located in Appendix 4, 5 and 6 for private, public and pooled 
companies respectively.  Other standard tests on skewness, kurtosis and Kolmogrov-
Smirnov tests of normality have also been known to be used to determine whether 
the sample came from a normally distributed population. As suggested from other 
prominent studies, the data will be transformed into natural logarithms where the 
assumptions of normality are not met (e.g. Kremelberg, 2011, Cooke, 1998, Field, 
2009). 
 
6.7.2.3 Linearity 
Scatter plots of the residuals were produced and examined using SPSS in 
order to check for the assumption of linearity, this is a similar method to that used in 
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previous studies such as Kyeyune (2010) and Dardor (2009) among many.  The plots 
are located in appendix 4, 5 and 6 for private companies, public companies and 
pooled companies respectively.  It is assumed that the residuals have a linear 
relationship with the predicted dependent variable scores, and that the variance of the 
residuals is the same for all predicted scores (e.g. Field, 2009, Coakes and Steed, 
2001, Pallant, 2001).  The assumption of linearity is observed to have been violated 
if there is a funnel pattern.  Extreme deviations also represent a violation of linearity.  
Transforming the data is a solution that overcomes these problems (e.g. Norusis, 
2005, Dardor, 2009).  Other authors suggest that mild variations are not considered 
to be a serious problem (e.g. Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996, Coakes and Steed, 2001, 
De Vaus, 2002). 
 
6.7.2.4 Homoscedasticity 
Homoscedasticity is defined as a situation where the variability in the scores 
for one variable is roughly the same at all values of the other variable (Coakes and 
Steed, 2001).  It may therefore be said to be concerned with how the scores cluster 
uniformly about the regression line.  The assumption of homoscedasticity will be 
checked using SPSS and this through a visual examination of the standardised 
residual scatter plots, this is a similar method used by Dardor (2009).  The equal 
variance assumption is satisfied if the residuals appear to be randomly scattered 
around the regression line (e.g. Norusis, 2005, Field, 2009, Coakes and Steed, 2001).  
The data may once again be transformed if the assumption of homoscedasticity 
appears to have been violated (e.g. Norusis, 2005). 
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6.8 Choice of Statistical Tests 
From the above discussions, the choice of statistical tests that could possibly 
be applied lie within the univariate or multivariate categories.  The main problem 
with univariate techniques is that they focus only on an individual causality for an 
event.  A simple example is suggesting that company size is significantly associated 
with the extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports.  It is difficult to suggest that 
company size alone is the influencing factor because there are several other 
possibilities and therefore it seems flawed to just focus on one explanatory variable 
and suggesting that it is the cause for changes in the quantity of KPI disclosures in 
annual reports.  It is essential as suggested by Dardor (2009) to include several 
plausible explanatory variables in a model at the same time.  One of the problems of 
using multivariate tests is that they have certain conditions that need to be met as 
discussed earlier.  It may be impossible to have a data set which is strictly normally 
distributed
43
.  Multivariate tests were chosen as the stronger of the two techniques in 
this study for the purpose of the research.  Field (2009) suggests that both sets of 
tests have their strengths in statistical calculations. 
 
6.8.1 Selection of Methods of Regression 
Multiple regression analysis is the statistical method that was chosen to 
determine the nature of the relationship between KPI disclosures in annual reports of 
UK companies and explanatory variables.  There are several procedures that can be 
utilised in the computation of multiple regression analysis as far as the selection of 
independent variables to include in the regression model is concerned.  The three 
                                                          
43
 This refers to data which has a skewness coefficient of 0.00. 
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main types include standard or forced entry method, the block wise entry method, 
and the stepwise method (Field, 2009, Pallant, 2001).  In the standard entry method, 
all the independent variables to be included in the model are simultaneously entered.  
The standard entry method was the selected method for this study, it is one in which 
each independent variable is evaluated in terms of its predictive power, over and 
above that offered by all the other independent variables.  Other studies suggest that 
this approach also reveals how much unique variance in the dependent variable is 
explained by each of the independent variables (Dardor, 2009, p.122, Pallant, 2001, 
p.135). 
The other two independent variable entry methods are the block wise and the 
stepwise methods.  Field (2009) suggests that in the block wise entry, the 
independent variables are entered in the order of their importance based on prior 
research.  Pallant (2001) suggests that any new variables can either be entered using 
the standard or stepwise entry methods.  In the final, stepwise method, the variables 
entered first into the model are those that have the highest degree of correlation to the 
dependent variable.  Subsequently the other exogenous variables are included one by 
one, on the basis of the partial correlation coefficients.  Dardor (2009) explains that 
under this method, a new variable is included in the model on the conditions that its 
t-statistic is larger than a critical value and that the t-statistics of the other variables 
that are already in the model do not diminish below that value after the inclusion of 
the new variable.  It was decided to use the standard multiple regression method in 
order to determine the variance in the dependent variables (KPI disclosures).  The 
preferred and selected method is similar to that used in several previous studies (e.g. 
Wallace et al., 1994a, Wallace and Naser, 1995, Depoers, 2000, Ho and Wong, 
2001b, Li et al., 2008b, Dardor, 2009). 
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6.8.2 The Regression Models 
After all the above considerations, it will then be necessary to run the 
regression analyses.  The objective of running the analyses is to establish whether 
there is a relationship between the dependent variable (KPIs score) with the 
independent variables from all the categories stated above.  Three models will have 
to be drawn up, that is, (1) for the public listed firms, (2), for the private limited firms 
and (3), for the pooled set of data.  Market related variables were excluded in the 
regression equation for private limited companies as they do not operate on the stock 
exchange.  The same rule will apply for the pooled set of companies as half of the 
sample will constitute those companies that are not listed on the LSE.  The Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analysis that will be manipulated may be expressed 
in the form of the models as below: 
 
Private Companies 
KPISCORE/COMP/WCOUNT = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BDMEET + 4 
FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 
11 MULTIN + j 
 
Listed Companies 
KPISCORE/COMP/WCOUNT = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 
4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT 
+ 11 MULTIN + 12 MLIST + j 
 
252 
 
Pooled companies 
KPISCORE/COMP/WCOUNT = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 
4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT 
+ 11 MULTIN + 12 MLIST + 13 LSTAT + j 
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Table 8: Definition of Regression Model Variables 
Regression Term Description 
  
KPISCORE Quantity of KPIs disclosed as a percentage of the index. 
  
KPIWC% KPI score as a percentage of the total word count in the annual report 
  
COMP Measure of quality taking into account presence of KPIs, relevant amount 
being stated, reason for changes being provided and provision of forward 
looking information. 
  
PNED Fraction of non-executive directors on the board. 
  
AUDSIZE Total number of members on the audit committee. 
  
BOARDM Frequency of board meetings per annum. 
  
FINEXP Proportion of financial experts on the board of directors. 
  
BDSIZE Total number of member on the board of directors. 
  
DSHARE Proportion of shares owned by board members at annual report date. 
  
COSIZE Company size by shareholders funds. 
  
GEAR Long-term debt divided by capital employed. 
  
PRAT Profit measured as operating profit divided by capital employed at the 
annual report date. 
  
LQDT Current assets divided by current liabilities. 
  
MULTIN Presence of company outside the UK. 
  
LSTAT Variable to depict whether a company is listed on the LSE or not. 
  
MLIST Variable to depict whether a company is listed on the LSE and another 
stock exchange. 
  
0 …… 10 Regressors/regression coefficients. 
  
j The disturbance/error term 
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Since a limited number of private limited companies disclosed KPIs in their annual 
reports, it may be inappropriate to include non-disclosing entities in the regression 
model.  Only the private limited disclosing companies were considered in the pooled 
companies’ model. 
 
6.8.3 Validity and Reliability 
Validity and reliability considerations of the techniques employed for this 
study were considered as recommended by Marston and Shrives (1991a).  Bouma 
and Atkinson (1999) also suggest that for a dependable content analysis it is 
important to ensure validity and reliability.  Validity relates to the accuracy fit of 
variables to a concept, while reliability is concerned with the achievement of similar 
results by different researchers while analysing similar content with an identical 
research device (Kyeyune, 2010).  Marston and Shrives (1991b) also agree that 
satisfactory levels of measurement in content analysis are attained through the 
assurance of validity and reliability.  The conformity to the requirements is explained 
below. 
 
6.8.3.1 Validity Considerations 
The concept of validity dates back as early as 1985 where Weber (1985) 
identified two types of validity namely internal face and external validity.  Internal 
face validity refers to the correspondence between the researcher’s definition of a 
concept and the categories that are used to measure it (Weber, 1985, Gustavsson et 
al., 2000).  The second, external validity is associated with the attesting of the 
measurement tool to external tests of conformity (Allee et al., 2007).  Weber (1985) 
also attached hypotheses that related to a theoretical framework which is linked to 
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the research tool.  These were broken into predictive validity that seeks the 
predictability of the disclosure model and semantic validity which is associated with 
the extent to which the text units grouped together have similar meaning.  This study 
applies external validity as explained by Weber (1985).  This study emulates 
Weber’s (1985) guidance by making use of a disclosure measurement tool that is in 
line with prior literature and places a substantial amount of dependence on current 
disclosures regulatory guidelines.  Confirmation of validity can be supported by the 
fact that the constructs for this study are similar to previous research (e.g. Kyeyune, 
2010, Beattie et al., 2004b), further confirmation was through the literature review 
for studies investigating disclosures in financial reporting.  Throughout this study, 
references have been used in the construction and application of methodologies (e.g. 
the disclosure indices and scoring techniques). 
 
6.8.3.2 Reliability Considerations 
According to Krippendorff (2004b), reliability can be explained through three 
models.  The first being stability; this is where there is consistence of the same coder 
over time while coding the same content.  The second being inter-coder reliability in 
which consistency between different coders is examined, the coders analyse similar 
data/content.  The final one noted by Krippendorff (2004b) is accuracy; it is 
concerned with the extent to which classification of text corresponds to a standard or 
norm.   In the context of financial reporting content analysis, inter coder reliability is 
normally used owing to the weakness in stability and the absence of standard coding 
(Beattie et al., 2004a).  Milne and Adler (1999a) suggest a ratio based estimation of 
reliability in which observed matches are weighted against the expected matches.  
This method is argued against by Beattie et al. (2004a) who suggest that this method 
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is an inadequate technique since the ratio is based on pair-wise inter-judge 
agreements to the total number of pair wise judgements; without controlling for 
random agreements.  The inter-coder reliability was conducted in this study for the 
scoring techniques employed.    
The purpose of reliability is to assure the quality of research as reinforced by 
Kyeyune (2010) in their study on the relative information content of complementary 
and supplementary narrative commentaries.  It is further suggested that where there 
are high degrees of variation amongst coders, this phenomenon would indicate that 
there is a possibility of several weaknesses within the research (see Lombard et al., 
2002b, Kolbe and Burnett, 1991).  Some examples of the possible weaknesses would 
include issues such as poor organisation, poor definition of the research tools and 
inadequate training of the coders among many possibilities.  Under inter coder 
reliability there is the advantage of the work being distributed among other coders 
(Neuendorf, 2011).  Other authors further suggest that this method is less susceptible 
to methodological errors (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999, Rust and Cooil, 
1994).   
Tinsley and Weiss  (2000) suggest that there are two ways to compute inter 
coder reliability in order to measure the level of consistency.  The first is through 
correlation (analysis of variance) which may be used as an indicator of the degree of 
similar rating by different coders expressed as a deviation from the means.  The 
second method is that of inter coder agreement which may be applied by assessing 
the extent to which the coders assign the same scores to each object that is being 
scored in the data to be computed.  Tinsley and Weiss  (2000) further argue that inter 
coder agreement is a more defensible strategy for reliability testing since the measure 
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is theoretically more oriented to comparable exactness between the scores as opposed 
to variation between the scores in the correlation approach. 
Lombard et al. (2002a) reviewed various methods for conducting reliability 
tests.  The procedures include percentage agreements, Holsti’s (1969) method, 
Scott’s (1955) pi [π], Cohen’s Kappa [κ] (Cohen, 1960, Cohen, 1968) and Bennett et 
al’s (1954) S [S].  Others include Fleiss’ K [K] (Fleiss, 1971, Siegel and Castellan, 
1988),  Cronbach’s (1951) Alpha [C-]  and Krippendorff’s (1980) Alpha [K-α].  
Lombard et al. (2002a) further adds that despite the many estimates for reliability, 
none has been known to be the best measure for reliability.  This research employs 
the K-α.  The K-α technique employs the inter coder technique which involves 
agreement with independent coders of the same data.  Tinsley and Weiss (2000) for 
instance consider this method to be a more appropriate measure for reliability than 
employing variation examinations. 
There are several advantages of using the K-α technique compared to the 
other options.  The technique allows for any number of coders, the method is 
applicable to different levels of measurement; it is also applicable to different types 
of measurement (nominal, ordinal, interval and ratios).  Finally complete or 
incomplete data may be computed using the method.  Krippendorff (2004a) also 
argues that using the method, the K-α may be customised in order to suit the nature 
of the data sets under study.  Kyeyune (2010) suggests that other methods are highly 
specialised and therefore restrictions apply in their usability.  Similar to π, the K-α 
technique accounts for instances where there are agreements by chance.  Hayes and 
Krippendorff (2007) add that the K-α  treats observers as being freely permutable 
since the process involves matrix pairing which is based on scores rather than the 
quantity of coders involved.  K-α is explicit in expressing the measure of reliability, 
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perfect reliability is rated [1] and perfect unreliability is rated [0].  Although this 
method appears to have several advantages, it has a very complicated computation 
procedure as described below. 
As a rule of thumb regardless of the technique employed to measure the level 
of reliability, the widely accepted levels for data to be deemed as reliable is when the 
rate lies between 0.70 and 1.00 according to Neuendorf (2002).  Other authors such 
as (Beattie et al., 2004a, Boyatzis, 1998, Guthrie and Matthews, 1985) are in 
agreement with the  range of 0.70 to 1.00 for a reliable data set.  According to 
Krippendorff (2004a), the procedure for computing K-α is as follows: 
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Where: 
 c and k   represent the coded values from coders c and k in the reliability matrix 
n   refers to the number of values in the reliability data matrix 
 ock and δck  surrogate for observed coincidences and the difference function 
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6.8.3.2.1 Reliability of the Scoring Technique 
In order to conduct the reliability tests, three coders with a strong accounting 
and finance background were invited.  The three coders involved were informed 
about the background and objectives of the study.  Beattie and Thomson (2007) 
identified among many issues, the problems with word count (e.g. font variations, 
disclosures in graphs, annotations and pictures format), and they proposed relevant 
coding rules.  For the same reason, the independent coders for this study were trained 
on the scoring technique that was employed for this study including the decision 
making process with use of both literature and illustrations.  Several studies that 
concur with the use of professionals in the process of inter coder reliability checks 
were identified and similar measures have been adopted for this study (see Beattie et 
al., 2004b, Beattie and Thomson, 2007, Kyeyune, 2010).  The use of inter coders for 
reliability enhances the quality of the output by ensuring that there is a certain level 
of consistency in the data used for the study.   
Three templates for the scoring process were developed; the templates 
covered the dichotomous scoring system, the word count methodology and the 
comprehensiveness methodology.  These templates were sent out to each of the 
coders including a summary of the decision rules on scoring the annual reports.  
Twenty annual (ten private limited and ten public listed companies) reports were 
then selected using the random sampling tool on Microsoft Excel.  Of the twenty 
reports selected, two coders were assigned seven and the third assigned six annual 
reports to score under the three identified categories (dichotomous, word count and 
comprehensiveness).  The scores from the coders were then compared to the scores 
that were recorded by the researcher for the respective annual reports using 
Krippendorff’s Alpha, Scott’s Pi and Cohen’s Kappa.  The results of the tests, 
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including the percentages of agreement are outlined in the Tables 9 and 10.  
Appendix 1 and 2 contain the scores awarded by the inter-raters prior to computing 
the reliability results. 
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Table 9: Reliability Results for Annual Reports Scoring: Private Limited Companies 
 
Company Percentage 
Agreement 
Scott's Pi Cohen's 
Kappa 
Krippendorff's 
Alpha 
N 
Agreements 
N 
Disagreements 
N 
Cases 
N 
Decisions 
                  
Anglian Water 93.75 0.92873 0.92889 0.93096 15 1 16 32 
Associated British Ports 87.50 0.86266 0.86325 0.86695 14 2 16 32 
Aston Martin 81.25 0.76978 0.77251 0.77698 13 3 16 32 
Barchester Healthcare Limited 81.25 0.76755 0.77033 0.77482 13 3 16 32 
Bargain Booze 81.25 0.79399 0.79574 0.80043 13 3 16 32 
C&J Clarke 81.25 0.79531 0.79661 0.80171 13 3 16 32 
Halcrow Holdings Limited 87.50 0.85388 0.85455 0.85845 14 2 16 32 
John Laing 93.75 0.92252 0.92271 0.92494 15 1 16 32 
Kwik Fit 81.25 0.79443 0.79574 0.80086 13 3 16 32 
Manchester United 87.50 0.85965 0.86026 0.86404 14 2 16 32 
Martin McColl 93.75 0.92326 0.92344 0.92566 15 1 16 32 
Monsoon 93.75 0.92326 0.92344 0.92566 15 1 16 32 
New Look 93.75 0.92471 0.92488 0.92706 15 1 16 32 
PA Consulting 87.50 0.85388 0.85455 0.85845 14 2 16 32 
Shop Direct 87.50 0.84834 0.84906 0.85308 14 2 16 32 
Spire Healthcare 75.00 0.72650 0.72881 0.73504 12 4 16 32 
Stewart Milne 93.75 0.92326 0.92344 0.92566 15 1 16 32 
Unipart Group 93.75 0.92873 0.92889 0.93096 15 1 16 32 
Virgin Atlantic 87.50 0.85455 0.85586 0.85909 14 2 16 32 
Wilkinson 87.50 0.86383 0.86441 0.86809 14 2 16 32 
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Table 10: Reliability Results for Annual Reports Scoring: Public Listed Companies 
 
Company Percentage 
Agreement 
Scott's Pi Cohen's 
Kappa 
Krippendorff's 
Alpha 
N 
Agreements 
N 
Disagreements 
N 
Cases 
N 
Decisions 
                  
Babcock International 93.75 0.93177 0.93191 0.93390 15 1 16 32 
BP 87.50 0.86383 0.86441 0.86809 14 2 16 32 
Cable and Wireless 87.50 0.86383 0.86441 0.86809 14 2 16 32 
Chloride Group 93.75 0.92873 0.92889 0.93096 15 1 16 32 
Dairy Crest Group 93.75 0.92326 0.92344 0.92566 15 1 16 32 
Debenhams 75.00 0.72591 0.72881 0.73448 12 4 16 32 
Dominos Pizza 93.75 0.93177 0.93191 0.93390 15 1 16 32 
G4S 93.75 0.92998 0.93013 0.93217 15 1 16 32 
Intercontinental Hotels 87.50 0.86611 0.86667 0.87029 14 2 16 32 
JD Wetherspoons 93.75 0.93177 0.93191 0.93390 15 1 16 32 
Ladbrokes 87.50 0.85520 0.85586 0.85973 14 2 16 32 
Michael Page 81.25 0.78523 0.78667 0.79195 13 3 16 32 
Millenium and Copthorne 87.50 0.84762 0.84834 0.85238 14 2 16 32 
Misys 81.25 0.79618 0.79747 0.80255 13 3 16 32 
Paypoint 87.50 0.85903 0.85965 0.86344 14 2 16 32 
Persimmon 87.50 0.85965 0.86087 0.86404 14 2 16 32 
Reed Elsevier 93.75 0.92541 0.92558 0.92774 15 1 16 32 
Rentokil Initial 81.25 0.78808 0.78947 0.79470 13 3 16 32 
Royal Dutch Shell 87.50 0.86207 0.86266 0.86638 14 2 16 32 
Smith and Nephew 87.50 0.86266 0.86325 0.86695 14 2 16 32 
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Riffe et al. (2005) takes the view that independent scores would need to be 
above a minimum 80% threshold for content analysis to be considered reliable.  
Nuendorf (2011) in a more recent study states that acceptable rates of reliability lie 
between 0.7 and 1;  It be concluded that the data used for this study is reliable as it 
meets the recommended thresholds.  The results are also in line with prior disclosure 
studies on financial reports (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004b, Kyeyune, 2010) who found 
reliability results ranging between the 0.7-1 remits.  Due to the criteria being met, it 
may be suggested that the level of reliability results may be attributed to factors such 
as the use of professionals in the area of study; provision of background information 
and adequate training on the disclosure measurement tool, the methodology and 
decision rules. 
Two of the inter coders often referred to the decision rules that were supplied 
and found them very useful in the process.  Another issue that was identified that 
may contribute to a descent reliability score is through avoiding the use of likert 
scale type scores based on subjectivity.  This study assigned a score of [1] every time 
an attribute of interest was identified, this helped in eliminating subjectivity.  Li et al. 
(2008b) in support of this argument also highlight the fact that prior disclosure 
studies have adopted the dichotomous (0:1) coding scheme in measuring disclosure, 
this method mainly checks for presence/absence (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000, 
Brennan, 2001).  There are however some disclosure studies that have used weighted 
coding schemes, which give uneven scores for quantitative and qualitative 
information (e.g. Bozzolan et al., 2003, Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007). In this study, 
items were not weighted because of potential scoring bias and scaling problems, the 
method adopted is consistent with that used in Cooke’s (1989a) study. 
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6.8.3.2.2 Reliability of the Regression Models 
  The reliability of any model revolves around the assumptions of regression 
being violated or not.  Analysing the residuals can be used to examine any violations in 
the models employed.  In order to check for the linearity of the independent variables 
with the dependent variables, a plot of the predicted residuals should not illustrate a 
relationship between the two measures.  Patterns in the plots would therefore point out 
that the linearity assumption was violated.  The plots for the models are attached in the 
appendices section of the study.   Apart from the normality assumptions and 
multicollinearity conditions already discussed in this chapter and examined in the 
results chapter, Field (2009) suggests testing for the impact of outliers and 
externalities.  To test for linearity and homoscedasticity of the models, the 
regression-standardised plots are examined for each of the models and attached in the 
appendices section.  The descriptive statistics in the results and analysis chapter 
discuss the distributive characteristics of the dependent and independent variables in 
greater detail.  
Externalities refer those variables that are outside of the regression models 
but have the potential to influence the power of the predictors.  Kyeyune (2010) 
notes that some of these predictors are at times included in the regression model as 
the error term.  It is however important to acknowledge that it is impossible to 
identify and establish all the externalities and their respective impact to the model.  
Their association with predictors may lead to misspecification of the model.  
Sensitivity analysis will also be undertaken in order to verify the reliability of the 
results of the regression analysis.  The tests to be carried out in the study include 
industry and family ownership for all the models.   The F-statistic part of the FZT 
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computator will be applied to compare the main results and the result of the models 
that include the sensitivity test dummy variables 
 
6.9 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The main purpose of the data and methodology chapter was to describe the various 
steps taken from data gathering through to the testing of the hypotheses. The chapter 
commenced by describing the study with focus on the selection and justification of 
the sample.  This was followed by describing the disclosure measurement and the 
disclosure index.  The scoring techniques employed and the methods of estimating 
the dependent variables followed.  The operationalization of the independent 
variables was then covered prior to a discussion of the hypothesis testing.  The 
choice of statistical tests and validity & reliability considerations were then discussed 
to close the chapter.  The next chapter presents and discusses the results of the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and company characteristics 
with the disclosure of KPIs in the annual reports of large private and large public 
listed UK companies. 
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Chapter 7 
Hypotheses Testing, Results and 
Discussion: 
Private Limited Companies 
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7 Hypotheses Testing, Results and Discussion: Private 
Limited Companies 
7.1 Introduction 
 This chapter is important because it provides evidence of KPI disclosure trends and 
the relationship between KPI disclosures and selected independent variables among private 
limited firms.    There are very few identifiable studies that have investigated disclosures 
among private limited companies in the UK, some of these few include Firth (1979) and 
Tauringana (1997).  This study is the first to provide evidence in the UK between large 
private limited company KPI disclosures and selected independent variables.  The results of 
the study pertaining to large private limited companies operating in the UK are discussed 
henceforth. 
 The chapter is organised as follows.  Section 7.2 discusses the extent of KPI 
disclosures in annual reports and the independent variable descriptive statistics.   Section 7.3 
summarises the logistic regression results.  The correlation results and regression results are 
covered in sections 7.4 and 7.5 respectively.  A discussion of the findings is in section 7.6 
followed by analysis of the diagnostic procedures in section 7.7.  The chapter closes with 
summary and concluding remarks in section 7.8. 
 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
None of the identified studies have investigated the extent of KPI disclosures 
among private firms.  This study will make a contribution in that area and extends 
further investigations in the later stages of this chapter.  Out of the 205 private 
limited companies investigated, 104 disclosed at least a single KPI in their annual 
reports.  101 did not disclose any KPIs therefore only 50.7% of the private limited 
firms investigated disclosed KPIs.  It may be argued that private limited firms are not 
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in the public interest and therefore their information disclosure is limited to its 
closest stakeholder groups, as opposed to the case of public listed firms where 
information is easily available and of direct interest to public shareholders.  This 
statistic is however an interesting find in light of the regulations under CA 2006 for 
companies to report on their KPIs.  This regulation is binding to all large public and 
private limited entities.  One may therefore expect the levels of disclosure to have 
very little variation between the two types of companies. 
Table 11 illustrates some descriptive statistics for the sample of two hundred 
and five private companies.  The variables that were used to estimate the influencing 
factors of KPI disclosures are also described in this section.  From the results it may 
be seen that the level of comprehensiveness in the disclosed KPIs is approximately 
31% according to the scale designed in this study.  The scale takes into account the 
presence of KPIs, amount and comparison, forward looking attributes and the reason 
for the performance.  This is significantly lower than approximately 66% reported for 
large public listed companies.  Private limited companies according to the 
investigation have approximately four non-executive directors on their board and 
public companies have two more than that figure. 
Audit committees in private companies comprise approximately three 
individuals which is just one less than in large public listed companies.  It was also 
found that there was very little difference between the frequencies of board meetings 
held by both sets of companies.  Private limited companies on average hold 
approximately seven board meetings per year while public listed companies hold 
approximately eight board meetings per year as reported in their annual reports.  
Finally under corporate governance mechanisms, it was found that private limited 
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companies have an average board size of seven individuals of which on average, 
approximately 40% of their board members have financial expertise. 
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Table 11: Descriptive Results of Variables 
a: Multiple models exist. The smallest value is shown. 
 KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP PNED AUDSIZE BOARDM FINEXP BDSIZE DSHARE SIZE GEAR PROF LQDT MULTIN 
N Valid 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Mean .0267 .0086 .3078 .3852 3.2766 7.4638 .4098 7.2681 .2064 429.285 1.97 .0122 1.1213 .4936 
Std. Error of Mean .00203 .00083 .02175 .01439 .09216 .17187 .01406 .20611 .01858 211.652 .22612 .00979 .06887 .03268 
Median .0158 .0019 .2300 .4000 3.0000 8.0000 .3750 7.0000 .0232 .4000 .6475 .0205 .9400 .0000 
Mode .00 .00 .00 .00 3.00 9.00 .33 9.00 .00 .12a .35 .00 .92a .00 
Std. Deviation .03110 .01270 .33347 .22057 1.41273 2.63478 .21554 3.15965 .28482 3244.568 3.46640 .15006 1.05578 .50103 
Variance .001 .000 .111 .049 1.996 6.942 .046 9.983 .081 10527223 12.016 .023 1.115 .251 
Skewness .870 2.875 .419 -.030 -.143 -.620 .751 1.587 1.262 10.919 3.520 -1.511 6.411 .026 
Std. Error of Skewness .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 .159 
Kurtosis -.063 13.483 -1.412 -.645 2.404 .654 .882 12.623 .501 132.991 15.853 8.432 64.510 -2.017 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 .316 
Range .13 .09 1.00 1.00 10.00 12.00 1.00 30.00 1.00 42944.00 27.21 1.36 12.77 1.00 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 -.42 -.87 .02 .00 
Maximum .13 .09 1.00 1.00 10.00 12.00 1.00 31.00 1.00 42944.00 26.79 .48 12.79 1.00 
Percentiles 25 .0000 .0000 .0000 .2222 3.0000 6.0000 .2500 5.0000 .0002 .1496 .2016 -.0024 .6000 .0000 
50 .0158 .0019 .2300 .4000 3.0000 8.0000 .3750 7.0000 .0232 .4000 .6475 .0205 .9400 .0000 
75 .0492 .0147 .6000 .5556 4.0000 9.0000 .5556 9.0000 .3712 1.0420 2.0666 .0502 1.3100 1.0000 
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7.3 Summary of Logistic Regression Results 
Since the extent of disclosure for private limited companies was approximately 
51%, logistic regression was conducted in order to identify the variables that 
influence the disclosure and non-disclosure of KPIs by the 205 sample of private 
companies.  The logistic regression results are supplementary to this study and 
therefore have been placed in appendix 3.  However to summarise, the Cox & Snell 
and Nagelkerke R
2
 were 51.3% and 71.1% respectively.  The coefficients results 
revealed that company size and multinationality positively determine the disclosure 
of KPIs at the 95% level of confidence. The frequency of board meetings, board size, 
gearing ratio and profitability ratio positively determine the disclosure of KPIs in 
annual reports of private companies at the 99% level of confidence. Finally, the 
proportion on non-executive directors and audit committee size negatively determine 
the disclosure of KPIs by private limited companies.  The following sections 7.4, 7.5 
and 7.6 on correlation analysis, diagnostic procedures and multiple regression results 
respectively, are based on the 104 private limited companies that disclosed KPIs in 
their annual reports. 
 
7.4 Correlation Analysis 
Table 12 presents the correlation results for the private limited companies.  
The correlation matrices have been drawn up to illustrate the relationship between 
the predictors and the outcome and also as a preliminary check for multicollinearity 
(Field, 2009).  Field (2009) suggests that high correlation (R>0.9: where R is the 
correlation coefficient) increases the chance that a good predictor may be 
misspecified.  Even though the correlation coefficients are significant, the matrices 
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revealed that there is no high correlation between the predictors.  The Table 12 below 
amalgamates all the dependent variables to be used in the three
44
 different models 
investigated in this chapter. KPISCORE and WCOUNT have a correlation of .652; 
KPISCORE and COMP have a correlation of .762 & WCOUNT and COMP a 
correlation of .619.  These correlations are all significant at the 0.001 level but it 
must be noted that they are all amongst dependent variables which are computed in 
three separate models hence there should not be any multicollinearity issues arising. 
                                                          
44
 Dependent variables include: (i) KPI score, (ii) Word count and (iii) Comprehensiveness. 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix 
 KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP PNED AUDSIZE BOARDM FINEXP BDSIZE DSHARE COSIZE GEAR PROF LQDT MULTIN 
KPISCORE 1                           
WCOUNT .652
**
 1                         
COMP .762
**
 .619
**
 1                       
PNED -.010 .063 .003 1                     
AUDSIZE -.008 -.032 -.019 .278
**
 1                   
BOARDM .041 .039 .078 .118 .302
**
 1                 
FINEXP .006 -.003 -.035 -.042 -.241
**
 -.139
*
 1               
BDSIZE .041 .008 .010 .301
**
 .755
**
 .261
**
 -.214
**
 1             
DSHARE -.066 -.056 -.021 -.007 -.147
*
 -.073 .046 -.099 1           
COSIZE .006 .071 .010 .123 .296
**
 .074 -.049 .423
**
 -.085 1         
GEAR .055 -.031 .022 .025 -.031 .019 -.034 -.023 -.048 .010 1       
PROF .033 .021 -.001 .022 .037 -.079 -.050 .065 .029 .065 -.169
**
 1     
LQDT .042 -.027 .018 -.006 .055 .040 .040 .046 -.030 -.051 -.056 .066 1   
MULTIN .045 .025 .110 -.144
*
 -.037 -.045 -.033 -.081 -.127 -.010 .101 -.051 -.050 1 
N
45
 = 104 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
                                                          
45
 Only companies that disclosed KPIs were considered for the correlation analysis and the same subsample was used for the OLS regression computation. 
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 BDSIZE and AUDSIZE are however observed to have a correlation of .755; 
it makes sense that larger boards are more likely to have a larger number of members 
on the audit committee.  Despite the correlation, the statistic is below 0.9 therefore 
should not be a cause for concern according to Field (2009). 
 
7.5 Diagnostic Procedures 
Four checks were made for the diagnostics prior to the regression simulations 
to ensure that none of the statistical assumptions were violated.  The four checks 
conducted include assessing the standardised residual, Cooke’s Distances, Durbin-
Watson and normality distribution checks.  According to Field (2009), standardised 
residuals should assume a normal distribution.  According to the guidance on 
interpretation of standardised residuals; values exceeding 2.5 should constitute less 
than 1% of the sample and values exceeding 2.0 less than 5% of the sample.  In the 
cases of KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP; only 2, 1, and 0 cases exceeded 2.0 
respectively.  As for the upper limit results for KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP 
show that 0, 2, and 0 cases exceeded 2.5 respectively. 
The statistics of the standardised residuals do not violate the 1% or the 5% 
guidance.  The Cook’s distance was the next diagnostic check that was conducted.  
This was done for all three models KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP.  The 
maximum values observed for the Cooks distance were 0.157, 0.348 and 0.2.  Cook’s 
distances that over 1.0 are a cause for concern according to (Cook and Weisberg, 
1980, Cook and Weisberg, 1982, Lawrence, 1995)  and this rule is not violated by 
the data sets concerned.  The Durbin-Watson test was conducted and the rule of 
thumb states that researcher should be concerned if the values for the statistic are <1 
or >3.  The relevant results for KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP were 1.799, 
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1.629 and 2.084 respectively.  Appendix 4 demonstrates that the data used for the 
study are normally distributed through the normal curve on the graphs.  The average 
VIF results showed that the relevant scores for KPI, WCOUNT and COMP were 1.4, 
1.704 and 1.55 respectively.  None of the scores were substantially greater than 1 
therefore there were no strong linear relationships among the predictors. 
 
7.6 Multiple Regression Results 
The results for this chapter have been split into four sections.  Initially the 
researcher set out to investigate the characteristics of the companies that are likely to 
disclose KPIs in their annual reports.  From the observations it was noted that 
approximately 51% of the private limited companies under investigation disclosed at 
least a single KPI in their annual report.  For this reason logistic regression was 
applied to determine the characteristics of those companies that are likely to disclose 
KPIs.  OLS regression was then applied only to those companies that had made 
disclosures.  The logistic regression results are attached in Appendix 3.  The 
dependent variables tested under OLS Regression include (i) KPI score, (ii) Word 
count and (iii) Comprehensiveness. 
 
7.6.1 OLS Regression Results 
In the next set of regression results, only those companies disclosing KPIs 
among the private limited firms investigated were considered.  This was done in this 
section as independent variables were tested against whether they influence the level 
of KPI disclosures and disclosure comprehensiveness as opposed to checking 
whether selected independent variables influence disclosure or non-disclosure alone 
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as in the previous section.  The following regression models were employed under 
OLS Regression: 
 
KPISCORE = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BDMEET + 4 FINEXP + 5 
BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 
MULTIN + j 
 
WCOUNT = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BDMEET + 4 FINEXP + 5 
BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 
MULTIN + j 
 
COMP = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BDMEET + 4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE 
+ 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 MULTIN + 
j 
 
Identification of variables as per Table 13.  Table 14 represents the results 
attained form the three models above. 
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Table 13: Explanation of Variables 
Variable Explanation 
  
0………….11 Regressors/regression coefficients 
  
KPI KPI disclosure; [1] where at least a single KPI is 
disclosed and [0] where no KPI disclosures have 
been made 
  
KPISCORE Level of KPI disclosures in annual reports as a 
proportion of a selected disclosure index 
  
WCOUNT Percentage of words used to describe KPIs as a 
proportion of the total number of words in the 
annual report 
  
COMP Measure of disclosure quality taking into account 
(i) presence of KPIs, (ii) amounts, (iii) reason for 
changes/trends and (iv) forward looking 
disclosures 
  
PNED Proportion on non-executive directors on the board 
  
AUDSIZE Audit committee size 
  
BDMEET Frequency of board meetings held during the 
year 
  
FINEXP Proportion of financial experts on the board of 
directors 
  
BDSIZE Total number of individuals on the board of 
directors 
  
DSHARE Director share ownership 
  
COSIZE Company size measured by total assets 
  
GEAR Gearing 
  
PROF Profitability 
  
LQDT Liquidity 
  
MULTIN Multinationality (code [1] awarded if company 
has substantial operations outside GB, code [0] if 
not) 
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Table 14: OLS Regression Results 
KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
             
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .045 .008   5.891 .000 .016 .003   4.694 .000 .632 .066   9.513 .000 
PNED -.016 .007 -.163 -2.240 .028 .012 .003 .297 3.675 .000 -.101 .059 -.150 -1.695 .093 
AUDSIZE .001 .002 .083 .774 .441 .001 .001 .231 1.634 .106 -.002 .016 -.018 -.118 .906 
BOARDM -.003 .001 -.393 -4.516 .000 .001 .000 .155 1.769 .080 -.006 .006 -.093 -.986 .327 
FINEXP .016 .007 .165 2.193 .031 -.001 .003 -.032 -.403 .688 -.101 .065 -.139 -1.551 .124 
BDSIZE .003 .001 .369 3.260 .002 -.002 .000 -.605 -3.786 .000 .007 .007 .151 .991 .324 
DSHARE -.004 .006 -.051 -.699 .486 -.010 .002 -.348 -4.461 .000 .106 .047 .191 2.227 .028 
COSIZE .001 .000 .301 4.059 .000 .000 .000 .359 3.465 .001 .000 .000 .143 1.681 .096 
GEAR .001 .000 .160 2.222 .029 .000 .000 -.195 -2.477 .015 -.004 .003 -.105 -1.191 .237 
PROF .020 .010 .155 2.014 .047 .017 .004 .317 4.064 .000 .276 .079 .301 3.512 .001 
LQDT .001 .001 .041 .571 .569 .001 .001 .128 1.638 .105 .033 .010 .281 3.304 .001 
MULTIN .000 .003 .006 .085 .933 .001 .001 .032 .395 .694 .048 .028 .150 1.747 .084 
                                
R sq.   .558      .476     .384    
R sq. adj.   .505     .413     .311    
St Error   .01601     .00684     .13364    
F Change   10.566     7.599     5.219    
Sig F change   .000         .000         .000     
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7.6.1.1 KPISCORE Regression Results 
The results reveal a 50.5% explanatory power of the variables tested.  
According to the results of the regression, BDSIZE, COSIZE, GEAR, FINEXP and 
PROF were found to have a positive and significant relationship with the level of 
KPI disclosures.  PNED and BOARDM were found to have a negative significant 
relationship with the level of KPI disclosures among large private limited companies.  
COSIZE was found among the companies that disclose KPIs that such companies 
also tend to disclose a relatively larger amount of KPIs in their reports compared to 
smaller companies that disclose KPIs.  This finding is in line with the hypothesis 
(H
7a
) and the rationale according to the hypothesis.  Such firms have greater 
resources to finance dissipation of vast amounts of information.  Larger companies 
also being in the limelight would aim to attract investors via detailed information of 
their critical success factors explained through KPIs (Alsaeed, 2006, Ismail and 
Ibrahim, 2008).  COSIZE was found to have a significant and positive correlation 
with the level of KPI disclosures at the 0.01 level.  COSIZE was also found to 
significantly explain the comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures in annual reports as 
stated in section 7.5.1.3.   
Akerlof (1970) described companies that post low profitability results as bad 
lemons.  When a company performs to a high standard in terms of profitability then 
it is likely to wish to report those results.  The results from the regressions suggest 
that there is positive and significant relationship between profitability and the level 
of KPI disclosures among the large private companies that disclose KPIs.  This 
finding is in line with the hypothesis (H
9a
) formulated.  As earlier mentioned, some 
companies will for instance, borrow money with the view to participate in investment 
opportunities that have arisen.  Such companies are likely to disclose information 
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about these investment prospects to their concerned stakeholders.  GEAR was found 
to be positively and significantly related to the level of KPI disclosures among the 
companies that disclose KPIs (Barako et al., 2006a, Camfferman and Cooke, 2002).  
It may be suggested that private companies though having a smaller investor base, 
those investors have more power than within public listed entities therefore would 
demand information about the leverage position of the firm particularly if it appears 
to be a cause for concern.  This finding is in line with the hypothesis (H
8a
) developed 
and should be accepted.  It has also been posited by many studies (Fama and Miller, 
1972, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Smith and Warner, 1979) that firms with higher 
levels of debt incur higher agency costs which can be mitigated by increased 
disclosure.  Disclosure of the key performance drivers of the reporting company 
reduces monitoring costs. 
The size of the board was found to be positively and significantly associated 
with the level of KPI disclosures by private companies that disclose KPIs; this is in 
line with the hypothesis (H
5a
).  Larger boards may be thought of as ones that offer 
more vigorous scrutiny as far as company performance is concerned.  This level of 
scrutiny is likely to result in increased disclosure of the critical success factors of the 
business entity in the form of KPIs in the annual reports.  The proportion of finance 
experts on the board positively and significantly explains KPI disclosures.  This 
finding is in line with the hypothesis (H
4a
).  A higher proportion of finance experts 
on the board are perceived as a sign of enhanced financial reporting.  Finance experts 
are likely to provide detailed explanations of the accounts and financial key 
performance indicators.  The proportion of non-executive directors was found to 
have a negative significant relationship with the level of KPI disclosures by private 
limited companies that report KPIs.  This finding was against the hypothesised 
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direction of the relationship (H
1a
).  Non-executive directors within private limited 
companies are likely to compromise with the policies and philosophies of the 
reporting entity as a consequence of their close relationship with the management.  
Chen and Jaggi (2000) suggest that the appointment of non-executive directors in 
some settings is likely due to close relationships.  This situation is less likely in the 
case of public listed companies.  These results are consistent with other previous 
research to find a negative relationship between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and disclosure extent (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Eng and Mak, 2003, 
Barako et al., 2006a).  Although MULTIN was found to significantly influence 
whether private companies disclose KPIs or not, it was not significantly influential in 
determining how much disclosure is then made by the reporting companies.  
AUDSIZE and DSHARE are not significantly related to the levels of KPI disclosures 
by reporting firms. 
 
7.6.1.2 Word Count Regression Results 
The results of the multiple regressions reveal that the adjusted R
2
 is 41.3%.  
The word count used in describing KPIs was used as a proxy for measuring 
disclosure quantity.  The assumption being that where more words are used to 
describe KPIs then more details are likely to be reported.  There are some similarities 
with the results found for the level of KPI disclosures despite different measures 
being applied.  However the rationale behind the relationships is largely similar.  
Such similar findings include a significant relationships being found between 
WCOUNT and four different variables; BDSIZE, DSHARE, COSIZE and PROF.  
PNED is significantly positively associated with the amount of words used in 
describing KPIs as hypothesised (H
1a
).  This result may suggest that non-executive 
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directors despite disclosing fewer KPIs as seen from the results of the relationship 
between KPISCORE and PNED; will in fact use more words in their descriptions of 
the KPIs disclosed.  Since they are not involved in the day to day running of the 
company, it is possible that they will demand detailed information of the 
management and in turn will encourage the disclosure of greater detail within each 
disclosed KPI.  Tauringana (1997) among others found a positive association between 
the variable and voluntary disclosures.  Non-executive board members often work 
within several organisations and they bring the skills they acquire over the years to the 
organisations they are involved with.  This may result in key competences being 
formulated and highlighted as KPIs within the annual reports of private companies.   
BOARDM was found to have a positive and significant relationship with 
WCOUNT.  This is in line with the hypothesis (H
3a
) formulated.  Companies that 
have a higher number of board meetings are likely to iron out any discrepancies and 
also discuss issues in greater detail than those companies which have fewer meetings.  
As a consequence of this frequency, it may be expected that such companies with 
numerous board meetings would also provide more details in their KPI disclosures 
regardless of the amount of KPIs actually disclosed.  It was hypothesised (H
8a
) that 
there was a positive relationship between gearing and the extent of disclosures.  H
8a
 
is to be rejected because the results reveal that gearing is negatively and significantly 
related to the amount of words used in the description of disclosed KPIs.  A possible 
explanation is that highly geared firms may wish to reveal very little in the way of 
detail about their gearing position although they might actually disclose a high 
number of KPIs as the gearing increases.  PROF was found to be positively and 
significantly associated with disclosure extent hence hypothesis H
9a
 is accepted. In 
addition to the rationale provided earlier, the signalling theory suggests that 
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companies with superior performance are more likely to disclose increased 
information about their performance.  Other studies have suggested that  lemons 
(underperforming business entities) tend to disclose less information to avoid 
embarrassment and exposure of their poor performance (Akerlof, 1970).  LQDT, 
MULTIN, FINEXP and AUDSIZE were found to have a weak relationship with 
WCOUNT. 
 
7.6.1.3 Comprehensiveness Regression Results 
The explanatory power of the model employed is 31.1%.  According to the 
results of the study under comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures by private limited 
companies, the outcomes reveal that PNED, DHARE, COSIZE, PROF, LQDT and 
MULTIN are significantly associated with the level of comprehensiveness in the KPI 
disclosures made.  The comprehensiveness is a measure that was used once again to 
check the quality of the KPIs that have been disclosed.  In this case, 
comprehensiveness
46
 considers four main aspects to the KPIs disclosed.  COSIZE 
and PROF were observed to post similar results to those found for WCOUNT and 
KPIscore being positively and significantly associated with COMP therefore 
hypotheses H
9a
 and H
7a
 are to be accepted.  On the balance of the arguments posited 
in the earlier sections under word count and KPISCORE, it appears that the rationale 
behind the disclosure patterns is similar.  COSIZE was however found to be 
significant at the 90% level of confidence. 
LQDT is positively and significantly associated with comprehensiveness of 
KPI disclosures in annual reports of private limited companies that disclose KPIs.  
                                                          
46
 The four aspects include (i) presence of KPI disclosures, (ii) amount, (iii) reasons for the changes 
and (iv) forward looking information. 
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This finding is in line with the hypothesis (H
10a
) developed.  Based on the results, 
firms that possess high levels of liquidity make KPI disclosures that are more 
comprehensive.  Higher liquidity entails that firms have funds available to readily 
invest in business opportunities. Liquidity also provides stability as far as other 
stakeholders are concerned, for example suppliers.  If comprehensive KPI 
disclosures are made, then it reduces any uncertainty and concerns regarding the 
financial position of the entity in question.  It makes sense in this case to find that 
companies in admirable positions of liquidity will wish to disclose more information 
and more KPIs that include vital details. 
MULTIN was positively and significantly found to be related to COMP at the 
90% level of confidence.  This finding was also in line with the hypothesis (H
11a
) 
formulated.  Although it was found that operating in different geographical regions 
does not necessarily influence whether a private limited company would disclose 
KPIs or not, it was however found that for those companies that disclose KPIs, 
operating in different geographical regions will have an influence on the 
comprehensiveness of the disclosures that those companies actually make.  It can be 
reasonably expected that where a company operates outside of Great Britain, there 
might be specific attributes that are important to report in order to enhance the 
comprehensiveness of the annual report in addition to meeting the regulations of the 
locality.  It is however an interesting point to note that if a private company operates in 
countries where the disclosure regulations are lax or less rigid than in the GB territory, 
such companies will not necessarily exhibit extra disclosures as a result.  The results 
show a weak relationship between PNED and COMP.  Other variables
47
 investigated 
                                                          
47
 DSHARE, BDSIZE, FINEXP, BOARDM and AUDSIZE. 
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did not have significant association with the comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures 
in the annual reports of large private limited companies. 
 
7.7 Discussion of Results 
 The section below summarises the findings from the OLS regression tests 
conducted.  Table 15 identifies the variables that were found to be significant and 
highlights the level of significance too. 
 
Table 15: Significance of Variables Across the Three Methods 
Variable KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
PNED Yes** Yes*** Yes* 
AUDSIZE No No No 
BOARDM Yes*** Yes* No 
FINEXP Yes** No No 
BDSIZE Yes** Yes*** No 
DSHARE No Yes*** Yes** 
COSIZE Yes*** Yes** Yes* 
GEAR Yes** Yes** No 
PROF Yes** Yes*** Yes** 
LQDT No No Yes** 
MULTIN No No Yes* 
*. Variable significant at the 0.1 level. 
**. Variable significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Variable significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 From Table 15 it can be seen that COSIZE is significant across all three 
models.  The results have all been positively associated with KPI disclosures.  This 
finding is in line with other studies (Andrikopoulos and Kriklani, 2012a, Samaha et 
al., 2012b, Li et al., 2011).  Larger companies have been considered to be in the lime 
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light and would hence endeavour to lead by example hence disclose more 
information in the annual reports.  Larger firms may also attempt disclosing more 
information in an attempt to avoid increased regulation and consequently reducing 
monitoring costs.  It has therefore previously been suggested that companies may 
increase disclosures as a means to self-regulate (Gray and Roberts, 1989).  PROF and 
PNED have also been found to be significantly associated in all three models.  
Interesting revelations through the results include GEAR which was found to be 
significantly associated with KPI, KPISCORE and WCOUNT but not with COMP.  
This revelation suggests that when companies are in situations of high gearing, they 
are likely to disclose more KPI information but this information is carefully selected 
excluding some detail that might otherwise be a cause for concern among various 
stakeholders. 
AUDSIZE was found to be significantly related to whether private companies 
chose to disclose KPIs or not.  However this variable does not influence the 
comprehensiveness of the disclosures that are reported in the annual report.  It 
appears from the findings that if there are larger audit committees within private 
companies then their information is subject to heavier scrutiny and such information 
is disclosed very cautiously.  From the logistic regression results, it can be suggested 
that multinationality affects whether companies disclose KPIs or not.  This variable 
is however only positively associated with the level of comprehensive disclosures 
therefore suggesting that companies operating in regions outside the GB territory are 
bound by specific regulations to which they ought to abide.  BDSIZE and BOARDM 
are significantly associated with KPISCORE and WCOUNT but not the 
comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures.  This finding suggests that more effort may 
need to be placed at board room level towards disclosing comprehensiveness 
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attributes in their disclosure as opposed to box ticking.  LQDT is however only 
associated with the comprehensiveness of disclosures.  This perhaps highlights the 
potential of the reporting entities through their KPIs by means of their liquid 
resources. 
 
7.8 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter had three main objectives which were firstly to investigate the 
level of KPI disclosures among large private limited firms.  Secondly, a subsidiary 
objective of investigating those variables that influence private firms to disclose or 
not disclose KPIs in their annual reports.  Finally, to investigate those variables 
which influence the extent and comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures in annual 
reports of large private companies.  The study highlights that just over five in every 
ten large private firms disclose at least a single KPI in their annual reports.  It was 
also found that there are several different factors that influence companies to disclose 
KPIs.  One of the interesting revelations highlighted is that although some companies 
may disclose KPIs, the comprehensiveness of the disclosures may be very low.  
Some of the disclosures made may be a consequence of operating in a different 
geographical region therefore subject to specific regulations in the territory of trade. 
However different factors influence the comprehensiveness of the disclosures 
that are then made.  From a policy making perspective, it might be useful if private 
companies had specific minimum requirements in terms of attributes that should be 
addressed in the reporting of KPIs so that the information holds value as opposed to 
just barely meeting requirements.  The next chapter will consider public listed 
companies and assess whether there are significant differences from the trends noted 
in this chapter.  The disclosure regulations for KPIs are similar for all large 
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companies regardless of listing status therefore a direct comparison can be made.  
Any differences and similarities noted may be useful from a policy formulating 
perspective as findings may be useful to legislators and/or accounting standard setters 
who seek to control information flow in a firm but fair manner.  This may be done in a 
way that is optimum to various stakeholders concerned without imposing constraints on 
the reporting business entities. 
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8 Hypotheses Testing, Results and Discussion: Public 
Listed Companies 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents results for the public listed companies investigated in this 
research.  This chapter provides KPI disclosure evidence firstly by providing 
statistical data on the extent of KPI disclosures by large listed companies and 
secondly by providing evidence of the factors that influence KPI disclosures, amount 
of words used in descriptions and level of comprehensiveness of the KPI information 
disclosed.  The dependent variables included in the investigation include KPI score, 
word count and comprehensiveness.  The independent variables that were used in the 
investigation include corporate governance mechanisms (proportion of non-executive 
directors, audit committee size, board size and director share ownership) and 
company specific characteristics (company size measured as total assets, gearing, 
profitability, liquidity, multinationality and multiple listing). 
 The Chapter is organised as follows:  The extent of disclosure and descriptive 
statistics are provided and explained in section 8.2.  Correlation analysis and diagnostic 
procedure discussions are covered in sections 8.3 and 8.4 respectively.  The results from 
the multiple regressions are provided next in section 8.5 providing evidence for KPI 
disclosure extent, word count and comprehensiveness.  The regression findings are 
discussed in section 8.6.  The chapter closes with a summary and conclusion in section 
8.7. 
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8.2 Descriptive Statistics 
From the research, it was found that 89.76% of the sample of 205 large public 
listed firms made KPI disclosures in their annual report.  On average, large public 
listed company disclosed approximately eight KPIs in their annual reports. While 
some companies did not disclose any KPIs one company disclosed 23 KPIs (National 
Grid Plc.).  Even though some companies are still not fully adhering to the 
requirements of the Business Review under the Companies Act 2006, statistics 
showed that the level of disclosures is high for public listed companies compared to 
approximately 51% in the case of large private limited companies.  A standard 
deviation of approximately five KPIs demonstrates that there is not much variation 
from the average level of KPI disclosures made by this set of companies.  Public 
listed companies report more comprehensive KPIs which score approximately 66% 
against the designed measure while on average private limited companies scored 
approximately 31%.  The results also show that public listed companies use up 
approximately 1.03% of their annual reports describing KPI information while the 
figure is lower at approximately 0.86% for private limited companies. 
Table 16 presents some descriptive statistics on the variables investigated.  
Based on the statistics it appears that the average board sizes for public listed 
companies (nine members) are larger than in the case of private limited companies 
(seven members).  Large public listed companies also hold more frequent board 
meetings compared to private limited companies, each group reporting eight and 
seven meetings per annum respectively.  Both public listed and private limited 
companies report a similar average level of gearing at approximately 190%.  Finally, 
it was noted that approximately 76% of large public listed companies have 
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operations outside GB while the figure stood at 49% for large private limited 
companies.
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Table 16: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
 KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP PNED AUDSIZE BOARDM FINEXP BDSIZE DSHARE SIZE GEAR PROF LQDT MULTIN LSTAT MLIST 
N Valid 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Mean .0536 .0103 .6557 .6383 3.8372 8.4744 .4140 9.2977 .0287 4.9784 1.9624 .1184 1.0927 .7628 1.0000 .7953 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
.00254 .00075 .01805 .00824 .06102 .15176 .00934 .15228 .00638 1.01854 .36689 .01078 .07463 .02908 .00000 .02758 
Median .0465 .0082 .7400 .6250 4.0000 8.0000 .4167 9.0000 .0016 1.4660 .9660 .0992 .9100 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Mode .00 .00 .00 .50 3.00
a 8.00 .38a 9.00 .00 .00 .05a .00a .71 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Std. Deviation .03724 .01099 .26460 .12088 .89469 2.225 .13696 2.23288 .09359 14.9347 5.3796 .15810 1.09431 .42636 .00000 .40439 
Variance .001 .000 .070 .015 .800 4.951 .019 4.986 .009 223.046 28.940 .025 1.198 .182 .000 .164 
Skewness 1.282 4.870 -1.195 -.003 .998 .308 .489 .795 4.952 9.564 7.874 .637 7.810 -1.244   -1.474 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 .166 
Kurtosis 2.761 42.088 1.034 -.412 1.430 .539 1.053 .555 25.980 112.834 68.045 3.864 85.693 -.456   .176 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 .330 
Range .23 .12 1.00 .62 5.00 15.00 .82 12.00 .64 190.44 51.72 1.21 13.77 1.00 .00 1.00 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .29 2.00 2.00 .08 5.00 .00 .00 -.04 -.44 .04 .00 1.00 .00 
Maximum .23 .12 1.00 .91 7.00 17.00 .90 17.00 .64 190.45 51.68 .77 13.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Percentiles 25 .0303 .0039 .5400 .5556 3.0000 7.0000 .3333 8.0000 .0002 .4740 .4151 .0385 .6300 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
50 .0465 .0082 .7400 .6250 4.0000 8.0000 .4167 9.0000 .0016 1.4660 .9660 .0992 .9100 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
75 .0690 .0150 .8400 .7273 4.0000 10.0000 .5000 11.0000 .0086 4.6440 1.6769 .1817 1.2100 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown.
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These descriptive statistics provide of a snapshot of the data collected for the 
purpose of this study and demonstrate key variations in the figures.  The next 
analysis of the variables covers the correlation coefficients between the variables. 
 
8.3 Correlation Analysis 
The Table 17 provides a summary of the results for the correlation analysis of 
the variables investigated under listed companies.  From the results, it can be 
identified that the independent variables are not highly correlated.  It was important 
to conduct the correlation analysis before the tests of regression to avoid the problem 
of multicollinearity. Many previous authors have suggested that correlation needs to 
be above 0.90 to cause collinearity problems e.g. Field (2009).  The researcher has 
however noted that there is inconsistent guidance on determining a high value of 
correlation.  Eastman (1984) suggests to be watchful of an upper limit of +0.60, 
Saunders et al (2003) suggest +0.70, Judge et al (1985) suggest +0.80 and Field 
(2005, 2009) suggest +0.90.  Due to the various suggestions, the researcher opted for 
the most up to date suggestion by Field (2009).  From the Table 17 it can be seen that 
the highest correlation is that between WCOUNT and COSIZE.  The correlation is 
.662 and is below the recommendation of +0.90 by Field (2009) therefore there is no 
risk of multicollinearity in the regression models. 
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Table 17: Correlation Matrix 
 
 COMP KPISCORE WCOUNT PNED AUDSIZE BOARDM FINEXP BDSIZE DSHARE COSIZE GEAR PROF LQDT MULTIN MLIST 
COMP 1                             
KPISCORE .376
** 1                           
WCOUNT .399
** .234** 1                         
PNED .042 -.037 -.057 1                       
AUDSIZE -.008 -.008 .027 .071 1                     
BOARDM .024 .077 -.146
* -.004 .064 1                   
FINEXP .045 .014 -.024 .077 -.080 .002 1                 
BDSIZE .029 .082 -.045 .123 .275
** .012 -.109 1               
DSHARE -.098 -.045 -.155
* .006 -.065 -.109 .013 -.050 1             
COSIZE .155
* .160* .662** .103 .103 .003 -.032 .096 -.119 1           
GEAR -.452
** -.227** -.182** .116 -.013 -.012 .012 .007 .048 -.081 1         
PROF -.024 .055 -.026 .197
** .057 -.029 .056 .084 .042 .086 -.052 1       
LQDT .087 .016 .035 .006 .089 -.101 .013 .101 .077 -.010 -.131 .390
** 1     
MULTIN .091 .013 .043 .073 .087 .068 .062 .076 .046 .118 .070 .032 .025 1   
MLIST -.126 .026 -.065 .050 .050 .087 .034 .011 .001 .008 -.002 .090 .053 .020 1 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed).
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8.4 Diagnostics Procedures 
Some diagnostic checks were conducted for this study.  The standard residuals 
were the first to be examined for all three models under scrutiny.  Standard residuals 
assume normal distribution and Field (2009) offers some guidance on interpretation.  
The sample should not contain more than 1% of the constituents possessing a 
standardized residual of +2.5 and or more than 5% with a standardized residual of 
more than 2.  When these situations exist, it suggests that the model is not an 
effective representation of actual data according to Field (2009).  The results of this 
study show that for the KPISCORE model, 2 cases had a residual of more than 2.5 
and 4 cases with a standard residual of greater than 2.  The model for WCOUNT had 
2 cases greater than 2 and none greater than 2.5.  The third model for COMP 
reported 1 case greater than 2.5 and none greater than 2.  All these statistics are 
below the 1% and 5% relevant thresholds hence the guidance was not violated. 
The next diagnostic check that was conducted is the Cooke’s distance.  This 
statistic measures the overall influence of the cases within the model being 
computed.  According to the guidelines, a value of greater than 1 should be a cause 
for concern (Cooke and Weisberg 1982).  The minimum and maximum values as per 
the findings of this study for the Cooke’s statistic under KPISCORE are .000 and 
.175 respectively, for the WCOUNT the relevant values are .000 and .651, finally for 
the COMP model the relevant statistics are .000 and .148 respectively. Another test 
that was conducted is the Durbin-Watson test.  The rule of thumb for this test is that 
values under 1 or greater than 3 are a cause for concern.  Under the three models 
KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP, the Durbin-Watson statistics were 1.913, 1.729 
and 1.865 respectively.  Also attached in the appendices are the histograms to 
illustrate normality, plot of standardized regression residual and scatterplots to 
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illustrate checks for heteroscedasticity.  From the supporting illustrations Appendix 5 
it can be seen that the overall check assumptions have not been violated.  The 
average VIF results showed that the relevant scores for KPI, WCOUNT and COMP 
were 1.13, 1.095 and 1.192 respectively.  None of the scores were substantially 
greater than 1 therefore there were no strong linear relationships among the 
predictors. 
 
 
8.5 OLS Regression Results 
 Three regression equations were formulated to assess the influence of 
company specific characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms on (i) the 
extent of KPIs disclosures in annual reports, (ii) the amount of words used in 
describing the disclosed KPIs and (iii) the comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures by 
UK listed companies.  The following multiple regression models were used: 
 
KPISCORE = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 4 FINEXP + 5 
BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 
MULTIN + 12 MLIST + j 
 
WCOUNT = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 4 FINEXP + 5 
BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 
MULTIN + 12 MLIST + j 
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WCOUNT = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 4 FINEXP + 5 
BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 
MULTIN + 12 MLIST + j 
 
Table 18 identifies the variables included in the equation: 
299 
 
Table 18: Explanation of Variables 
Variable Explanation 
0………….12 Regressors/regression coefficients 
  
KPI KPI disclosure; [1] where at least a single KPI is 
disclosed and [0] where no KPI disclosures have been 
made 
KPISCORE Level of KPI disclosures in annual reports as a 
proportion of a selected disclosure index 
  
WCOUNT Percentage of words used to describe KPIs as a 
proportion of the total number of words in the annual 
report 
  
COMP Measure of disclosure quality taking into account (i) 
presence of KPIs, (ii) amounts, (iii) reason for 
changes/trends and (iv) forward looking disclosures 
  
PNED Proportion on non-executive directors on the board 
  
AUDSIZE Audit committee size 
  
BDMEET Frequency of board meetings held during the year 
  
FINEXP Proportion of financial experts on the board of 
directors 
  
BDSIZE Total number of individuals on the board of directors 
  
DSHARE Director share ownership 
  
COSIZE Company size measured by total assets 
  
GEAR Gearing 
  
PROF Profitability 
  
LQDT Liquidity 
  
MULTIN Multinationality (code [1] awarded if company has 
substantial operations outside GB, code [0] if not) 
  
MLIST Multiple listing status (code [1] if a company is listed 
on more than one stock exchange and [0] if listed on 
just one or none.) 
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Table 19: Multiple Regression Results 
  KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
                            
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized Coefficients   Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized Coefficients   Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
                                
  B Std. Error Beta t sig B Std. Error Beta T sig B Std. Error Beta t sig 
                                
(Constant) .017 .018  .968 .334 .019 .004   4.482 .000 .386 .134   2.885 .004 
PNED -.040 .016 -.138 -2.455 .015 -.006 .004 -.076 -1.463 .145 .274 .131 .131 2.096 .037 
AUDSIZE -.002 .002 -.039 -.688 .492 .000 .001 .020 .397 .692 -.010 .018 -.038 -.583 .561 
BOARDM .003 .001 .196 3.508 .001 -.001 .000 -.168 -3.333 .001 .018 .007 .169 2.734 .007 
FINEXP .008 .014 .032 .584 .560 .000 .004 .000 -.008 .994 .081 .112 .045 .729 .467 
BDSIZE .001 .001 .079 1.387 .167 .000 .000 -.048 -.929 .354 -.002 .008 -.021 -.307 .759 
DSHARE .065 .019 .186 3.384 .001 -.010 .005 -.098 -1.928 .055 .338 .155 .134 2.191 .030 
COSIZE .001 .000 .176 2.802 .006 .001 .000 .657 12.956 .000 .002 .001 .109 1.695 .092 
GEAR .005 .001 .474 8.651 .000 .000 .000 -.107 -2.098 .037 -.019 .004 -.310 -
5.047 
.000 
PROF .046 .014 .185 3.165 .002 -.006 .003 -.098 -1.811 .072 -.462 .105 -.288 -
4.409 
.000 
LQDT .010 .003 .204 3.563 .000 .002 .001 .130 2.384 .018 .057 .014 .261 3.964 .000 
MULTIN -.003 .005 -.041 -.746 .456 .000 .001 .007 .135 .893 .047 .036 .080 1.303 .194 
MLIST -.003 .005 -.030 -.550 .583 -.001 .001 -.056 -1.130 .260 -.066 .039 -.103 -
1.680 
.095 
                                
R sq.   .460     .531     .310    
R sq. adj.   .423     .502     .267    
St Error of the 
estimate 
   .0271     .00692     .21508    
F Change   12.499     18.109     7.188    
Sig F change     .000         .000         .000     
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8.5.1 KPISCORE Regression Results 
The multiple regression results as per Table 19 demonstrate that the overall 
model explains 42.3% of the variation in the level of KPI disclosures.  Based on the 
table, it is evident that the significant
48
 explanatory variables include PNED, 
BOARDM, DSHARE, COSIZE, GEAR, PROF and LQDT.  The proportion of non-
executive directors was found to significantly and negatively influence the level of 
KPI disclosures in the annual reports.  This finding is an unusual one as it goes 
against the hypothesis (H
1b
) that non-executive directors are more likely to encourage 
the increased disclosure of information on the business’ critical success factors as 
proposed.  H
1b
 is therefore rejected; it is possible that the negative relationship could 
be a result of non-executive directors’ lack of involvement in the day to day running 
of the business as opposed to the executive directors.  There are several other studies 
that have found a similar relationship (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Eng and Mak, 2003, 
Barako et al., 2006a).  This finding may warrant further research in order to clarify 
whether non-executive board member appointments are also made on the basis of 
personal relationships with management in the case of public listed firms.  This 
situation however leads to a compromise in their relationship which in turn leads to 
poor monitoring in the mitigation of agency costs. 
 The frequency of board meetings was found to significantly and positively 
influence the level of KPI disclosures in the annual reports under investigation.  This 
finding is in line with the proposed hypothesis (H
3b
).  It is a reasonable line of 
thought to suggest that boards that meet more frequently are more likely to iron out 
issues that directly affect the performance of corporate entities.  In this manner it is 
                                                          
48
 Significance referred to here is at the 95% confidence level. 
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also likely that such board set ups are likely to report increased information relating 
to KPIs.  The next variable found to positively and significantly affect the level of 
KPI disclosures was director share ownership.  This finding is in line with the 
hypothesis (H
6b
).  This positive relationship might be the result of alignment of 
directors’ interests with those of the shareholders.  When there is an alignment of 
interests due to a common denominator of stake in the company, it can be expected 
that directors are likely to report more KPI information.  This increased disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry.  This situation will also result in the increased 
awareness of company affairs by the ordinary shareholders such that they feel that 
their investment is more secure. 
 Naturally, larger companies are thought to have more resources for 
information gathering and disclosure compared to smaller companies.  The results 
confirm that there is a significant and positive association between company size 
(measured by total assets) and the level of KPI disclosures (Ismail and Ibrahim, 
2008, Alsaeed, 2006, Al-Khadash and Abhath Al-Yarmouk, 2003).  H
7b
 is therefore 
to be accepted.  It may be further suggested that larger companies on average tend to 
be more stable than smaller companies; as a consequence larger companies perform 
better and are more likely to disclose more KPIs to create appeal for their stocks.  
The level of gearing was also found to be significantly and positively associated with 
the level of KPI disclosures in the annual reports under investigation.  This finding is 
in line with the hypothesis (H
8b
) which is accepted.  Companies that are highly 
geared are likely to create uncertainty among shareholders, customers, suppliers and 
lenders among many.  In order to reduce the uncertainty, it may be worthwhile for 
companies to disclose increased information about their leverage position.  In many 
cases it has been found that companies that are highly geared may be in that situation 
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because they anticipate a positive turn in business cycles hence borrow funds to 
invest in potentially successful ventures.  Such companies therefore find it vital to 
present increased information which may include KPI information to its 
stakeholders.  KPI information according to the ASB’s Reporting Standard 1 should 
include forward looking information. 
 Profitability was found to positively and significantly influence the level of 
KPI disclosures (Hossain, 2008, Iatridis, 2008b, Wang and Claiborne, 2008).  This 
finding is in line with the proposed hypothesis (H
9b
).  Highly profitable firms have an 
incentive to disclose this information to create demand for the company’s stocks 
which will in turn potentially influence positive shifts in the stock prices of the firm 
in accordance with the signalling theory.  The final variable that was found to have a 
significant influence on the level of KPI disclosures was liquidity.  It may be 
suggested that firms with higher levels of liquidity tend to fare better in the market as 
they can better and readily pay any financial dues.  Firms with higher liquidity are 
also likely to perform better as they can readily take advantage of lucrative 
investment opportunities.  As a consequence they are more likely to report more 
KPIs in the annual report highlighting their critical success factors.  Hypothesis H
10b
 
is therefore accepted.  The number of financial experts on the board, audit committee 
size, board size, multinationality and multiple stock exchange listings all 
demonstrated a relationship with the level of KPI disclosures but these relationships 
were insignificant. 
 
8.5.2 Word Count Regression Results 
The multiple regression equation computed for word count demonstrates that 
50.2% of the variation in the quantity of words used to describe the KPIs disclosed 
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can be explained by the model.  Company size and liquidity were found to be 
positively and significantly associated with the amount of words used to describe 
KPIs in relation to the total word count in the relevant annual report. This finding is 
in line with hypotheses H
7b
 and H
10b
 which are accepted.  Frequency of board 
meetings, director share ownership, gearing and profitability were found to be 
significantly and negatively associated with word count.   In the case of company 
size (H
7b
), the argument expressed earlier holds  as it can be expected that larger 
companies tend to have better resources to provide more detailed information 
regarding KPIs in their annual reports (Al-Khadash and Abhath Al-Yarmouk, 2003, 
Hossain and Hammami, 2009).  Along the similar line of thought, it falls that the 
same argument is relevant to businesses with higher levels of disposable income.  It 
can also be reasonably expected that such companies will provide more detailed 
information in the annual reports due to the ready availability of financial resources 
to collect and disclose detailed information regarding KPIs as mentioned in H
10b
. 
Board meeting frequency was found to be significantly negatively associated 
with levels of word count in the annual report.  This finding was contrary to the 
proposed hypothesis (H
3b
), particularly on the premise that the same variable was 
found to significantly affect KPISCORE positively.  Word count was investigated to 
measure the amount of words in the KPI disclosure descriptions as a percentage of 
the total number of words in the annual report.  It is possible that companies that 
have too many meetings do so because they fail to reach agreements on certain 
aspects regarding the critical success factors of the business therefore reduced word 
count score.  It may also be suggested that in some cases too many meetings may 
lead to disfunctionality. 
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Based on the results, public companies with higher gearing scored lower on 
word count score in their annual report.  This significant negative association was 
also found with profitability.  The hypotheses H
8b
 and H
9b
 formulated are therefore to 
be rejected.  It is not clear why these relationships exist in this direction.  Some may 
argue that with high gearing or high profitability, companies have to carefully select 
their wording in the annual reports such that it does not convey the wrong signals to 
stakeholders therefore such companies tend to be more cautious when it comes to 
detail.   Profitability was found to be negatively associated to word count at the 0.01 
level of significance. 
 Director shareholding was the final significantly associated variable to word 
count.  The association was found to be negative contrary to the hypothesis H
6b
.  
Since the data for this study was based on 2008 annual reports which was the same 
era marking the climax of the global financial crisis, it can be suggested that there is 
a strong possibility that companies with high director share ownership may have had 
a tendency of disclosing limited poor performance information during this difficult 
business cycle which would result in protection of company share prices.  The results 
could well be different under an unalike economic climate.  PNED, FINEXP, 
BDSIZE, MULTIN and MLIST did not have significant relationships with the level 
of word count disclosed. 
 
8.5.3 Comprehensiveness Regression Results 
The multiple regression results according to Table 19 demonstrate that the 
overall model explains 26.7% of the variation in the level of KPI comprehensiveness.  
Comprehensiveness is a measure that was designed to measure the quality of KPI 
disclosures as explained earlier.  The variables that were found to significantly 
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influence comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures according to the model include 
PNED, BOARDM, DSHARE, COSIZE, GEAR, PROF, LQDT and MLIST.  As 
expected under comprehensiveness, the findings will provide more insight as it is 
measured under four
49
 dimensions as opposed to the word count methodology in the 
previous section.  One of the disadvantages of the word count methodology is that 
although it provides some insights, it is a generalised measure hence the 
comprehensiveness measure would provide even better insight as it considers 
specific KPI attributes.  Word count only measures quantity within descriptions 
while comprehensiveness measures the quality within descriptions. 
 Several previous studies have found a positive and significant relationship 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and the quality of disclosures 
(Babío Arcay and Muiño Vázquez, 2005, Wan-Hussin, 2009, Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006, Eng and Mak, 2003).  The results of this study display that the proportion of 
non-executive directors is positively and significantly associated with the 
comprehensiveness of KPIs disclosed.  This finding is in line with the suggested 
hypothesis (H
1b
).  It can be suggested that non-executive directors are overseers 
therefore they will look to ensure that reporting guidelines are followed.  Non-
executive directors play the role of a monitoring tool to mitigate the agency problem. 
Board meeting frequency was also found to be positively and significantly 
associated with the level of comprehensiveness.  Hypothesis H
3b
 is therefore 
accepted.  As suggested earlier, frequent board meetings may be seen as 
opportunities to iron out performance issues.  If such issues are ironed out, it is in the 
interest of the board to report these resolutions to stakeholders; one important 
                                                          
49
 Presence of KPIs, relevant amounts, reason for changes and forward looking elements. 
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manner in which this information is communicated is through reporting 
comprehensive KPI information.  This action will actively reduce information 
asymmetry.  Directors who own shares within the firm are likely to have ambitions 
that are aligned with those of ordinary shareholders with the primary goal of 
maximising profits.  Maximisation of profits is very often communicated through 
comprehensive KPIs and this would explain the positive significant relationship 
demonstrated through the results.  This finding is in line with hypothesis H
6b
 which is 
accepted. 
 Company size was found to significantly
50
 explain comprehensiveness of KPI 
disclosures in line with the hypothesis (H
7b
).  Larger companies disclose more 
comprehensive information due to the availability of the resources required as this 
may be a costly exercise (Ismail and Ibrahim, 2008, Owusu-Ansah, 1998a, Barako et 
al., 2006a, Wan-Hussin, 2009).  Higher liquidity was found to be significantly 
positively associated with changes in the level of comprehensive disclosures.  This 
finding is in line with the hypothesis H
10b
 formulated therefore accepted.  Firms that 
possess higher liquidity cannot only readily afford to pay the costs of gathering and 
disclosing comprehensive performance information but may also wish to report their 
strong cash equivalence positions.  A result that was contrary to expectation was the 
significant
51
 negative relationship between multiple stock exchange listing and 
comprehensiveness.  Although it makes sense to expect a higher level of disclosures 
due to multiple stock exchange requirements, the case for comprehensiveness might 
be different.  Where firms are listed on multiple exchanges there is strong possibility 
that the comprehensiveness of the information disclosed will be compromised due to 
                                                          
50
 At the 90% confidence level 
51
 At the 90% confidence level 
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the vast amounts of information that companies are required to disclose in different 
jurisdictions.  It is not uncommon for companies to engage in box ticking exercises 
to meet the minimum requirements for a particular stock exchange.  Hypothesis H
13
 
is therefore rejected. 
 Gearing reported a negative significant association with the 
comprehensiveness of information disclosed.  This result was contrary to the 
hypothesis H
8b
 developed.  The possible explanation is that firms that are highly 
geared may disclose larger amounts of information in order to justify the level of 
gearing.  This information may however not be comprehensive.  The final variable 
found to be associated with comprehensiveness was profitability which surprisingly 
has a significant negative relationship under the sample for listed companies.  An 
observation by the researcher that might have led to this finding is that highly 
profitable businesses tend to report vast amounts of information on their financial 
KPIs and pay very little attention to the non-financial KPIs.  The result of this 
situation is that the comprehensiveness of the overall KPIs is compromised due to an 
imbalanced distribution of efforts in the amount of informational attributes provided.  
Hypothesis H
9b
 was therefore rejected. 
 
8.6 Discussion of the Results 
This chapter investigated public listed companies.  The chapter investigated the 
extent of KPI disclosures in light of the regulation to report on KPIs under the 
Companies Act 2006.  Corporate governance mechanisms (proportion of non-
executive directors, audit committee size, frequency of board meetings, number of 
financial experts on the board, board size and director share ownership) and company 
specific characteristics (gearing, profitability, company size, liquidity, 
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multinationality and multiple listing status) where investigated in order to determine 
their influence on disclosures under three measures
52
.  The three measures include 
key performance indicator score
53
, word count
54
 and comprehensiveness
55
. 
                                                          
52
 Dependent variables 
53
 This is a measure for the extent of KPI disclosures in the annual report as a fraction of a 
constructed index. 
54
 This is a measure of the total number of words used to describe KPIs in the annual report as a 
proportion of the total word count of the full report. 
55
 This is a measure of KPI disclosure quality.  Comprehensiveness takes into account, presence of KPI 
disclosures, stating of the relevant figures, reasons provided for the changes in variation of KPIs of 
several trading periods and forward looking attributes/future targets. 
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Table 20: Significance of Variables Across the Three Methods 
Variable KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
PNED Yes** No Yes** 
AUDSIZE No No No 
BOARDM Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
FINEXP No No No 
BDSIZE No No No 
DSHARE Yes*** Yes* Yes** 
COSIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes* 
GEAR Yes*** Yes** Yes*** 
PROF Yes*** Yes* Yes*** 
LQDT Yes*** Yes** Yes*** 
MULTIN No No No 
MLIST No No Yes* 
***.  Significant at the 0.01 level 
**.  Significant at the 0.05 level 
*.  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 Table 20 provides a summary of the significance of variables over the three 
dimensions of disclosure investigated.  From the table it can be seen that audit 
committee size, financial experts on the board, board size and multinationality do not 
have a significant association with all three measures of disclosures investigated.  On 
the other hand other findings such as company size results have been found to be 
significantly associated with all the three measures of disclosures.  The company size 
results are consistent with those reported by Firth (1979), Gray and Roberts (1989), 
Tauringana and Mangena (2009), Cornier et al (2011) and Branco et al (2011) among 
many.    Company size has been posited as the most important significant explanatory 
variable of the extent of annual report disclosures. 
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 Other variables such as frequency of board meetings, director share ownership, 
gearing, profitability and liquidity have been found to be significantly associated with 
disclosure levels in all three dimensions.  These findings are consistent with other 
previous disclosure studies such as Cornier et al (2011) for leverage/gearing. The 
proportion of non-executive directors is a significant explanatory variable under all 
three measures except for word count.  Other variables have been found to be 
significantly associated at the 0.01 significance level as indicated by the asterisks.  
Overall, the most significantly influential variables for KPI disclosures are BOARDM, 
DSHARE, COSIZE, GEAR, PROF and LQDT. 
 
8.7 Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse KPI disclosures among large public 
listed companies in the UK.  Some of the objectives included firstly to analyse the 
extent of KPI disclosures in light of Companies Act 2006 regulations.  Secondly, to 
investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms significantly influence the 
disclosure of KPI disclosures and third, to investigate whether company specific 
characteristics significantly influence the disclosure of KPIs.  From the results it was 
noted that approximately 90% of the sample disclosed at least one KPI in their 
annual report.  This statistic represents the highest figure for KPI disclosures 
compared to evidence from previous research.  This statistic alone serves as an 
indicator to policy formulators that regulations have had a positive impact in 
attaining its objectives.  From the extent of disclosure it was also noted that public 
listed companies report an increased average number of KPIs compared to previous 
research.  This suggests that corporate entities are making an effort towards the level 
of reporting. 
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 On average as per Table 20; it has been noted that board meeting frequency, 
director share ownership, company size, gearing, profitability and liquidity all have a 
significant influence on the level of KPI disclosures on the three dimensions 
investigated.  Audit committee size, financial experts on the board, board size and 
multinationality have all been found to be insignificantly associated to the level of 
KPI disclosures on all three platforms.  It was interesting however to note that certain 
variables for example proportion of non-executive directors did not have an influence 
on the word count of disclosures but had a significant influence on 
comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures which measures quality.  This finding clarifies 
the importance of interaction of certain variables to yield different results and also 
the fact that although companies may all report on KPIs, the focus of their reporting 
can vary widely from company to company. 
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Chapter 9 
Hypotheses Testing, Results and 
Discussion: Pooled Companies 
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9 Hypotheses Testing, Results and Discussion: Pooled 
Companies 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to investigate the extent of disclosure among the pooled 
set of companies.  The companies investigated consist of both private limited and 
public listed companies.  The selection of companies was conducted over two steps.  
The first being summation of all the companies from the private limited firms 
investigated and public listed firms combined.  From this set of companies, the extent 
of disclosure was investigated and the results are discussed in the section below.  The 
second stage of the data selection for the regression analysis involved a summation 
of only those companies that made KPI disclosures as explained in Chapter 6
56
. 
 As already mentioned, the first objective was to investigate the extent of 
disclosure among all the companies investigated under the sample, large private and 
public listed firms operating in the UK.  The second objective was to investigate 
whether company characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms influence 
the disclosure of KPIs in the annual reports of the combined sample of companies.  
The level of KPI disclosures was measured by KPISCORE
57
, WCOUNT
58
 and 
COMP
59
.  The rest of the chapter is organised as follows:  The results start off with a 
                                                          
56
 Data and Methodology 
57
 The total number of KPIs disclosed in the annual report as a percentage of a selected disclosure 
index. 
58
 The total number of words used to describe KPIs as a percentage of the total number of words in 
the annual report. 
59
 The disclosure comnprehensiveness of reported KPIs.  The comprehensiveness was measured by 
assessing firstly whether KPIs have been disclosed or not; secondly’ whether corresponding figures 
have been attached to any reported KPIs, third; the reasons for changes in the figures reported have 
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discussion of the descriptive statistics for the pooled set of companies in section 9.2.  
The next section of the chapter covers results from the correlation analysis followed 
by the diagnostic procedures conducted in sections 9.3 and 9.4 respectively.  The 
multiple regression results are illustrated and explained in section 9.5 covering extent 
of KPIs disclosure, word count and comprehensiveness results.  Section 9.6 contains 
discussions of the results and the chapter closes with section 9.7 by summarising and 
providing some concluding remarks. 
 
9.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The Table 21 provides an aggregate of the level of disclosure through 
combining the findings from both the private and public firms.  It is a summary of 
how many firms on aggregate disclose KPIs in comparison to the ones that do not 
disclose KPIs and serves as a pointer as to how well umbrella regulation requiring 
companies to disclose KPIs in their annual reports is meeting its objectives. 
 
Table 21: Disclosure Extent Results 
  KPI Reporting Firms Non-Reporting Firms Sub-total 
        
Public Listed Companies 184 21 205 
Private Limited Companies 104 101 205 
Total 288 122 410 
 
From the results it can be seen that 70.24% of all companies in the sample 
disclose at least a single KPI in their annual report.  Although this statistic represents 
progress towards the level of disclosures, there is a considerable difference between 
                                                                                                                                                                    
been provided and finally, whether an forward looking disclosures regarding the reported KPIs have 
been provided or not. 
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private firms and public firms given that the regulation governs both sets of 
companies.  The individual statistics and comparisons for private and public listed 
entities are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. 
The following Table 22 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables 
including all dependent and independent variables. 
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Table 22: Descriptive Statistics 
 KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP PNED AUDSIZE BOARDM FINEXP BDSIZE DSHARE COSIZE GEAR PROF LQDT MULTIN LSTAT MLIST 
N Valid 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 410 
Mean .0567 .0140 .6318 .5085 3.6083 8.0542 .4091 8.5417 .1141 260.5661 2.4355 .0634 1.1037 .6583 .5042 .4250 
Std. Error of Mean .00214 .00086 .01556 .01423 .08300 .15647 .01175 .21116 .01475 182.19667 .36747 .01127 .08311 .03068 .03234 .03198 
Median .0526 .0121 .6450 .5714 4.0000 8.0000 .4000 8.0000 .0034 .8432 .9364 .0405 .8900 1.0000 1.0000 .0000 
Mode .00 .00 .00a .50 3.00 8.00 .33a 9.00 .00 .00a .83 .00 .71a 1.00 1.00 .00 
Std. Deviation .03315 .01332 .24104 .22049 1.28588 2.42399 .18195 3.27127 .22855 2822.579 5.69287 .17461 1.28755 .47526 .50103 .49538 
Variance .001 .000 .058 .049 1.653 5.876 .033 10.701 .052 7966950.8 32.409 .030 1.658 .226 .251 .245 
Skewness .930 3.744 -.832 -.569 .097 -.378 .677 1.279 2.333 14.683 6.287 -.512 7.400 -.672 -.017 .305 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 .157 
Kurtosis 1.451 22.368 .578 -.262 3.620 1.798 1.388 8.697 4.923 221.591 47.510 5.944 67.283 -1.562 -2.017 -1.923 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 .313 
Range .18 .12 1.00 1.00 10.00 17.00 1.00 30.00 1.00 42944.00 52.10 1.65 13.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 -.42 -.87 .02 .00 .00 .00 
Maximum .18 .12 1.00 1.00 10.00 17.00 1.00 31.00 1.00 42944.00 51.68 .77 13.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Percentiles 25 .0329 .0060 .5200 .3727 3.0000 7.0000 .3000 7.0000 .0003 .2616 .3695 .0054 .6025 .0000 .0000 .0000 
50 .0526 .0121 .6450 .5714 4.0000 8.0000 .4000 8.0000 .0034 .8432 .9364 .0405 .8900 1.0000 1.0000 .0000 
75 .0725 .0182 .8000 .6667 4.0000 9.7500 .5000 10.0000 .0749 4.0060 2.0806 .1366 1.2475 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown. 
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 Based on the Table 22, the pooled set of companies devotes approximately 
1.4% of the annual report to explaining KPI disclosures.  The comprehensiveness of 
the disclosed KPIs scored an average of 63% on the disclosure scale that considers 
presence of KPIs in the annual report, amount and comparison, forward looking 
information and the reason for changes in the KPI performance over previous trading 
periods.  The pooled set of companies reported that approximately 51% of 
individuals on corporate boards are non-executive directors.   According to the 
results, the average level of director share ownership for the pooled set of companies 
is approximately 11%.  The average board size for the largest companies operating in 
the UK is 9 members with approximately 41% of board members possessing some 
financial expertise such as qualified auditors, investment bankers or chartered 
accountants among other professions.  The results also show that on average; 
approximately 66% of the largest companies operating in the UK also have 
substantial operations outside of the GB territory. 
 
9.3 Correlation Analysis60 
From the Table 23 of the Correlation Results, it can be seen that the highest 
correlation is between MLIST and LSTAT.  The correlation coefficient is .853, the 
positive relationship between these two variables was noticed during the scoring 
process as often large firms that were listed also had operations outside Great Britain 
(GB) and were registered on other stock exchanges.  The level of correlation would 
however be expected to be different for smaller listed companies as it is reasonable 
                                                          
60
 In order to run correlation analysis and OLS regressions, only KPI disclosing firms were considered.  
The 104 KPI disclosing private limited companies were matched with a randomly selected sample of 
104 KPI disclosing public listed companies.  The pooled sample thus constituted 208 companies 
including both private and public listed companies.   
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to suggest that smaller companies would have smaller operations outside of GB in 
comparison with larger companies.  Though  .853 is the highest correlation, it is 
certainly not a cause for concern as it is below the 0.9 threshold suggested by Field 
(2009).  There is consequently no concern for multicollinearity within the models to 
be tested for the pooled set of companies. 
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Table 23: Correlation Results 
 
  KPISCOR
E 
COMP WCOUNT PNED AUDSIZE BOARDM FINEXP BDSIZE DSHARE COSIZE GEAR PROF LQDT MULTIN LSTAT MLI
ST 
KPISCOR
E 
1                               
COMP .137 1                             
WCOUNT .068 .013 1                           
PNED .026 .062 .103 1                         
AUDSIZE -.084 .143* .021 .321** 1                       
BOARDM .051 .005 -.107 .113 .318** 1                     
FINEXP .045 -.060 -.003 .069 -.144* -.084 1                   
BDSIZE .074 .138* -.158* .365** .659** .264** -.100 1                 
DSHARE -.159* -.022 -.021 -.195** -.270** -.212** .080 -.296** 1               
COSIZE .167* .149* .614** .061 .038 -.048 .018 .071 -.013 1             
GEAR -.094 -.063 -.182** -.032 -.076 .041 -.040 .006 -.046 -.081 1           
PROF .121 .195** .141* .263** .153* .021 -.004 .202** -.097 .103 -.004 1         
LQDT -.037 .034 .012 -.042 .072 -.044 .035 .057 .023 -.011 .059 .194** 1       
MULTIN .066 .136 -.040 .102 .040 .020 -.042 .055 -.124 .044 .093 .104 -.009 1     
LSTAT .205** .274** -.241** .478** .300** .146* .024 .396** -.370** .134* .070 .316** -.003 .252** 1   
MLIST .150* .308** -.311** .429** .289** .138* .030 .350** -.330** .080 .058 .284** .017 .246** .853** 1 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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9.4 Diagnostic Procedures 
In order to ensure that the data and tests used in this chapter do not violate 
statistical assumptions, some diagnostic checks were conducted.  The main checks 
conducted include standard residuals, Cook’s distance, Durbin-Watson and normality 
distribution.  Commencing with the standard residuals; Field (2009) suggests that 
they assume normal distribution and offers some guidance on how to interpret the 
standard residual values.  When a sample contains more than 1% of the constituents 
of that sample possessing standardized residuals of +2.5 and or more than 5% with 
standardized residuals of +2, then there is cause for concern because the sample may 
possibly not best represent actual data (Field, 2009).   For the lower limit of greater 
than 2.0 KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP reported results of 2, 1 and 2 cases 
greater respectively.  For cases above the upper limit of greater than 2.5; the result 
for KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP reported 4, 1 and 2 cases respectively. 
Based on these results, it can be concluded that the assumption guidelines have not 
been violated, the highest statistic is that of KPISCORE number of cases greater than 
2.5, the statistics as a proportion would represent 0.00975 which is below the 1% 
threshold so would not be a cause for concern in this situation.  The remainder of the 
statistics were below the 1% and 5% relevant thresholds hence the guidance was not 
violated. 
The next diagnostic check that was conducted is the Cook’s distance.  Cook's 
assists in detecting influential individual or subsets of observation in linear 
regression for cross sectional data such as that used in this study (Zhu et al., 2012, 
Cook, 1977).  A Cook’s value of greater than 1 is thought to be a cause for concern 
(Cook and Weisberg, 1982).  The minimum values reported for Cook’s distances for 
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KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP were .000 for all three categories and the 
maximum values were .157, .573 and .875 respectively. 
The Durbin-Watson test was also conducted, as a rule of thumb for this test, 
values <1 and >3 are a cause for concern (Dardor, 2009).  The findings on 
KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP are 1.951, 1.791 and 1.838 respectively.  All 
these statistics do not violate the statistical assumption of the diagnosis check.  Also 
attached in the appendices are the histograms to illustrate normality, plot of 
standardized regression residual and scatterplots to illustrate checks for 
heteroscedasticity.  From the supporting illustrations in Appendix 6, it can be seen 
that the overall check assumptions have not been violated.  The average VIF results 
showed that the relevant scores for KPI, WCOUNT and COMP were 1.68, 1.873 and 
1.68 respectively.  None of the scores were substantially greater than 1 therefore 
there were no strong linear relationships among the predictors. 
 
9.5 OLS Regression Results 
Table 25 summarises the regression results of the three models investigated in 
this chapter.  The three independent variables investigated include KPISCORE, 
WCOUNT and COMP.  The companies investigated in this chapter are a gross of 
those companies that disclosed KPIs only including both large private and large 
public listed companies.  The following multiple regression models were used: 
 
KPISCORE = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 4 FINEXP + 5 
BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 
MULTIN + 12 LSTAT + 13 MLIST + j 
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WCOUNT = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 4 FINEXP + 5 
BDSIZE + 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 
MULTIN + 12 LSTAT + 13 MLIST + j 
 
COMP = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BOARDM + 4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE 
+ 6 DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 MULTIN + 
12 LSTAT + 13 MLIST + j 
 
Table 24 identifies the variables included in the equation: 
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Table 24: Explanation of Variables 
Variable Explanation 
0………….11 Regressors/regression coefficients 
  
KPI KPI disclosure; [1] where at least a single KPI is 
disclosed and [0] where no KPI disclosures have been 
made 
  
KPISCORE Level of KPI disclosures in annual reports as a 
proportion of a selected disclosure index 
  
WCOUNT Percentage of words used to describe KPIs as a 
proportion of the total number of words in the annual 
report 
  
COMP Measure of disclosure quality taking into account (i) 
presence of KPIs, (ii) amounts, (iii) reason for 
changes/trends and (iv) forward looking disclosures 
  
PNED Proportion on non-executive directors on the board 
  
AUDSIZE Audit committee size 
  
BDMEET Frequency of board meetings held during the year 
  
FINEXP Proportion of financial experts on the board of 
directors 
  
BDSIZE Total number of individuals on the board of directors 
  
DSHARE Director share ownership 
  
COSIZE Company size measured by total assets 
  
GEAR Gearing 
  
PROF Profitability 
  
LQDT Liquidity 
  
MULTIN Multinationality (code [1] awarded if company has 
substantial operations outside GB, code [0] if not) 
  
LSTAT Listing status (code [1] awarded if a company is 
listed on at least one stock exchange and [0] if the 
company is not listed on any stock exchange.) 
  
MLIST Multiple listing status (code [1] if a company is listed 
on more than one stock exchange and [0] if listed on 
just one or none.) 
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Table 25: Regression Results 
KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
  Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
  Standardized 
Coefficients 
    Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
  Standardized 
Coefficients 
    
B Std. 
Error 
Beta B Std. 
Error 
Beta T Sig. B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .051 .009   5.876 .000 .016 .003   5.482 .000 .585 .061   9.573 .000 
PNED -.024 .009 -.184 -2.718 .007 .011 .003 .221 4.021 .000 -.238 .061 -.272 -3.907 .000 
AUDSIZE -.006 .002 -.293 -3.908 .000 .001 .001 .164 2.481 .014 -.001 .012 -.009 -.116 .908 
BOARDM .001 .001 .091 1.545 .124 .000 .000 -.051 -1.015 .311 -.003 .005 -.037 -.601 .548 
FINEXP .019 .008 .125 2.255 .025 .000 .003 -.001 -.019 .985 -.128 .061 -.122 -2.084 .038 
BDSIZE .002 .001 .268 3.491 .001 -.001 .000 -.308 -4.668 .000 .014 .004 .262 3.298 .001 
DSHARE -.016 .008 -.125 -2.090 .038 -.006 .003 -.123 -2.374 .019 .218 .056 .251 3.922 .000 
COSIZE .000 .000 .391 6.766 .000 .000 .000 .567 11.618 .000 .000 .000 .158 2.699 .008 
GEAR .000 .000 -.074 -1.341 .182 .000 .000 -.095 -2.000 .047 .005 .002 .123 2.116 .036 
PROF .028 .010 .180 2.891 .004 .009 .003 .144 2.768 .006 .216 .064 .215 3.360 .001 
LQDT -.002 .001 -.092 -1.660 .098 .000 .000 .012 .241 .810 .026 .010 .165 2.747 .007 
MULTIN .004 .003 .058 1.036 .301 .000 .001 .004 .078 .938 .013 .024 .033 .557 .578 
LSTAT .005 .006 .085 .792 .429 -.004 .002 -.182 -1.759 .080 -.015 .045 -.040 -.340 .734 
MLIST -.001 .006 -.019 -.193 .848 -.005 .002 -.241 -2.354 .020 .152 .042 .392 3.591 .000 
                                
R sq.   .439     .587      .372    
R sq. adj.   .401     .560     .330    
St Error of 
the estimate 
  .02243     .00748     .15779    
F Change   .439     21.240     8.853    
Sig F change     .000         .000         .000     
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9.5.1 KPISCORE Regression Results 
40.1% of the variation in KPISCORE can be explained by the model 
employed.  From the regression results of KPI disclosures among the pooled set of 
companies, it was found that FINEXP, BDSIZE, COSIZE and PROF all had a 
positive and significant relationship with the KPISCORE which represents the level 
of KPI disclosures as a proportion of an index.  On the other hand AUDSIZE, 
BOARDM, DSHARE and LQDT were found to have a significant but negative 
relationship with the level of KPI disclosures by the same set of companies.  As 
expected, larger companies were found to have a positive relationship significant at 
the 0.01 level.  This is in line with the proposed hypothesis H
7c
.  As larger companies 
are prominent, they tend to provide a greater deal of disclosures in a bid to self-
govern and self-protect against further regulations.  In the case of KPIs, it is 
reasonable to expect larger companies to adhere to relatively recent regulatory 
developments and showcase that they are making efforts to meet any summoning.  
As can be supported by the agency theory, this could in fact reduce monitoring cost 
with respect to the companies’ boards.  These findings are in line with other previous 
studies (Ismail and Ibrahim, 2008, Alsaeed, 2006, Al-Khadash and Abhath Al-
Yarmouk, 2003). 
 PROF was also found to be significantly and positively associated with the 
level of KPISCORE at the 0.01 level.  This finding is in line with the hypothesis 
(H
9c
) that was proposed.  The rationales are similar to the previous chapter in that 
companies that perform well will look to dance and shout about their superior 
performance, some authors label bad performing companies as lemons (Akerlof, 
1970). 
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Companies with larger boards were found to disclose a higher proportion of 
KPIs compared to companies with a smaller board size.  The relationship was found 
to be significant at the 0.01 level.  This is in line with the proposed hypothesis H
5c
.  
Companies with larger boards can be thought of as having a greater base for human 
resources thus talent.  If this is the case, it can reasonably explain that such entities 
perform better on their critical success factors and would wish to disclose the 
relevant/corresponding data.  If they were performing badly it would be interesting to 
see whether they would still disclose a higher amount of KPI information.  It may be 
proposed that this may still be the case as such companies will probably look into the 
future through identifying problematic areas and providing more forward looking 
information to the identified KPIs, this thought is supported and evidenced under the 
results for comprehensiveness
61
 below. 
 The proportion of financial experts on the board was found to be positively 
and significantly associated with the level of KPI disclosures at the 0.05 level.  This 
finding is in line with the proposed hypothesis H
4c
.  Financial experts are likely to be 
more diligent with the financial key performance indicators (FKPIs) compared to 
companies with a smaller proportion of experts.  For this reason the rationale for the 
finding could be explained by the fact that where there are more financial experts on 
the board then it follows that there would be a higher level of KPIs relating to 
financial measures reported in the relevant annual reports. 
PNED is significantly and negatively associated with the level of KPI 
disclosures in the annual reports of the pooled set of companies, the relationship is 
significant at the 0.01 level.  This finding is contrary to the hypothesis (H
1c
) 
                                                          
61
 COMP 
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formulated therefore H
1c
 is to be rejected.  Where there are a higher proportion of 
directors who are not involved in the day to day running of the business then it falls 
that the quantity of KPIs reported would also be limited.  One of the characteristics 
of KPIs is that they are set out by the management who are involved in the day to 
day running of the enterprise; if there are a high proportion of non-executive 
directors then it makes sense to expect a lower level of KPIs reported under such 
settings.  This finding might also be influenced by the result that a negative 
association exists within private limited companies and this might have an overall 
effect on the pooled company findings. 
 AUDSIZE was found to have a negative relationship with KPI disclosures at 
the 0.01 level contrary to the hypothesis H
2c
.  The audit committee is responsible for 
the primary task of “overseeing the firm's financial performance and ensure the 
reliability of its financial reporting” (Georges and Thouraya, 2005).  Other studies 
also reinforce that the audit committee plays a monitoring role (Chapple et al., 2012, 
Ika et al., 2012).  Larger committees may subject information to greater scrutiny 
therefore limiting the amount that is agreed on for final publishing.  In other words, a 
larger audit committee is likely to entail that there is an increased level of 
supervision and in turn increased filtering of information that is reported. 
DHSHARE was found to have a negative relationship with the level of KPI 
disclosures at the 0.05 level.  H
6c
 is therefore rejected.  There is a bigger agency 
problem when ownership by directors is low, in such situations it is common that 
managers will have incentives to consume perks and there is likely to be a reduced 
level of incentives in maximising performance in their tasks.  It can therefore be 
expected that shareholders in this situation will wish to increase the level of 
monitoring so as to reduce the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Eng and 
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Mak, 2003).  The level of monitoring can however be reduced if the directors in 
these situations provide increased disclosure therefore the negative relationship 
between DSHARE and KPISCORE.  This finding is consistent with other studies in 
the field (Ruland et al., 1990, Li et al., 2012, Sidney and Bertrand, 2004). 
 Finally under this model, LQDT was found to have a negative relationship 
with KPISCORE, the relationship is however significant only at the 0.1 level.  This 
finding was is consistent with other studies (Wallace et al., 1994a, Naser et al., 2002, 
Khaled et al., 2010), including some that have also found weak relationships (Elzahar 
and Hussainey, 2012).  It may be suggested that companies that have low liquidity 
ratios may have a higher level of disclosures in the annual report as a means of 
justifying their weak financial position.  Hypothesis H
10c
 is therefore rejected.  The 
next section of the results analyses the model for the amount of words disclosed in 
the annual report. 
 
9.5.2 Word Count Regression Results 
56% of the variation in WCOUNT can be explained by the regression model 
employed.  Word count is a measure for the quantity of disclosures, the amount of 
words method disregards the amount of KPIs disclosed hence only takes into account 
the amount of words used to describe KPIs as a proportion of the total number of 
words in the annual report.  The results from the WCOUNT model reveal that 
PNED, AUDSIZE, COSIZE and PROF were found to be positively and significantly 
associated with the proportion of words used to discuss KPIs.  BDSIZE, DSHARE, 
GEAR, LSTAT and MLIST were found to be negatively associated with WCOUNT. 
COSIZE was found to significantly and positively explain the level of 
WCOUNT in annual reports in relation to the total number of words in the full 
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report, the relationship was found to be significant at the 0.01 level (Hossain and 
Hammami, 2009, Barako et al., 2006a, Owusu-Ansah, 1998b).  This finding is in line 
with the hypothesis H
7c
 formulated.  According to the results, larger companies use 
more words in discussing their KPIs than smaller companies.  This result is 
consistent with that found for KPISCORE in the previous section which leads to the 
thought that a higher number of KPIs may result in more words being used in the 
descriptions of those KPIs.  The rationale would be similar to that proposed for 
KPISCORE.  It was also found that PROF is positively and significantly associated 
with the proportion of words used to describe KPIs in the annual report.  From this 
finding it appears that large companies tend to disclose more performance 
information when they perform well and less when the performance is not desirable.  
This relationship is significant at the 0.01 level.  The finding is in line with the 
proposed hypothesis H
9c
 which is to be accepted. 
PNED significantly and positively explains WCOUNT at the 0.01 level 
(Babío Arcay and Muiño Vázquez, 2005, Cheng and Courtenay, 2006, Wan-Hussin, 
2009).  This is a very unusual finding because the results also suggest that there is an 
inverse relationship with the number of KPIs.  It may be suggested that where there 
is a higher number of non-executive directors, then they seek to provide explanations 
for those items that have been identified to the stakeholders, it however remains 
questionable as to the comprehensiveness of the disclosures.  One then begs to 
wonder about the usefulness of these lengthy descriptions, this is a question that is 
addressed in the section of discussion of results below.  The result is however in line 
with the proposed hypothesis H
1c
. 
AUDSIZE reports a positive significant relationship with the proportion of 
word count in the annual report in line with the formulated hypothesis H
2c
.  Auditors 
331 
 
clearly seem to be interested in the details, regardless of how many KPIs have been 
made. Where there is a larger number of individuals on the audit committee then a 
larger proportion of the annual report is devoted to the description of KPIs.  A larger 
audit committee in this case appears to encourage the disclosure of details to 
stakeholders. 
BDSIZE was found to be significantly and negatively related to the 
proportion of words used in describing KPIs reported in the annual reports of large 
companies.  Hypothesis H
5c
 is contrary to the results therefore rejected.  The 
rationale suggested in this case is that the board is at large interested in meeting the 
regulatory demands, the positive relationship with KPISCORE and negative 
relationship with WCOUNT suggests that it may be a box ticking exercise to ensure 
that regulatory demands are met but without necessarily devoting much effort to 
details in the KPI disclosures made.  This situation however assists in the argument 
that the annual report has become too large, here the board effectively aim to provide 
the required KPIs but not necessarily excess detail. 
DSHARE was found to have a negative relationship with the extent of 
WCOUNT in contrast to the hypothesis (H
6c
) formulated.  This finding is similar to 
that found for KPISCORE.  According to the agency theory it seems that when 
director ownership is low there is a likelihood of the directors to consume perks and 
as a consequence there is increased monitoring.  These monitoring costs can however 
be mitigated by increased disclosures which in turn also reduce information 
asymmetry between the management and shareholders.  GEAR was found to be 
negatively associated with WCOUNT.  The suggested explanation for this finding is 
that large companies may attempt to avoid providing details about poor performance 
in this financial ratio as it might be detrimental to the firms’ affinity for investment 
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and confidence in stakeholders.  On the other hand it may also make sense that firms 
with low gearing may wish to present an increased amount of detail regarding their 
identified KPIs in order to showcase their position of lower risk consequently 
attracting investment and reinstating confidence within their existing and potential 
stakeholders.  As the formulated hypothesis (H
8c
) is contrary to the finding, H
8c
 is 
rejected. 
An atypical find in the results was that LSTAT and MLIST were found to be 
negatively associated with WCOUNT at the 0.1 and 0.05 levels respectively.  This is 
contrary to the hypotheses H
12c
 and H
13c
 respectively which are both rejected.  The 
general expectation is that when companies are listed on a stock exchange then they 
would make increased disclosures to meet the requirements of the various stock 
exchanges.  In this case it however appears the opposite.  The negative relationship 
witnessed is stronger for companies with multiple listings
62
 compared to those with 
single listing status
63
. 
This may suggest that where there are stringent rules in the host country (UK) 
anyway, then any other stock exchange listing might not warrant the disclosure of 
additional information.  Other authors have found that there are no significant 
relationships between listing status and information disclosure in different contexts 
(Cerf, 1961, Buzby, 1975).  A final suggestion based on the results is that the 
comprehensiveness of disclosures made may be negatively affected by increased 
rules governing the disclosure items.  Companies will attempt to tick boxes in all 
other areas of disclosures consequently spreading themselves thin.  On the other hand 
unlisted companies that are not liable to extra disclosure rules would place more 
                                                          
62
 Significance = 0.05 
63
 Significance = 0.1 
333 
 
emphasis on explaining/providing more detail on the already identified KPIs in their 
annual reports. 
 
9.5.3 Comprehensiveness Regression Results 
 33% of the variation in WCOUNT can be explained by the model employed.  
This final section of the results chapter investigates corporate governance and 
company specific characteristics that influence the comprehensiveness of KPI 
disclosures made in the annual reports, comprehensiveness is represented by 
COMP
64
.  PNED and FINEXP were found to have a negative relationship with 
COMP.  BDSIZE, DSHARE, COSIZE, GEAR, PROF, LQDT and MLIST were 
found to positively and significantly influence the comprehensiveness of KPI 
disclosures made in the annual reports of firms operating in the UK. 
 DSHARE was found positively significant at the 0.01 level.  This result is in 
line with the proposed hypothesis H
6c
.  Where directors within the company own a 
higher stake, it can be suggested that they may wish to increase the 
comprehensiveness of disclosures made in order to reduce any monitoring costs.  It is 
reasonable to assume that a higher proportion of ownership by directors would lead 
to an alignment of interests with the shareholders of the firm.  As a consequence the 
comprehensiveness of the information disclosed is likely to be increased as they wish 
to provide information that sheds the company in good light.  Such information 
might attract investment; restore confidence among stakeholders and increase share 
price in the case of listed entities. 
                                                          
64
 Comprehensiveness (COMP) takes into account, whether a KPI has been disclosed at all, whether 
the relative figures have been disclosed, whether reasons have been provided to changes in the 
identified KPI and whether any forward looking information has been provided. 
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 COSIZE was found to significantly explain disclosure comprehensiveness at 
the 0.01 level (Hossain and Hammami, 2009, Barako et al., 2006a, Ismail and 
Ibrahim, 2008).    This finding confirms the hypothesis (H
7c
) proposed.  Larger 
companies as previously suggested have it in their own interest to self-regulate 
particularly in light of new regulations.  Companies that are highly geared according 
to the findings of the COMP model tend to disclose more comprehensive information 
in accordance with hypothesis H
8c
 which is accepted.  It is in the interest of highly 
geared companies to present comprehensive information in a bid to justify 
undesirable financial ratios. 
In some cases it has been found that gearing may be a consequence of 
borrowing to take advantage of an investment opportunity.  In the case of 
comprehensive disclosures, such companies may therefore provide the amounts 
concerned in the relevant ratios, reasons for the increase in gearing and forward 
looking information which in most cases would highlight flourishing financial 
performance for the future.  It is therefore reasonable to expect highly geared 
business entities to provide more comprehensive information regarding their 
position.  These results are consistent with several other studies (Bewley and Li, 
2000, Brammer and Pavelin, 2004, Clarkson et al., 2008, Cormier and Magnan, 
1999). 
 Along the same lines of thought, it was found that PROF significantly and 
positively explains disclosure comprehensiveness of reported KPIs (Hossain, 2008, 
Iatridis, 2008b, Wan-Hussin, 2009).  This finding is in line with other previous 
findings (Cormier and Magnan, 1999, Cormier and Gordon, 2001) and is in line with 
the proposed hypothesis H
9c
.  The rationale for this finding is similar to that proposed 
in previous sections.  Companies that display superior financial performance will in 
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most cases provide detailed information on this performance and in turn a range of 
benefits
65
 may be derived from the disclosure of this information.  The researcher 
posits a similar rationale for LQDT which was also found to have a positive 
relationship with the extent of COMP at the 0.01 significance level.  Hypothesis H
10c
 
is therefore to be accepted. 
 BDSIZE was found to be positively and significantly associated with COMP 
at the 0.01 level.  This finding is supported by the proposed hypothesis H
5c
 which is 
accepted.  Larger boards are thought to have the benefit of a wider pool of talent and 
therefore in this case it can be reasonably expected that the comprehensiveness of the 
information disclosed will be enriched.  However it must be noted that in some cases, 
a larger number of members on the board may increase poorer communication and 
decision making (Hidalgo et al., 2011).  It appears that this problem is offset by 
greater pool talents in UK large companies.  MLIST is positively and significantly 
associated with the comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures at the 0.01 level.  The 
previous section showed that the relationship is negative in relation to the amount of 
words used but in terms of comprehensiveness there is a positive relationship.  This 
might highlight that multiple stock exchanges might have particular information 
items that they require disclosed and this is evidenced in the findings of the COMP 
model.  Hypothesis H
13
 is therefore to be accepted. 
 The proportion of non-executive directors is associated negatively with 
COMP at the 0.01 level.  This finding is contrary to the hypothesis (H
1c
) formulated.  
The lack of detail might perhaps be a consequence of having a higher number of 
                                                          
65
 Benefits include for example easy accessibility to lending facilities, an improved stock price, 
confidence instilled in suppliers and existing lenders and attracting of potential investors among 
several reasons. 
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individuals who are not involved in the day to day running of the business.  It is 
reasonable therefore to expect a positive relationship between executive directors and 
the comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures made in the annual report.  H
1c
 is therefore 
rejected.  The level of finance experts on the board was also found to be negatively 
associated with COMP.  From the previous section it was discovered that FINEXP is 
positively associated with KPI.  Although financial experts may disclose a larger 
amount of financial measures in the annual report, it appears that the details and 
comprehensiveness of disclosure seem to reduce with the number of experts on the 
board.  Financial information can be extremely complex and meaningless in annual 
reports that are meant for ordinary individuals which might not have sufficient 
financial knowledge to decipher the information conferred.  The negative 
relationship here is therefore a result of a higher proportion of financial experts that 
is not met by a resultant increase in the comprehensiveness of information disclosed.  
It may also be suggested that conflicts, communication inefficiency and slower 
decision making may prevail when there is a higher number of experts in a specific 
area leading to a lower comprehensiveness in the information items disclosed for 
every KPI identified.  The hypothesis (H
4c
) proposed is therefore rejected. 
 
9.6 Discussion of Results 
Extent of KPIs Disclosure 
The results from the findings of this study show a positive response by 
companies to the regulation by the CA (2006) to disclose KPI as supported by some 
previous studies.  Black Sun plc. (2006) reported that the percentage of companies 
disclosing KPIs rose from 19% in 2004 to 36% in 2005.  This period was prior to the 
introduction of the business review and there is little reason to expect a high level of 
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KPI disclosures.   This section of the study only covers large listed entities but the 
results suggest a big leap towards meeting regulatory recommendations.  The study 
(Black Sun plc. 2006) also shows that the number of KPIs discussed ranged between 
one and eight while the current study shows an increase in the range too, of between 
one and twenty-three KPIs. 
Deloitte (2005) examined the reporting of KPIs and found that 74% of the top 
350 companies (by market capitalisation) disclosed clear KPIs.  The average number 
of KPIs reported in that study was 3.6 KPIs per report whereas this study identifies 
that the average KPIs reported by listed firms is 8.2 KPIs.  Once again this may be 
seen to demonstrate the efforts and progress being made by corporate entities in 
reporting critical success factors to a wide range of stakeholders.  The range of KPIs 
disclosed based on results from the Deloitte (2005) study was between one and nine 
while as afore mentioned in this study lies between one and twenty-three.  This 
finding supports the case that perhaps those companies that are disclosing KPIs are 
showing better practice over the years. 
Deloitte ( 2006) also examined annual reports of 100, FTSE 350 companies 
spread evenly between the large, middle and small by market capitalisation. The 
findings suggested that the proportion of companies disclosing KPIs had decreased 
from 49% to 45%. They also report that the average number of KPIs disclosed was 
six.  This finding shows a relatively lower disclosure extent compared to the 90% 
discovered in the current study where 205 largest listed companies were investigated.  
This increase in disclosure could be attributed to several reasons and among the main 
ones being the introduction of the requirements to report KPIs
66
 and the notion that 
                                                          
66
 As exemplified in the study by Tauringana and Mangena (2009) explained below. 
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larger listed firms such as those investigated in this sample can better afford to gather 
the data compared to smaller companies.  According to Deloitte (2005), the range of 
KPIs disclosed in the top 350 companies was 1 to 8 and a jump of 1 to 18 in their 
2006.  
Another study (Tauringana and Mangena, 2009) on KPIs reporting in the UK 
media sector showed that in 2004 and 2005 before the introduction of the Business 
Review (BR), only 56.3% of the companies disclosed some KPIs.  Following the 
introduction of the mandatory Business Review in 2006, there was a noticeable 
increase in disclosure to 71.9% and 75% in 2006 and 2007 respectively.  Although 
the study is industry specific it reveals that the media industry has a high level of 
KPIs disclosure. 
 
Multiple Regression Results 
Table 26 summarises the variables that significantly explain the disclosure of 
KPIs across the three models tested under pooled companies. 
 
339 
 
Table 26: Significance of Variables Across the Three Methods 
Variable KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
PNED Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
AUDSIZE Yes*** Yes** No 
BOARDM No No No 
FINEXP Yes** No Yes** 
BDSIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
DSHARE Yes** Yes*** Yes*** 
COSIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
GEAR No Yes** Yes** 
PROF Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
LQDT Yes* No Yes*** 
MULTIN No No No 
LSTAT No Yes* No 
MLIST No Yes** Yes*** 
***. Significant at the 0.01 level 
**.  Significant at the 0.05 level 
*.  Significant at the 0.1 level 
 
This chapter investigated the pooled set of companies
67
.  The results covered 
in the section above highlight the extent of disclosure and also the corporate 
governance and company specific variables that influence the extent of disclosures 
and the comprehensiveness of the disclosures made.  The measures used to determine 
disclosure extent and comprehensiveness include KPISCORE
68
, WCOUNT
69
 and 
COMP
70
.  Table 26  provides a summary of the variables that were found to 
significantly explain each of the three dependent variables investigated as part of this 
chapter. 
                                                          
67
 A combination of both private limited and public listed firms. 
68
 This dependent variable measure the amount of KPI disclosed as a proportion of a specific index 
relevant to the company under scrutiny. 
69
 This dependent variable represents the amount of words used to describe the KPIs disclosed in the 
annual report as a proportion of the total number of words in the full annual report.  WCOUNT was 
used as a proxy for quantity disclosed. 
70
 This dependent variable was used as a proxy for disclosure comprehensiveness.  The score 
attributed to COMP aggregates the comprehensiveness attributes included in the KPIs disclosures 
namely presence of KPI, amount relevant to the KPI, reasons for changes in the KPI figures over 
different trading periods and forward looking information relating to the disclosed KPIs. 
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According to the summary table it can be seen that the number of board 
meetings and multinationality do not significantly explain KPISCORE, WCOUNT 
and COMP.  The proportion of non-executive directors, the size of the board, 
company size and profitability all significantly explain KPISCORE, WCOUNT and 
COMP at the 1% level.  These results are in line with previous studies as identified in 
the individual sections of results i.e. KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP.  The 
results of this chapter confirm that there is a substantial difference between the 
quantity and the comprehensiveness of the information disclosed in the annual 
report.  The factors that influence quantity and comprehensiveness are often 
different. 
A classic example is that from the results it was found that the proportion of 
non-executive directors significantly explains KPISCORE, WCOUNT and COMP.  
PNED however has a negative relationship with KPISCORE and COMP but a 
positive relationship with WCOUNT.  What this finding seems to suggest is that 
companies should perhaps be watchful of the proportion of independent directors it 
has on its board.  The members may assist in the monitoring of the executive board 
members but possess limited knowledge of the company in comparison.  As a 
consequence the results of this study suggest that a higher proportion of non-
executive directors leads to the identification a fewer KPIs and lower 
comprehensiveness in the details of the disclosed KPIs.  The opposite is also true, 
fewer non-executive where a higher level of executive directors lead to more resolute 
identification of the critical success factors of the business and better 
comprehensiveness of the KPIs identified and disclosed.  What is also interesting in 
this find is that where there are a high proportion of non-executive directors, they 
seem to say very little comprehensive information in very many words.  This is not 
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to take away from the useful role of a non-executive committee but perhaps firms 
should be watchful where there are a substantially high number of non-executive 
directors. 
Another interesting find was that listing status and multiple listing negatively 
explain the amount of words used in the annual reports in describing the identified 
KPIs.   On the other hand listing status does not explain comprehensiveness but 
multiple listing significantly and positively explains it.  From this result it appears 
that where there is an increase in the rules regarding disclosures then companies tend 
to stick to ‘ticking the boxes.’  In other words companies spend less effort on 
explaining each and every requirement as the binding rules increase, however the 
comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures increase with multiple listed companies.  
Overall the most significant variables in explaining KPI disclosure quantity and 
comprehensiveness include PNED, BDSIZE, DSHARE, COSIZE and PROF. 
 
9.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The main objectives of this chapter were firstly; to investigate the extent to 
which large companies (including private limited and public listed) disclose KPIs in 
their annual reports in accordance with the requirements of Companies Act 2006.  
Secondly to investigate the extent to which company specific characteristics 
influence the extent of KPI disclosure, amount of words in KPI disclosures and 
comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures in annual reports. The third objective was to 
investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms significantly influence the 
extent of KPI disclosures, amount of words in KPI disclosures and 
comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures in annual reports. 
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From the results it is evident that just over seven in every ten companies 
investigated disclose at least a single KPI in their annual report.  This finding also 
shows an upward trend in the extent of KPI reporting in comparison to previous 
studies therefore suggesting that the current regulation has been increasingly 
influential over time.  It was also discovered according to the results that company 
size and profitability are the most influential company specific factors in determining 
the level of KPI disclosures, word count and comprehensiveness.  The most 
influential corporate governance factors in determining the level of KPI disclosures, 
word count and comprehensiveness are the proportion of non-executive directors, 
board size and director share ownership. 
Finally there are stark differences between the motivators of KPI disclosures 
and the comprehensiveness of those disclosures.  It is not only important for regulations 
to place emphasis on the disclosure of KPIs but also the comprehensiveness and in turn 
usefulness of the information that is disclosed.  There are also balances that need to be 
met in terms of executive and non-executive board members so that monitoring 
objectives are met but without overshadowing the work of the executive committee.  
Overall this chapter sets out very useful insights on KPI disclosures by large 
corporations operating in the UK. 
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Chapter 10 
Summary, Implications, Conclusions, 
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10 Summary, Implications, Conclusions, Limitations and 
Further Research 
10.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this research was to investigate the extent of KPIs 
disclosure by UK companies in response to the new regulation by the Companies Act 
2006 section 417(6) (CA 2006 henceforth) requiring companies to disclose KPIs.  
The research had two subsidiary objectives which were firstly, to investigate the 
influence of corporate governance mechanisms (proportion of non-executive 
directors, audit committee size, number of board meetings held, director share 
ownership and board size) on the extent of KPIs disclosure in annual reports.  
Secondly, to investigate the influence of company specific characteristics (company 
size, gearing, profitability, liquidity, multinationality, listing status, multiple listing 
status) on the extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports.  This chapter provides a 
summary and explains the implications of this research.  In addition the conclusions, 
limitations and some possible areas of future research are highlighted. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows:  Section 10.2 provides a 
summary of the research which is broken down into background of the study, 
research objectives, research methodology and the results and explanations.  Section 
10.3 discusses the contributions of the study followed by section 10.4 which covers 
the implications of the results of the research results for policy makers, researchers 
and managers.  Section 10.5 restates the overall conclusions of the research. In 
section 10.6, the limitations of the research are examined and section 10.7 discusses 
possible further research in the area of annual report disclosures. 
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10.2 Research Summary 
This thesis provided both capital market based and non-capital market based 
theories explaining why there can be an expectation for a company to disclose 
information in their annual reports.  These theories were also supported by details in 
Chapter 1 on the accounting environment in the UK and Chapter 3 with discussed 
Annual report users and their information needs. 
The use of capital market-based theories led to the suggestion of three main 
reasons for listed companies to disclose information.  These reasons include firstly to 
signal to the market in order to correctly value the company’s shares, secondly; in 
order to reduce the risk associated with the company’s shares and third; to protect 
from undervaluation of the company’s shares.  It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that 
the results of previous studies on the usefulness of annual reports to the market are 
conflicting because they suggest that annual reports are of little use for share pricing 
on one hand and that annual reports have some information value to the market on 
the other hand. One reason for arguing that annual reports are not useful is that if the 
markets are efficient then the annual reports are historical in nature thus come out too 
late to be of any use.  
Non-capital market-based theories examined included the agency, 
stakeholder, political costs, legitimacy and stewardship theories.  These theories 
make a contribution in highlighting that private and public listed companies both 
have incentives to disclose information outside of the effect of information on stock 
prices.  These theories were used in the development of the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter 5 and tested in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  The proposed hypotheses were used in an 
attempt to identify possible causalities (corporate governance mechanisms and company 
specific characteristics) of KPI disclosure quantity and in annual reports. 
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The methodology used in this study is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  The 
perspectives considered in the chapter include the research philosophy, justification 
of the study sample, methods of estimating and the dependent variables and the 
models used for examining the extent of KPI disclosures in annual reports.  Other 
considerations were scoring of the annual reports and operationalizing the 
independent variables. 
The research philosophy adopted in this study is inclined towards the 
positivist approach in which the quantitative methods of data collection are 
considered favourable for answering the research objectives.  The sample for the 
thesis comprises 410 large companies.  The sample comprises 205 large private 
limited companies and 205 large public listed companies.  These companies were 
randomly selected from an initial sampling frame of 600 companies.  The sampling 
frame was derived from a compilation of FTSE350
71
 and Top Track100
72
 + Top 
Track 250
73
 firms.  The companies selected had to meet three main conditions which 
were firstly to be listed on the LSE or part of the Top Track 100/250.  Secondly, they 
would have had to be constituent in their index from the 1
st
 of January 2008 to 31
st
 
December 2008 and third; they had to be non-financial service sector firms. 
The first stage of analysis involved investigating KPIs disclosure extent 
across three groupings which were private limited companies, public listed 
                                                          
71
 The FTSE350 Index is a market capitalisation weighted stock market index.  It incorporates the 
largest 350 listed companies which have their primary listing on the LSE by order of market 
capitalisation.  The FTSE 350 is a combination of companies from the FTSE100 and companies from 
the FTSE250. 
72
 The Sunday Times Fast Track 100 league table ranks Britain's 100 private companies with the 
fastest-growing sales over their latest three years. 
73
 The Sunday Times Top Track 250 league table ranks Britain's leading mid-market private 
companies with the biggest sales. 
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companies and the combination of both groups.  Further to this was then satisfying 
the subsidiary objectives.  In the case of private limited companies, due to the fact 
that just over one in two disclosed at least one KPI in their annual report, the decision 
was made to assess using logistic regression what corporate governance and 
company specific independent variables influenced this group of companies to make 
any KPI disclosures in their annual report.  OLS regression was then used to test the 
hypotheses formulated through assessing the relationship between KPI disclosures 
and corporate governance & company specific characteristics for those companies 
that made KPI disclosures in their annual report.  This separation of method between 
companies that disclose KPI and those that did not was done in order to meet 
assumptions of parametric tests such as a normal distribution in the sample data 
(Field, 2009, Robertson, 2012, Sedgwick). 
Approximately nine in ten of the public listed firms disclosed KPIs therefore 
the OLS regression method was used.  This method was also used in the case of the 
pooled set of companies; this set of companies included a random selection of 104 
companies to match the 104 companies that made at least a single KPI disclosure 
from the group of private limited companies. 
The extent of KPI disclosures were measured by an index which gave credit to 
the comprehensiveness of disclosures made.  These KPI measurements did not only take 
into account the quantity.  Comprehensiveness also considered attributes such as the 
relevant presence, amounts, reasons and forward looking information.  The items 
examined were included in this index after pilot testing.  Weights were not attached to 
the disclosure indexes simply because an assumption was made that annual reports have 
a wide array of stakeholders who look for different information therefore all the 
information disclosed was treated as equally important.  All the information used for the 
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study was collected from 2008 annual reports.   OLS regression analysis procedures 
were used to draw inferences from the data. Companies in the sample were pooled, and 
partitioned into unlisted and listed samples  
 
10.2.1 Results and Explanations  
10.2.1.1 Extent of KPIs Disclosure 
Detailed discussions of the results on private limited companies are discussed 
in Chapter 7.  Through a review of literature, the researcher did not identify any 
research that has investigated the level of KPI disclosures among large private 
limited firms.  This study makes a contribution by investigating the level of KPI 
disclosures by private limited companies as explained further in section 10.3.  The 
results indicate that just over five in every ten private firms disclose at least a single 
KPI in their annual reports.  This figure is considerably lower to that found for public 
listed firms. 
The level of disclosure among public listed firms investigated in the sample 
was approximately 90%.  Just fewer than nine out of every ten firms disclosed at 
least a single KPI in their annual report.  This figure is substantially higher than that 
for private limited firms.  Given that the regulation to report on KPIs in annual 
reports by the CA 2006 covers both private and public listed firms, it appears that 
this regulation has differential impact on the subjects concerned.  This issue is 
discussed further in section 10.4 which addresses the implications of this research.  
The results on the extent of KPI disclosures by public listed firms are discussed in 
detail in chapter 8. 
Based on the results, approximately 70% of companies from the total sample 
disclose at least a KPI in their annual report.  This finding demonstrates an increase 
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in the average level of KPI disclosures in comparison with previous results.  In a 
2004 study by Black Sun Plc. for example, it was found that only 19% of the 
companies investigated disclosed KPIs.  It is worth noting that this finding was prior 
to the introduction of the business review mandating companies to report KPIs in 
their annual report.  The figure almost doubled rising to 36% in a study by the same 
firm in the following year.  There is a significant improvement based on the findings 
in this study.  Tauringana and Mangena (2009) investigated the impact of the BR’s 
introduction on the reporting of KPIs.  They found that the extent of disclosure rose 
from 56% to 75% over the periods 2005 to 2007.  Their findings were based on listed 
firms within the media industry.  In comparison to the findings of this study it may 
also be seen that there is an improvement and approximately 90% of large listed 
firms disclose KPIs.    
 
10.2.1.2 Explanatory Variables and KPI Disclosures by Private Limited Companies 
 
Table 27: Significance of Variables Across the Three Methods 
Variable KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
PNED Yes** Yes*** Yes* 
AUDSIZE No No No 
BOARDM Yes*** Yes* No 
FINEXP Yes** No No 
BDSIZE Yes** Yes*** No 
DSHARE No Yes*** Yes** 
SIZE Yes*** Yes** Yes* 
GEAR Yes** Yes** No 
PROF Yes** Yes*** Yes** 
LQDT No No Yes** 
MULTIN No No Yes* 
*. Variable significant at the 0.1 level. 
**. Variable significant at the 0.05 level. 
***. Variable significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
350 
 
For those companies that made KPI disclosures in their annual reports, it was 
found that the proportion of non-executive directors, company size and profitability 
significantly influence the extent and comprehensiveness of KPI disclosures as 
measured by all three platforms; KPI score, word count and comprehensiveness.  
There is only one study identified in the UK which investigated company specific 
factors and corporate governance mechanisms that influence the disclosure of KPIs.  
Tauringana and Mangena (2009) found that the proportion of non-executive 
directors, company size, profitability and gearing significantly influenced the 
disclosure of KPIs.  Although this study posts similar findings, the major 
disagreement is the direction of the relationship between proportion of non-executive 
directors with the extent of KPIs disclosure.  While Tauringana and Mangena (2009) 
found a positive relationship, this current study finds a negative relationship in the 
case of privately owned firms, therefore reject H
1a
.  This finding invites the 
suggestions that the appointment of non-executive directors within privately held 
firms might partly be attributed to personal relationships as opposed to merit.  Where 
such situations occur, there is likely to be reluctance on the non-executive directors’ 
monitoring responsibilities thereby leading to less information disclosure.  Several 
other studies have a found a significant relationship between the level of disclosures 
with the proportion of non-executive directors (Chen and Jaggi, 2000, Cheng and 
Courtenay, 2006), company size (Domínguez, 2012) and profitability (Cormier and 
Gordon, 2001). 
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10.2.1.3 Explanatory Variables and KPI Disclosures by Public Listed Companies 
 
Table 28: Significance of Variables Across the Three Methods 
Variable KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
PNED Yes** No Yes** 
AUDSIZE No No No 
BOARDM Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
FINEXP No No No 
BDSIZE No No No 
DSHARE Yes*** Yes* Yes** 
SIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes* 
GEAR Yes*** Yes** Yes*** 
PROF Yes*** Yes* Yes*** 
LQDT Yes*** Yes** Yes*** 
MULTIN No No No 
MLIST No No Yes* 
***.  Significant at the 0.01 level 
**.  Significant at the 0.05 level 
*.  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The results for public listed firms showed that corporate governance 
mechanisms (number of board meetings and director share ownership) and company 
specific characteristics (company size, gearing, profitability and liquidity) have a 
significant influence on the disclosure extent and comprehensiveness of KPIs 
reported in the annual reports of public listed companies.  These variables proved to 
possess a significant association with the disclosure of KPIs across all three measures 
of disclosure extent used.  The results are consistent with previous findings in 
disclosure studies such as the frequency of board meetings (Kent and Stewart, 2004) 
and liquidity (Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978). 
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10.2.1.4 Explanatory Variables and KPI Disclosures by Pooled Companies 
 
Table 29: Significance of Variables Across the Three Methods 
Variable KPISCORE WCOUNT COMP 
PNED Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
AUDSIZE Yes*** Yes** No 
BOARDM No No No 
FINEXP Yes** No Yes** 
BDSIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
DSHARE Yes** Yes*** Yes*** 
SIZE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
GEAR No Yes** Yes** 
PROF Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
LQDT Yes* No Yes*** 
MULTIN No No No 
LSTAT No Yes* No 
MLIST No Yes** Yes*** 
***. Significant at the 0.01 level 
**.  Significant at the 0.05 level 
*.  Significant at the 0.1 level 
 
In respect to the pooled set of companies, this group constitutes both private 
and public listed companies that disclosed KPIs in their annual reports.  The results 
reveal that corporate governance mechanisms (proportion of non-executive directors, 
board size and director share ownership) and company specific characteristics 
(company size and profitability) are significantly related to the disclosure extent and 
comprehensiveness of KPIs reported in the annual reports of this group of 
companies.  Board size for example, has been found by previous research to 
influence the extent of disclosures (for example Cornier et al., 2009) as well as 
director share ownership (for example Chau and Gray, 2002). 
 
10.3 Research Contributions 
This research makes several contributions to the area of disclosure studies in 
accounting research.  First, the research found that the extent of KPI disclosures 
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among private listed firms was approximately 51%.  Through a review of literature, 
the researcher did not identify any study that has specifically looked at KPI 
disclosures among large private firms hence this finding introduces fresh knowledge 
and evidence.  The low level of disclosures by private limited companies can be 
explained by the fact that private limited companies have a lower shareholder base 
compared to public listed firms.  It also then falls that their information disclosure is 
limited due to the limited audience.  The disclosure statistic for private limited firms 
is low and advances in regulation perhaps need to address this problem as discussed 
further under research implications. 
To add to this explanation, an observation made during the data collection 
stage is that majority of private limited companies are very secretive with 
information regarding their companies.  It was widely observed that majority of the 
companies are unaware that private limited company information is publicly 
available through the Companies House.  For this reason, it may also add to 
explanations of the low level of KPI disclosures among this group of companies.  
This research contributes by providing information on private limited companies.  
Research investigating private limited companies is scarce due to the difficulty and 
expense of acquiring the information from such. 
Second, this study provides a comparison between disclosure levels of private 
and public listed companies.  This study provides a direct comparison using a data 
set from a similar trading period.   From the study it was noted that approximately 
90% of public listed companies make at least a single KPI disclosure in their annual 
report.  This finding may be explained by the fact that large public listed companies 
have a huge shareholder base and these shareholders are keen on performance 
information.  This information also has an impact on share prices as suggested by 
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some event studies therefore it is a motivational factor for increased disclosures on 
the part of public listed companies.  The research therefore makes a contribution by 
highlighting the stark difference between KPI disclosure levels of private limited 
companies (51%) and public listed companies (89%). 
Third, this research makes a contribution by assessing the factors that influence 
private limited companies to disclose or not to disclose KPIs in their annual reports.  
This contribution is unique as once again the researcher has not identified a study 
that focuses on disclosures by private companies in the UK.  The findings indicated 
that audit committee size, the number of board meeting, the board size, director share 
ownership, company size, gearing, profitability and operations in geographical 
regions outside of Great Britain had a significant influence on whether private 
limited companies disclosed KPIs in their annual report or not. 
Fourth, once the researcher had identified those factors that influenced private 
limited companies to disclose KPIs in their annual reports. The study makes another 
contribution by investigating further for those companies that make any KPI 
disclosures in their annual reports.  The study, investigates the factors that influence 
the level of KPI disclosures among private limited companies.  It was found that both 
some corporate governance mechanisms (the proportion of non-executive directors 
and director share ownership) and some company specific characteristics (company 
size and profitability) had a significant influence on the level of KPI disclosures 
among private limited firms.  These variables had an influence across all three 
measures used in assessing KPI disclosures.  The three measures include KPI 
disclosure extent, word count and comprehensiveness.  The research makes further 
contributions by also providing a comparison of the factors that influence public 
listed companies and the pooled set of companies. 
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Fifth, this research makes some methodological contributions.  It is the first study 
to subdivide KPI disclosures into Presence, Word Count and Comprehensiveness.  
The manner in which KPIs are measured takes into account the traditional research 
index methodology.  This is the second study to measure KPI disclosures using the 
index research methodology after Tauringana and Mangena (Tauringana and 
Mangena, 2009).  The word count method is also used (Li et al., 2008b); this is the 
first of the ones identified studies to measure KPI word count.  These two measures 
are particularly instrumental in accounting for the extent of disclosures and to a 
certain level the quality.  The comprehensiveness method adopted, has not been 
previously used in measuring the quality of KPI disclosures.  This method takes into 
account not only the amount of KPIs disclosed but three other measures such as the 
relevant amounts for the identified KPIs, the reasons for the changes in the KPI 
measures over different periods and any forward looking information regarding the 
KPIs.  This method not only enables measurement of the extent of disclosures but the 
comprehensiveness of the disclosures by taking an aggregate of the different 
attributes of information included in the identified disclosures. 
Finally, the research has two implications in the research environment.  The first 
is that there are several studies that have investigated the extent of KPIs disclosure.  
However only one study has gone on to investigate the factors that influence the 
level of KPI disclosures (Tauringana and Mangena, 2009).  This study is the first to 
answer calls by Tauringana and Mangena with regard to the factors that influence the 
disclosure of KPIs.  The findings in this study are useful to future finance and 
accounting research concerning KPI disclosures in annual reports.  Secondly, 
disclosure literature (e.g., Beattie et al. 2004; Beattie and Thomson 2007; Kyeyune 
2010) recommend that disclosure extent measurement through content analysis ought 
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to be in-depth, considering repetitions, and where possible manual.  This is thought 
to assist them in capturing the context of disclosures that are made, for instance in 
this case, KPI comprehensiveness.  This research has adopted the recommendations 
and the results identify the comprehensiveness attributes of disclosures.  The 
evidence in this thesis may provide useful insights relevant to the direction of future 
disclosure extent and KPIs research. 
 
10.4 Research Implications 
There is a proliferation in the amount of disclosures in annual reports.  The fact that 
annual reports are becoming bigger over time has raised concerns amongst various 
stakeholders.  It is agreeable with the argument raised by Kyeyune (2010), that disclosure 
proliferation in annual reports may lead to a negative effect in the usefulness of the 
information disclosed (ASB., 2005, ASB., 2006).  First, this thesis was motivated by 
concerns raised about disclosure proliferation in financial reports and the likely negative 
effect on the usefulness of the information.  From a policy formulating perspective, the 
findings of this study will provide some evidence on how comprehensive KPI disclosures are 
among large companies operating in the UK.  The study also highlights those qualities that 
are influential for the disclosure of comprehensive KPI disclosures therefore this information 
may be instrumental to regulators when formulating policy that aims to encourage more 
comprehensive disclosures. 
Secondly, building on the point raised in the research contribution about this 
study revealing the differences in extent of disclosures between private and public 
company disclosures in the annual reports of large companies operating in the UK; 
approximately 51% of private companies disclose KPIs in their annual reports while 
90% of public listed companies disclose KPIs.  It is important at this juncture to 
highlight that the requirement by CA 2006 for companies to disclose KPIs in their 
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annual reports includes both private and public listed companies.  It is clear from the 
findings that this regulation does not have the same impact between the two groups 
concerned.  This study suggests that perhaps it would be necessary to tailor certain 
disclosure regulations depending on category in order to achieve the desired effect by 
the regulation.  By providing the factors that influence private and public listed 
companies to disclose KPIs, regulators may also have a greater awareness what are 
the characteristics of the companies that disclose KPIs thereby making it clear what 
are the characteristics of the companies that would require to be targeted in order to 
ensure that new disclosure regulations are effectively received. 
Third, the results suggest that there are systematic differences in the corporate 
reporting by large UK listed firms as supported by Kyeyune (2010). The existence of 
these systematic differences can be construed as the existence of equilibrium in the 
market for corporate disclosure (Wallace et al., 1994a). As seen from the results, 
larger companies provide more KPI disclosures than smaller companies.  The 
economic solution that allows large UK firms on the London Stock Exchange to 
provide more detail in their accounts than other firms may be considered undesirable 
in a country where there are more small firms.  Other authors (Foster, 1978) have 
recommended that regulation should intervene in such situations so that the anomaly 
may be corrected. 
Fourth, part of the overall results of this research revealed that listed 
companies revealed more KPI information than unlisted companies.  This finding of 
the listing status explanatory variable may imply that regulators require taking action 
in order to ensure that it becomes a mandatory measure for unlisted firms to disclose 
similar information to public listed companies.  Although it may be argued that 
public listed company shares are traded by the public hence the public are likely to 
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demand more information from them in their annual reports.  It may also be argued 
that private limited companies constitute approximately 97% of all businesses 
therefore private limited companies have a greater impact on the public.  For that 
reason both sets of companies have substantial information demand hence the 
requirement is binding to both private and public listed firms.  This adds to the 
argument posited for the extent of disclosure measured for private limited and public 
listed entities’ KPI disclosures.  It may be suggested that companies will not 
necessarily face any additional cost to ensure that they make increased disclosures 
because some private companies are already making these required KPI disclosures 
in their annual reports.  It will, however, be important that more research is 
undertaken to determine if there is need for more information by the users of the 
unlisted companies before such action is taken, this sentiment is also echoed by other 
recent studies (Kyeyune, 2010).  
The results of the study highlight that company size significantly explains the 
level of KPI disclosures in all three types of models for private, public and the 
pooled set of companies.  Due to this finding it may be recommended that authorities 
may take three courses of action.  The first being to have a two tier system that 
ensures that smaller companies provide sufficient disclosures as per a requirement 
that is tailored in such a way that they are not constrained.  The reporting 
requirements may thus be split depending on the size of the companies involved.  
The second recommendation may be to set a minimum level of KPI disclosures 
regardless of company size to ensure that some companies do not work around this 
requirement.  The third recommendation would be for authorities to ensure to 
provide or ensure that all companies concerned have the appropriate resources 
without placing marginal burdens in order to meet the legal reporting requirements.    
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10.5 Limitations of the Research 
The findings and conclusions to be drawn from this research must be 
interpreted in the light of the limitations of the study.  This study is based on 
disclosure investigations from annual reports.  It is important to bear in mind that 
there are many sources for financial disclosures.  Some of these sources include 
disclosures in interim reports, press releases and web based disclosures to mention a 
few.  The results of this study are restricted to the remits of annual report disclosures 
in annual reports only and therefore should not extrapolated to other forms of 
disclosures, and if this is done then precaution needs to be considered. 
The use of a voluntary disclosure index in this research has its limitations. The 
voluntary disclosure index was intended to capture the extent of disclosures but 
because there are so many items disclosed by the companies it was not possible to 
include every item disclosed by each company. This may have influenced the results. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, steps were taken to ensure and check whether 
the voluntary disclosure index was representative of the various disclosure items 
made by the different companies.  
 This research makes use of cross sectional data.  Although this data is useful 
and provides a lot of information with regards answering the research questions, the 
data set provides a snapshot when compared with panel data.  There were many 
complications in acquiring the data for this study particularly that relating to private 
limited companies where in some instances responses from the relevant companies 
had to be awaited upon.  In the case of the data that was readily available, it still took 
a lot of time to score the annual reports therefore it would have been impractical to 
use panel data. 
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There were a high number of models used in this study.  Measurement methods 
were constructed for KPISCORE, word count and comprehensiveness; these three 
models were then tailored and applied to private limited companies, public listed 
companies and the pooled set of companies.  Due to the high number of models 
applied, it was inevitable that some results would conflict and this made it difficult to 
interpret the few conflicting results.  There are also other variables that could have 
been tested for example industry, auditor size, role duality, family ownership etc.  
For practicality reasons the amount of variables were limited to the most popular 
ones based on previous research in this area.  Some of them such as auditor size were 
not included because the sample for this study is based on large companies.  Large 
companies on average tend to use the big four auditing firms therefore there would 
be very little variation which would not yield significant results in explaining KPI 
disclosures. 
Another limitation of the study is the lack of concentration on one user group. 
This could be remedied by ascertaining a specific user groups’ information values 
reflecting these in weightings of the items of disclosure in the model.  These values 
could have been investigated through means of a survey.  The process would have 
had two main disadvantages, firstly, it can be a time consuming process in which the 
response rate is not guaranteed.  Secondly, as argued in Chapter 3, information 
disclosed in annual reports is meant for many user groups and selection of certain 
items of information as being meant for a particular group may be subjective. 
The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008 is considered by many to be 
the worst since the Great Depression in the 1930’s.  The crisis which was triggered 
by a collapse in subprime mortgage lending resulted in the downfall of large 
financial institutions, some of which were bailed out by national governments for 
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example the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in the UK.  The crisis played a 
significant role in the decline and failure of key businesses leading to a global 
recession.  As the data used for this research was collected form 2008 annual reports, 
there is a high prospect that there are some anomalies due to the crisis.  The GFC 
would count as a limitation to this research particularly where results are compared 
with previous studies.  Secondly any generalisations would need to be handled with 
caution. 
 
10.6 Further Research 
This study has explored some new areas and these areas may warrant more 
research in order to build on the investigations and understanding.  Firstly, this 
research has made use of cross-sectional data; it may be useful if in the future there 
was an exploration using panel data perhaps covering periods since the introduction 
of the requirement by the CA 2006 to disclose KPIs through to the current trends.  
The variables used in this research therefore represent one period of time. To 
understand any phenomenon it may also be helpful if the investigation covered data 
observed over a longer period. 
KPIs are known to be company and industry specific.  Inclusion of industry 
variables would have resulted in too many variables therefore distorting the models.  
It is therefore in this context important in future research to investigate the influence 
of corporate governance mechanisms and company specific characteristics on the 
level of KPI disclosures within specific industry groupings.  This would best be done 
as a separate research focusing on the impact of industry on KPI disclosures.  This 
would help to ascertain whether some industries better adhere to KPI disclosure 
regulations and also the characteristics of the companies that are better or worse at 
362 
 
disclosing KPI information.  There is one identified study that has investigated the 
factors that influence the disclosure of KPIs in which the sample was based on the 
media industry (Tauringana and Mangena, 2009).  Further studies could consider 
measuring the quantity and comprehensiveness of disclosures within different 
industries, for example using the word count method and the comprehensiveness 
method such as the ones used in this study 
Due to the importance of KPIs and the push for centralised regulatory orders 
such as the EU directives on financial reporting, it may be interesting to extend the 
study to the European context.  This will not only provide details of how companies 
in different geographical regions adopt centralised regulation but will offer a direct 
comparison between different countries.  The differences between the level of 
disclosures in response to regulation and factors that influence the level of disclosure 
may enlighten about cultural differences in the business context, therefore lessons 
might be learnt on various dimensions. 
It is important to extend the investigation on the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms and company characteristics on disclosures not only in 
annual reports but other media such as the internet and interim reports.  The annual 
report is only one medium of communication, different stakeholders are 
progressively looking to other means in addition to become informed about their 
interests.   As a consequence of this situation, it can be beneficial for instance to 
investigate the usefulness of the annual report versus alternative media.  It will also 
be interesting to investigate whether similar properties that influence disclosures in 
annual reports are the ones that influence disclosures elsewhere for instance the 
company website.  This type of research would not only be executed in the UK but 
extended to an international context. 
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The current study takes a purely quantitative approach in the investigations 
conducted.  Through the use of comprehensiveness attributes for future research such 
as the use of interviews and questionnaires, then it would be useful to investigate the 
opinions and feelings of KPI users.  Such insights would provide direct knowledge 
from the users of the information as opposed to highlighting the importance of KPIs 
from the regulators’ and management perspectives. 
Finally, there has been great deliberation among standard setters and regulators 
over the root causes of the GFC.  It has been suggested that inaccurate accounting 
standards may be a contributing factor.  Since 2008 many important standards have 
been and are in development through the joint work of the FASB and IASB 
particularly around fair value accounting (FVA).  This situation may have led to 
stronger disclosure regulations.  In addition, the legitimacy theory suggests that 
corporate disclosures react to economic, social and political factors and therefore 
assist in explaining the motivations for disclosures.  Large companies such as the 
ones investigated in this study are likely to increase the level of disclosure as a means 
of self-regulation to avoid summoning by accounting bodies which may be 
restrictive.  As a point of future research, annual reports from 2011/12 will be 
analysed to find out whether the results yielded are similar or significantly different.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Reliability Data for Private Limited Companies 
1. New Look  2. PA Consulting Group 
Variable NL2008A NL2008B    Variable PA2008A PA2008B   
                 
KPISCORE 0.06202 0.06    KPISCORE 0.00000 0   
WCOUNT 0.01127 0.01    WCOUNT 0.00000 0   
COMP 0.82 0.8    COMP 0.00 0   
PNED 0.6250 0.6    PNED 0.3750 0.38   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 4 4   
BOARDM 6 6    BOARDM 9 9   
FINEXP 0.6250 0.63    FINEXP 0.6250 0.6   
BDSIZE 8 8    BDSIZE 8 8   
DSHARE 0.0005576 0.0006    DSHARE 0.1580745 0.16   
COSIZE 1283100 1283000    COSIZE 426681 426680   
GEAR 0.5814 0.6    GEAR 0.5656 0.6   
PROF 0.0000 0    PROF 0.1337 0.1   
LQDT 0.650 0.7    LQDT 2.520 2.5   
MULTIN 1 1    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0 0   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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3. Spire Healthcare  4. John Laing 
Variable SH2008A SH2008B    Variable JL2008A JL2008B   
                 
KPISCORE 0.09009 0.09    KPISCORE 0.00000 0   
WCOUNT 0.02411 0.02    WCOUNT 0.00000 0   
COMP 1.00 1    COMP 0.00 0   
PNED 0.3333 0.3    PNED 0.4286 0.4   
AUDSIZE 5 5    AUDSIZE 3 3   
BOARDM 8 8    BOARDM 10 10   
FINEXP 0.5833 0.6    FINEXP 0.4286 0.4   
BDSIZE 12 12    BDSIZE 7 7   
DSHARE 0.0387400 0.04    DSHARE 0.0894750 0.09   
COSIZE 1511622 1511600    COSIZE 1902800 1902800   
GEAR 0.0069 0.007    GEAR 3.2702 3.3   
PROF 0.2416 0.2    PROF 0.0000 0   
LQDT 12.790 12.8    LQDT 2.990 3   
MULTIN 0 0    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0 0   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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5. Anglian Water  6. Unipart Group 
Variable AW2008A AW2008B    Variable UG2008A UGS2008B   
                 
KPISCORE 0.06667 0.067    KPISCORE 0.04918 0.05   
WCOUNT 0.00967 0.01    WCOUNT 0.02657 0.03   
COMP 0.54 0.5    COMP 0.72 0.7   
PNED 0.2500 0.3    PNED 0.5000 0.5   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 4 4   
BOARDM 7 7    BOARDM 6 6   
FINEXP 0.6667 0.7    FINEXP 0.6250 0.6   
BDSIZE 12 12    BDSIZE 8 8   
DSHARE 0.0000000 0    DSHARE 0.0500600 0.05   
COSIZE 6939000 6939000    COSIZE 427800 427800   
GEAR 3.4867 3.5    GEAR 0.4515 0.5   
PROF 0.3184 0.3    PROF 0.0179 0.02   
LQDT 1.380 1.4    LQDT 0.870 0.9   
MULTIN 0 0    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0 0   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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7. Associated British Ports  8. Halcrow Holdings Limited 
Variable AB2008A AB2008B    Variable HHS2008A HH2008B   
                 
KPISCORE 0.07273 0.07    KPISCORE 0.00000 0   
WCOUNT 0.01839 0.02    WCOUNT 0.00000 0   
COMP 0.65 0.7    COMP 0.00 0   
PNED 0.6364 0.6    PNED 0.3333 0.3   
AUDSIZE 4 4    AUDSIZE 4 4   
BOARDM 8 8    BOARDM 6 6   
FINEXP 0.5455 0.5    FINEXP 0.5556 0.6   
BDSIZE 11 11    BDSIZE 9 9   
DSHARE 0.0000000 0    DSHARE 0.0192408 0.02   
COSIZE 8.151E+09 8151000000    COSIZE 211135 211135   
GEAR 0.3598 0.4    GEAR 4.4091 4.4   
PROF 0.4823 0.5    PROF 0.0265 0.03   
LQDT 0.940 0.9    LQDT 1.380 1.4   
MULTIN 1 1    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0 0   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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9. Kwik Fit  10. C&J Clarke 
Variable KF2008A KF2008B    Variable CJ2008A CJ2008B   
                 
KPISCORE 0.06299 0.06    KPISCORE 0.06202 0.06   
WCOUNT 0.02569 0.03    WCOUNT 0.01931 0.02   
COMP 0.52 0.5    COMP 0.80 0.8   
PNED 0.5714 0.6    PNED 0.6667 0.7   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 3 3   
BOARDM 8 8    BOARDM 6 6   
FINEXP 0.2857 0.3    FINEXP 0.1667 0.2   
BDSIZE 7 7    BDSIZE 6 6   
DSHARE 0.0000000 0    DSHARE 0.4228490 0.4   
COSIZE 970300 970300    COSIZE 586900 586900   
GEAR 0.3459 0.35    GEAR 0.8076 0.8   
PROF 0.2151 0.2    PROF 0.0774 0.08   
LQDT 1.630 1.6    LQDT 0.880 0.9   
MULTIN 1 1    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0 0   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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11. Monsoon Limited  12. Barchester Healthcare Limited 
Variable ML2008A ML2008B    Variable BH2008A BH2008B   
                 
KPISCORE 0.00000 0    KPISCORE 0.00000 0   
WCOUNT 0.00000 0    WCOUNT 0.00000 0   
COMP 0.00 0    COMP 0.00 0   
PNED 0.4444 0.4    PNED 0.1667 0.2   
AUDSIZE 5 5    AUDSIZE 3 3   
BOARDM 9 9    BOARDM 6 6   
FINEXP 0.3333 0.3    FINEXP 0.1667 0.2   
BDSIZE 9 9    BDSIZE 6 6   
DSHARE 0.0120387 0.01    DSHARE 0.1133866 0.1   
COSIZE 305828 305830    COSIZE 439492 439500   
GEAR 0.0623 0.06    GEAR 1.3498 1.3   
PROF 0.0845 0.08    PROF 0.0313 0.03   
LQDT 1.090 1.1    LQDT 1.100 1.1   
MULTIN 0 0    MULTIN 0 0   
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0 0   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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13. Virgin Atlantic  14. Shop Direct Group 
Variable VA2008A VA2008B    Variable SD2008A   SD2008C 
                 
KPISCORE 0.00000 0    KPISCORE 0.00000   0 
WCOUNT 0.00000 0    WCOUNT 0.00000   0 
COMP 0.00 0    COMP 0.00   0 
PNED 0.4286 0.4    PNED 0.2000   0.2 
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 3   3 
BOARDM 9 9    BOARDM 12   12 
FINEXP 0.4286 0.4    FINEXP 0.0000   0 
BDSIZE 7 7    BDSIZE 5   5 
DSHARE 0.0044657 0.004    DSHARE 0.0046000   0.0046 
COSIZE 1383300 1383300    COSIZE 2353900   2354000 
GEAR 0.5521 0.6    GEAR 0.4442   0.44 
PROF -0.0148 -0.015    PROF 0.0142   0.014 
LQDT 1.150 1.2    LQDT 0.920   0.92 
MULTIN 1 1    MULTIN 1   1 
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0   0 
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0   0 
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15. Wilkinson  16. Martin McColl 
Variable WK2008A   WK2008C  Variable MM2008A   MM2008C 
                 
KPISCORE 0.07874   0.079  KPISCORE 0.00000   0 
WCOUNT 0.09159   0.092  WCOUNT 0.00000   0 
COMP 0.44   0.44  COMP 0.00   0 
PNED 0.6000   0.6  PNED 0.2222   0.22 
AUDSIZE 4   4  AUDSIZE 4   4 
BOARDM 9   9  BOARDM 11   11 
FINEXP 0.3000   0.3  FINEXP 0.3333   0.33 
BDSIZE 10   10  BDSIZE 9   9 
DSHARE 0.0556730   0.056  DSHARE 0.5214680   0.521 
COSIZE 370779   370800  COSIZE 278121   278000 
GEAR 0.0634   0.0634  GEAR 7.8015   7.8 
PROF -0.0578   -0.058  PROF 0.0580   0.058 
LQDT 0.160   0.16  LQDT 0.330   0.33 
MULTIN 0   0  MULTIN 0   0 
LSTAT 0   0  LSTAT 0   0 
MLIST 0   0  MLIST 0   0 
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17. Aston Martin  18. Bargain Booze 
Variable AM2008A   AM2008C  Variable BB2008A BB2008C   
                 
KPISCORE 0.00000   0  KPISCORE 0.03937 0.04   
WCOUNT 0.00000   0  WCOUNT 0.00858 0.009   
COMP 0.00   0  COMP 0.78 0.8   
PNED 0.6667   0.67  PNED 0.2222 0.2   
AUDSIZE 3   3  AUDSIZE 4 4   
BOARDM 8   8  BOARDM 9 9   
FINEXP 0.6667   0.67  FINEXP 0.3333 0.3   
BDSIZE 6   6  BDSIZE 9 9   
DSHARE 0.8169172   0.817  DSHARE 0.6215400 0.6   
COSIZE 767716   767716  COSIZE 104504 104500   
GEAR 0.6945   0.69  GEAR 1.3911 1.4   
PROF 0.0660   0.066  PROF 0.0016 0.002   
LQDT 0.430   0.43  LQDT 1.110 1.1   
MULTIN 0   0  MULTIN 0 0   
LSTAT 0   0  LSTAT 0 0   
MLIST 0   0  MLIST 0 0   
 
402 
 
 
19. Manchester United  20. Stewart Milne 
Variable MU2008A MU2008C    Variable SM2008A   SM2008C 
                 
KPISCORE 0.03509 0.04    KPISCORE 0.00000   0 
WCOUNT 0.00798 0.008    WCOUNT 0.00000   0 
COMP 1.00 1    COMP 0.00   0 
PNED 0.0000 0    PNED 0.7143   0.71 
AUDSIZE 6 6    AUDSIZE 3   3 
BOARDM 9 9    BOARDM 7   7 
FINEXP 0.3000 0.3    FINEXP 0.4286   0.429 
BDSIZE 10 10    BDSIZE 7   7 
DSHARE 0.0120387 0.01    DSHARE 0.9542100   0.954 
COSIZE 446688 446700    COSIZE 538663   538700 
GEAR 0.3104 0.3    GEAR 0.5946   0.595 
PROF 0.0068 0.007    PROF 0.0017   0.0017 
LQDT 2.740 2.7    LQDT 0.670   0.67 
MULTIN 0 0    MULTIN 0   0 
LSTAT 0 0    LSTAT 0   0 
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0   0 
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Appendix 2: Reliability Data for Public Listed Companies 
1. Misys  2. Babcock International Group 
Variable MS2008A   MS2008C  Variable BI2008A   BI2008C 
                 
KPISCORE 0.02326   0.025  KPISCORE 0.06612   0.066 
WCOUNT 0.003212731   0.003051  WCOUNT 0.0275288   0.028 
COMP 0.36   0.32  COMP 0.6   0.6 
PNED 0.71428   0.7143  PNED 0.75   0.75 
AUDSIZE 3   3  AUDSIZE 3   3 
BOARDM 12   12  BOARDM 9   9 
FINEXP 0.428571   0.429  FINEXP 0.25   0.25 
BDSIZE 7   7  BDSIZE 8   8 
DSHARE 0.00856095   0.006235  DSHARE 0.0030794   0.0031 
COSIZE 349905.6   35000  COSIZE 1466146   1470000 
GEAR 0.2771   0.28  GEAR 1.6769   1.68 
PROF 0.0993   0.0857  PROF 0.0544   0.054 
LQDT 0.74   0.733  LQDT 0.85   0.85 
MULTIN 1   1  MULTIN 1   1 
LSTAT 1   1  LSTAT 1   1 
MLIST 1   1  MLIST 1   1 
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3. British Petroleum  4. Cable and Wireless 
Variable BP2008A   BP2008C  Variable CW2008A   CW2008C 
                 
KPISCORE 0.11207   0.112  KPISCORE 0.02273   0.023 
WCOUNT 0.00726025   0.0073  WCOUNT 0.008712488   0.0087 
COMP 0.5   0.5  COMP 0.77   0.77 
PNED 0.642857   0.643  PNED 0.636363636   0.64 
AUDSIZE 4   4  AUDSIZE 5   5 
BOARDM 9   9  BOARDM 8   8 
FINEXP 0.428571   0.43  FINEXP 0.36363636   0.36 
BDSIZE 14   14  BDSIZE 11   11 
DSHARE 0.00056761   0.00057  DSHARE 0.00158695   0.0016 
COSIZE 130874.4   130900  COSIZE 2711.2   2700 
GEAR 0.8786   0.88  GEAR -0.042   -0.042 
PROF 0.0934   0.093  PROF 0.4194   0.419 
LQDT 0.71   71  LQDT 0.84   0.84 
MULTIN 1   1  MULTIN 1   1 
LSTAT 1   1  LSTAT 1   1 
MLIST 1   1  MLIST 1   1 
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5. G4S  6. Smith and Nephew 
Variable GS2008A   GS2008C  Variable SN2008A   SN2008C 
                 
KPISCORE 0.02479   0.0248  KPISCORE 0.02941   0.029 
WCOUNT 0.00783579   0.0078  WCOUNT 0.01144569   0.0114 
COMP 0.85   0.85  COMP 0.75   0.75 
PNED 0.44444   0.4  PNED 0.75   0.75 
AUDSIZE 3   3  AUDSIZE 4   4 
BOARDM 8   8  BOARDM 8   8 
FINEXP 0.333333   0.33  FINEXP 0.4166666   0.417 
BDSIZE 9   9  BDSIZE 12   12 
DSHARE 0.00454389   0.0045  DSHARE 0.00080652   0.00081 
COSIZE 5576700   5577000  COSIZE 341121.6   341121 
GEAR 1.4498   1.45  GEAR 0.34221   0.342 
PROF 0.0445   0.0445  PROF 0.143   0.143 
LQDT 1.23   1.23  LQDT 0.84   0.84 
MULTIN 1   1  MULTIN 1   1 
LSTAT 1   1  LSTAT 1   1 
MLIST 1   1  MLIST 1   1 
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7. InterContinetalHotels Group  8. Michael Page 
Variable IC2008A   IC2008C  Variable MP2008A MP2008D   
                 
KPISCORE 0.04464   0.0446  KPISCORE 0.04132 0.04   
WCOUNT 0.0121097   0.01211  WCOUNT 0.0027557 0.003   
COMP 0.85   0.85  COMP 0.66 0.7   
PNED 0.6666667   0.67  PNED 0.5714286 0.6   
AUDSIZE 4   4  AUDSIZE 4 4   
BOARDM 8   8  BOARDM 6 6   
FINEXP 0.444444   0.44  FINEXP 0.428571 0.43   
BDSIZE 9   9  BDSIZE 7 7   
DSHARE 0.0018876   0.00189  DSHARE 0.0032149 0.003   
COSIZE 2123000   2123000  COSIZE 427554 428000   
GEAR 25.1957   25.2  GEAR 0.3082 0.3   
PROF 0.1594   0.16  PROF 0.1440 0.14   
LQDT 0.47   0.47  LQDT 1.71 1.7   
MULTIN 1   1  MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 1   1  LSTAT 1 1   
MLIST 0   0  MLIST 1 1   
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9. Persimmon  10. Reed Elsevier 
Variable PM2008A PM2008D    Variable RE2008A RE2008D   
                 
KPISCORE 0.05844 0.06    KPISCORE 0.16814 0.17   
WCOUNT 0.005882043 0.006    WCOUNT 0.007849426 0.008   
COMP 0.5 0.5    COMP 0.92 0.9   
PNED 0.6 0.6    PNED 0.5 0.5   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 3 3   
BOARDM 10 10    BOARDM 6 6   
FINEXP 0.2 0.2    FINEXP 0.333333333 0.3   
BDSIZE 10 10    BDSIZE 12 12   
DSHARE 0.002229007 0.002    DSHARE 0.00113977 0.001   
COSIZE 3153900 3154000    COSIZE 12714000 12714000   
GEAR 0.6254 0.6    GEAR 8.2294 8.2   
PROF -0.4389 -0.4    PROF 0.1153 0.1   
LQDT 0.21 0.2    LQDT 0.53 0.5   
MULTIN 0 0    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 1 1    LSTAT 1 1   
MLIST 1 1    MLIST 1 1   
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11. JD Wetherspoon  12. Royal Dutch Shell 
Variable JD2008A JD2008D    Variable RD2008A RD2008D   
                 
KPISCORE 0.13636 0.14    KPISCORE 0.068965517 0.07   
WCOUNT 0.00698603 0.007    WCOUNT 0.009253335 0.009   
COMP 0.5 0.5    COMP 0.84 0.8   
PNED 0.4 0.4    PNED 0.64286 0.6   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 3 3   
BOARDM 8 8    BOARDM 10 10   
FINEXP 0.1 0.1    FINEXP 0.5454545 0.5   
BDSIZE 10 10    BDSIZE 14 14   
DSHARE 0.06814859 0.07    DSHARE 2.594E-05 0.00003   
COSIZE 850947 850947    COSIZE 190446000 190450000   
GEAR 3.0162 3    GEAR 0.3981 0.4   
PROF 0.0597 0.06    PROF 0.1091 0.12   
LQDT 0.24 0.2    LQDT 0.92 0.9   
MULTIN 0 0    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 1 1    LSTAT 1 1   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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13. Rentokil Initial  14. Ladbrokes 
Variable RI2008A RI2008D    Variable LB2008A LB2008D   
                 
KPISCORE 0.14876033 0.15    KPISCORE 0.044247788 0.04   
WCOUNT 0.0089333 0.009    WCOUNT 0.010480379 0.01   
COMP 0.93 0.9    COMP 0.65 0.7   
PNED 0.555556 0.6    PNED 0.857 0.9   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 3 3   
BOARDM 7 7    BOARDM 9 9   
FINEXP 0.555556 0.6    FINEXP 0.57142 0.6   
BDSIZE 9 9    BDSIZE 7 7   
DSHARE 0.000998 0.001    DSHARE 0 0   
COSIZE 2242500 2242500    COSIZE 1274100 1274100   
GEAR 2.2951 2.3    GEAR 0.9277 0.9   
PROF 0.0095 0.01    PROF 0.2131 0.2   
LQDT 0.76 0.8    LQDT 0.32 0.3   
MULTIN 1 0    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 1 1    LSTAT 1 1   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 1 1   
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15. Chloride Group  16. Dairy Crest Group 
Variable CG2008A CG2008D    Variable DC2008A DC2008D   
                 
KPISCORE 0.036764706 0.04    KPISCORE 0 0   
WCOUNT 0.004934855 0.005    WCOUNT 0 0   
COMP 0.64 0.6    COMP 0 0   
PNED 0.666667 0.7    PNED 0.6 0.6   
AUDSIZE 4 4    AUDSIZE 4 4   
BOARDM 9 9    BOARDM 10 10   
FINEXP 0.3333333 0.3    FINEXP 0.3 0.3   
BDSIZE 6 6    BDSIZE 10 10   
DSHARE 0.022757 0.02    DSHARE 0 0   
COSIZE 247473 247500    COSIZE 1205000 1205000   
GEAR 0.609 0.6    GEAR 1.489 1.5   
PROF 0.117 0.1    PROF 0.0417 0.042   
LQDT 1.04 1    LQDT 0.85 0.9   
MULTIN 0 0    MULTIN 0 0   
LSTAT 1 1    LSTAT 1 1   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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17. Millennium and Copthorne Hotel  18. Domino's Pizza 
Variable MC2008A MC2008D    Variable DP2008A DP2008D   
                 
KPISCORE 0 0    KPISCORE 0.05970149 0.06   
WCOUNT 0 0    WCOUNT 0.01705191 0.02   
COMP 0 0    COMP 0.76 0.8   
PNED 0.8333333 0.8    PNED 0.666667 0.7   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 4 4   
BOARDM 11 11    BOARDM 9 9   
FINEXP 0.5 0.5    FINEXP 0.3333333 0.3   
BDSIZE 6 6    BDSIZE 9 9   
DSHARE 0 0    DSHARE 0.002276 0.002   
COSIZE 2932600 2932600    COSIZE 64180 64180   
GEAR 0.9937 1    GEAR 2.2045 2.2   
PROF 0.0392 0.04    PROF 0.1627 0.16   
LQDT 1.12 1.1    LQDT 1.18 1.2   
MULTIN 1 0    MULTIN 0 0   
LSTAT 1 1    LSTAT 1 1   
MLIST 0 0    MLIST 0 0   
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19. Debenhams  20. Paypoint 
Variable DB2008A DB2008D    Variable PP2008A PP2008D   
                 
KPISCORE 0.022058824 0.02    KPISCORE 0.04958678 0.05   
WCOUNT 0.005629881 0.006    WCOUNT 0.01651194 0.02   
COMP 0.78 0.8    COMP 0.89 0.9   
PNED 0.75 0.8    PNED 0.6666667 0.7   
AUDSIZE 3 3    AUDSIZE 3 3   
BOARDM 6 6    BOARDM 9 9   
FINEXP 0.5 0.5    FINEXP 0.5 0.5   
BDSIZE 8 8    BDSIZE 6 6   
DSHARE 0 0    DSHARE 0 0   
COSIZE 1959300 1959300    COSIZE 102492 102492   
GEAR 1.2838 1.3    GEAR 0.0082 0.008   
PROF 0.0576 0.06    PROF 0.1433 0.14   
LQDT 0.17 0.2    LQDT 1.07 1.1   
MULTIN 1 1    MULTIN 1 1   
LSTAT 1 1    LSTAT 1 1   
MLIST 1 1    MLIST 1 1   
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Appendix 3: Logistic Regression Results (KPI) 
The following model was used in the computation of the logistic regression: 
 
KPI = 0 + 1 PNED + 2 AUDSIZE + 3 BDMEET + 4 FINEXP + 5 BDSIZE + 6 
DSHARE + 7 COSIZE + 8 GEAR + 9 PROF + 10 LQDT + 11 MULTIN + j 
 
Variable explanations are provided in Table 24.  The results are as follows:   
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Table 30: Logistic Regression Results 
Variables B S.E. Wald df Sig. 
PNED -2.699 1.141 5.595 1 .018 
AUDSIZE -.652 .250 6.795 1 .009 
BDMEET .412 .101 16.716 1 .000 
FINEXP .357 1.086 .108 1 .742 
BDSIZE .454 .123 13.646 1 .000 
DSHARE 9.866 1.658 35.402 1 .000 
COSIZE .043 .017 6.614 1 .010 
GEAR 1.001 .232 18.645 1 .000 
PROF 13.354 3.229 17.107 1 .000 
LQDT -.054 .284 .036 1 .850 
MULTIN 1.099 .497 4.885 1 .027 
Constant -7.642 1.528 25.013 1 .000 
            
       Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Test 
 Cox & Snell R 
Square 
.534  Chi-square 10.170 
 Nagelkerke R Square .711  df 8 
 -2 Log likelihood 127.830
a
   Sig. .253 
 
From the results presented in Table 30, it can be seen that the Cox & Snell 
and Nagelkerke R Square are 51.3% and 71.1% respectively.  The coefficients results 
reveal that COSIZE and MULTIN have a positive significant relationship with KPI 
disclosures at the 95% level of confidence.  BMEET, BDSIZE, GEAR and PROF 
were found to have a positive significant relationship with KPI disclosures at the 
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99% level of confidence.  PNED and AUDSIZE were found to have a significant but 
negative relationship with KPI disclosures. 
COSIZE may be suggested to have a relationship with KPI disclosures since 
larger companies are in the public limelight and this could be a reason why such 
entities may wish to disclose KPI information as a self-governance mechanism and 
in the long run avoiding stringent regulations and regulatory restrictions being placed 
upon them (Al-Khadash and Abhath Al-Yarmouk, 2003).  BDSIZE was also found 
to have a significant positive relationship with the disclosure of KPIs, this finding 
may be partly explained by the fact that companies with larger boards will possibly 
have the human capacity to have specialists in specific areas of the business therefore 
encouraging closer monitoring of performance and reporting of the critical success 
factors of the particular business entity. 
Gearing was found to have a positive significant relationship with the 
disclosure of KPIs, this finding may be a consequence of the fact that although 
private companies are thought to have smaller investor base.  These individuals 
and/or corporations will be concerned by high gearing therefore in a bid to retain 
investors, such companies will make efforts to disclose performance updates to retain 
investors as well as attract potential investors.  In some cases it has been found that 
high gearing among businesses is partly a result of future business prospects.  Where 
an investment opportunity has been identified, then companies will wish to secure 
funding so as to take advantage of the investment opportunity which would hopefully 
pay dividend in the future but the initial investment outlay having been brought about 
by leveraging. 
According to the findings, it was revealed that companies that are more 
profitable tend to disclose KPIs while companies that are least profitable disclose 
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minimal or no KPIs at all.  A positive significant relationship was identified between 
KPI disclosures and profitability.  When private companies perform well, they are 
more likely to report as much of this good news for several reasons, such as 
strengthening relationships with suppliers through a strong display of going concern.  
Private companies seldom disclose profitability information for the purpose of 
securing further investment as is the case with public listed companies.  This is 
mainly to do with the fact that their stocks are not tradable therefore they do not have 
an extra drive to reveal their superior financial performance.  From the results of the 
logistic regression it was also noted that there is a positive significant relationship 
between multinationality and KPI disclosures.  As can be expected, companies that 
operate over larger geographical regions have the incentive of reporting more KPIs 
to secure investment and reassure those investors of the firm’s going concerns among 
other reasons.  Larger geographical expanses are also likely to entail that companies 
affected are subjected to specific restrictions for the region in which they operate, for 
instance the requirement to disclose KPI by the CA 2006 in the UK. 
The number of board meeting held within the trading period under scrutiny 
was found to be positively and significantly related to whether a company discloses 
KPIs or not.  Companies that have more frequent board meetings are thought to have 
more opportunities to iron out any existing or potential problems within the relevant 
company.  Private companies have a narrow shareholder base and these shareholders 
have significantly larger holdings than shareholders in public listed companies where 
the shares are traded publicly.  as a consequence of private limited companies having 
fewer and higher stake shareholders, these individual or institutions are likely to 
demand more information from the management particularly relating to deliberations 
from board meetings.  It may also be suggested that more frequent meetings allow 
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for better communication among the board, better efficiency and thorough resolving 
and follow up of problematic matters within the company.  This information is a 
great interest to private company stakeholders as they have higher stakes so demand 
more detailed disclosures. 
The proportion of non-executive directors was found to be negatively 
significantly related to whether a company discloses KPIs or not.  Due to private 
ownership and control structure, the appointment of non-executive directors by 
private limited companies is likely to be influenced by the close relationship between 
managers and the prospective non-executive directors.  Chen and Jaggi (2000) 
suggest that where there is a close relationship between management and the non-
executive directors, the non-executive directors are likely to support the policies and 
philosophies of the management.  The results suggest that in the case of private 
limited companies, there is a compromise of control where non-executive directors 
are appointed.  It may further be suggested that non-executive directors are less 
effective when operating in private limited companies. 
The size of the audit committee was also found to have a negative significant 
relationship with whether private firms disclose KPIs or not.   This is not an unusual 
finding since audit committees mainly consist of non-executive directors (see for 
example Ho and Wong, 2001c p.144).  The results of the study suggest that the 
establishment of an audit committee within private limited companies is not 
necessarily an effective measure of attenuating agency costs. 
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Appendix 4: Private Companies Sample Normality Checks, P-P Plots and Scatter 
Plots 
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KPIscore Normal P-P Plot 
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KPIscore Scatterplot 
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WCOUNT Normality Check 
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WCOUNT Normal P-P Plot 
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WCOUNT Scatterplot 
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COMP Normality Check 
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COMP Normal P-P Plot 
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Appendix 5: Public Companies Sample Normality Checks, Scatter Plots & P-P Plots 
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COMP Scatterplot 
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KPISCORE Normal P-P Plot 
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KPISCORE Scatter Plot 
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WCOUNT Normal P-P Plot 
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WCOUNT Scatter Plot 
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COMP Normality Check 
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COMP Normal P-P Plot 
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Appendix 6: Pooled Companies Sample Normality Checks, P-P Plots and 
Scatter Plots 
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KPISCORE Normal P-P Plot 
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KPISCORE Scatterplot 
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WCOUNT Normal P-P Plot 
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WCOUNT Scatter Plot 
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COMP Normality Check 
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